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Severability and the Realignment of the
Balance of Power Over the Public
Lands: The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 After
the Legislative Veto Decisions
By ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN*
For much of this century, the President and Congress have engaged
in a series of struggles involving the scope of authority of the executive
and legislative branches of government. These struggles have encom-
passed the President's power to remove from office executive officials and
administrative agency appointees,1 to take possession of and operate an
industry deemed indispensable to the national security without congres-
sional authorization, 2 and to impound funds appropriated by Congress.
3
One of the longest-running disputes between the two branches stems
from the use of the legislative veto.4 The legislative veto reserves to Con-
gress the power to overturn, without presidential participation, executive
action that Congress deems inconsistent with the policies reflected in the
initial statutory delegation. Congress has incorporated this mechanism
for controlling executive branch discretion into nearly two hundred stat-
utes since the 1930's. 5
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B., 1973, Union College; M.A.,
1974, Harvard University; J.D., 1977, Cornell University.
I would like to thank my colleagues, Francis H. Heller, George Cameron Coggins, Sidney
A. Shapiro, and Robert H. Jerry, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2
U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982).
4. As used in this Article, the term "legislative veto" or "congressional veto" refers to
action by the entire Congress or some part thereof that (1) reverses an action taken by the
executive branch or prevents such action from becoming effective, and (2) does not take the
form of enactment of legislation by both houses of Congress followed by presentment of such
legislation to the President for his approval. Cf. Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72
GEo. L.J. 785, 785-86 (1984).
5. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983).
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The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19766 (FLPMA)
is a good example of the manner in which Congress has resorted to the
legislative veto to control executive branch discretion. Congress enacted
FLPMA after more than half a century of controversy concerning the
scope of presidential and legislative authority over the public lands.
7
One particularly contentious issue involved the executive power to with-
draw lands from certain types of uses without express congressional au-
thorization. 8 In the 1976 Act, Congress tried to settle such controversies
by precisely delineating the roles of the executive and the legislative
branches in managing the public lands. FLPMA contains a comprehen-
sive set of guidelines for the management of federally owned lands under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) of the De-
partment of the Interior. The Act grants various powers to the Secretary
of the Interior, including the authority to make withdrawals and sales of
the public lands,9 but limits that authority in two ways. First, the Secre-
tary can act only in accordance with detailed substantive criteria enunci-
ated by Congress.' 0 Second, Congress retains the power to overturn
particular actions of the Secretary through the exercise of a legislative
veto. " In this manner, Congress has attempted to avoid the burdensome
task of making all decisions on matters concerning the public lands,
while reasserting its proprietary authority over the public lands and
wresting ultimate control over public lands policy-making from the
hands of the executive branch.
This delicate balance of power over the public lands may have been
upset by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha.12 In Chadha, the Court held that a one-
house legislative veto provision in section 244 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act' 3 violated the constitutional requirements that all legis-
lation be adopted by both houses of Congress and be presented for presi-
dential ratification. 14 As two Justices noted in Chadha, the Court's
analysis casts doubt on the validity of all legislative veto provisions.
15
6. Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1784 (1982)).
7. See infra notes 47-100 & accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 71-100 & accompanying text.
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713-1714 (1982).
10. Id. §§ 1712(c), 1713(a).
11. Id. §§ 1712(e), 1713(c), 1714(c), 1714(e), 1714(l)(2).
12. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
15. Id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2792, 2796 (White, J., dissenting); see
EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Precluding resort to this mechanism for congressional oversight can
have serious consequences. This can be illustrated by considering the
effect that Chadha would have if applied to invalidate the legislative veto
provisions of FLPMA. Congress' principal means of limiting executive
discretion in managing the public lands would be eliminated. In enacting
FLPMA, Congress sought to assume the dominant role in public lands
policy-making and to confine the executive role to the implementation of
congressionally declared policy. 16 Congress relied, at least in part, on the
legislative veto provisions of the statute to accomplish these objectives. If
Chadha invalidates those provisions, the allocation of power between the
two branches of government could differ dramatically from what Con-
gress intended when the statute was enacted.
17
This Article considers whether it is possible to avoid or to minimize
the reallocation of power over public lands management which could re-
sult from the invalidation of FLPMA's legislative veto provisions. Part I
of the Article describes the background and structure of FLPMA.18 Part
II analyzes the decision of the Supreme Court in Chadha, as well as two
lower court decisions invalidating provisions authorizing the legislative
veto of agency rules.19 Part III addresses the question whether the
FLPMA vetoes can be distinguished from those invalidated in Chadha
and other legislative veto decisions.20 In particular, that section consid-
ers whether Congress can exercise its power under the property clause of
the Constitution2' without complying with the requirements of bicameral
action and presidential presentment applicable to legislative action under
article I. Part IV considers whether, if the FLPMA veto provisions are
not distinguishable, the provisions are severable from the remainder of
the statute. The Article then considers several approaches to severability
and analyzes how the statute that results from application of each ap-
proach would differ from the one Congress intended to enact.
The Article concludes that the FLPMA veto provisions, presumably
like similar provisions in other statutes, are subject to the same constitu-
tional infirmities as the provisions struck down in Chadha. Each of the
legislative veto provisions in FLPMA authorizes congressional action
that is "legislative in . . .character and effect,"'2 2 and therefore subject
16. See infra notes 414-28 & accompanying text.
17. Recent clashes between Congress and the Secretary of the Interior have resulted in
exercise of legislative veto provisions. See infra notes 276-309 & accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 23-100 & accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 101-210 & accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 211-377 & accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
22. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
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to article I procedural requirements. Although Congress has broad pro-
prietary power over the public lands under the property clause, congres-
sional implementation of that power is probably subject to the procedural
constraints applicable to Congress' article I powers. Because the
FLPMA vetoes do not comply with those procedures, they are probably
unconstitutional. On the question of severability, which arises whenever
legislative veto provisions are found to be unconstitutional, the Article
concludes that the legislative veto provisions in FLPMA are severable
from the rest of the Act. Several approaches to severance are available,
none of which would result in a division of authority over the public
lands that is fully consistent with the allocation Congress intended when
it enacted FLPMA. A court that severs the veto provisions of FLPMA
or any other statute, however, can and should attempt to minimize the
effect of severance on the achievement of congressional objectives.
An Overview of FLPMA
The Authority of the Secretary of the Interior under FLPMA23
Congress enacted FLPMA in 197624 to provide the BLM for the
first time with permanent, comprehensive statutory guidelines for ad-
ministering the public lands2 5 under its control. 26 Title III of the Act
23. The BLM of the Department of the Interior is responsible for administering more of
the public lands (nearly 350 million acres) than any other agency of the federal government.
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS 1982, at 1, 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS]. For a
description of the public domain under the jurisdiction of the BLM, see G. COGGINS & C.
WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 1, 15-16 (1981); PUBLIC LAND
LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND-A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESS 19-21 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT]; S. REP.
No. 583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 583], reprinted in
SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976,
92-93 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA]; Getches,
Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 279, 281-82 (1982).
24. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743
(1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982)).
25. FLPMA defines the "public lands" to include:
any land and interest in land owned by the United States within the several States
and administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Man-
agement, without regard to how the United States acquired ownership, except-
(1) lands located on the Outer Continental Shelf; and
(2) lands held for the benefit of Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos.
43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1982).
26. S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 24, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 89; see also H.R. REP. No. 1163, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 1 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1163], reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA,
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directs the Secretary of the Interior, through the BLM, to exercise gen-
eral management authority27 over the public lands. The Secretary main-
tains an inventory of the public lands and manages them in accordance
with regulations 28 and land use plans developed by the Secretary.29 In
title IV, the Act also authorizes the Secretary to issue permits and leases
for domestic livestock grazing on public lands.30 Title V authorizes the
Secretary to grant rights-of-way over the public lands. 31 Title VI calls
for a review of parts of the public lands for possible designation as wil-
derness areas.
32
This Article focuses on the provisions of title II which authorize the
Secretary to sell portions of the public lands and to make management
decisions concerning the withdrawal or development of those lands.
Although some of these provisions simply codify a well-settled public
lands management philosophy, others represent a congressional effort to
end decades of controversy between the executive and legislative
branches concerning their respective powers to control the pace of devel-
opment of federally owned lands. This part of the Article examines vari-
ous provisions of the Act and explains their relationship to the two
governmental branches' struggle for power over the public lands.
Title II of FLPMA in Context: A Brief History of Public Land Sales and
Withdrawals
Sales
FLPMA declares that the public lands should be retained in federal
supra note 23, at 431; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at iii-vi (statement of
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, ex-
plaining the reasons for compiling a legislative history of FLPMA).
27. The Secretary of the Interior, through the BLM, is directed to manage the public
lands under principles of "multiple use and sustained yield," in accordance with the land use
plans developed under FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982). For definitions of "multiple use"
and "sustained yield," see id. § 1702(c), (h) (1982). See generally Coggins, The Law of Public
Rangeland Management IV FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1
(1983); Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple
Use Sustained Yield"for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 229 (1982). For a
discussion of the provisions of FLPMA, see generally The Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 267-597 (1979); Landstrom, An Operational View of the BLM
Organic Act, 54 DEN. L.J. 455 (1977).
28. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1733, 1740 (1982).
29. Id. § 1712.
30. Id. §§ 1751-1753.
31. Id. §§ 1761-1771.
32. Id. § 1782. See generally Ray & Carver, Section 603 of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act: An Analysis of the BLM's Wilderness Study Process, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 373
(1979).
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ownership, unless it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will
serve the national interest. 33 The Secretary cannot sell any public land
without determining that disposal of a particular tract meets several cri-
teria. 34 Congress, by concurrent resolution, can veto the Secretary's at-
tempts to sell tracts in excess of 2,500 acres.35
FLPMA's stringent limitations on the Secretary's authority to sell
the public lands reflect a modem congressional hostility to large-scale
disposition. Opposition to large-scale disposition, though long-lived, has
not always been predominant. Just after establishment of the new na-
tion, the federal government embarked upon an effort to dispose of the
public domain. 36 A policy favoring disposition prevailed for nearly a
century and a half, during which time approximately 1.1 billion acres
were sold. 37 Initially, the government sold public lands to gain revenue
to reduce the national debt.38 Later, grants and sales were made to pub-
lic and private institutions in order to assist in the development of the
frontier. 39 The government also conveyed small tracts to individuals and
families for settlement and cultivation,40 and encouraged private mineral
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 25, re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 90. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1163,
supra note 26, at 2, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 432
(The "underlying mission proposed for the public lands is the multiple use of resources on a
sustained-yield basis. Corollary to this is the selective transfer of public lands to other owner-
ships where the public interest will be served thereby."). FLPMA also enunciates several
other congressional policies. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982).
34. The provisions of FLPMA governing sales of the public lands are discussed in greater
detail infra at notes 262-66 & accompanying text.
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1982).
36. See S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 28, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 93; Getches, supra note 23, at 281-82. For a discussion of the
government's public land disposal policies, see generally P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 43-119.
37. See S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 28, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 93.
38. See S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 28, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 93; Getches, supra note 23, at 282 n.12. The Land Ordinance of
1785 was the first attempt to provide for the orderly disposal of the public lands. Id.; see also
G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 43.
39. By 1982, more than 328 million acres had been granted to the states for use as com-
mon schools, land grant colleges, hospitals, mental health facilities, railroads, wagon roads,
canals, reclamation of swamplands, and for other purposes. Railroad corporations had
purchased or been given more than 94 million acres of the public domain. PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 5; see also S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 28-29, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 93-94; Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9
Stat. 466 (1850); Act of Aug. 4, 1852, ch. 80, § 2, 10 Stat. 28 (1852); G. COGGINS & C. WIL-
KINSON, supra note 23, at 45-55, 88-105; Getches, supra note 23, at 282 & n.18.
40. See Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 321
(1982)); Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (repealed in part 1976);
[Vol. 36
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exploration and development of public lands.41
By the end of the nineteenth century, the climate of opinion that
favored the transfer of land from public to private ownership began to
change fundamentally. Congress was less motivated to sell, because it
had achieved some of the purposes underlying the earlier disposals.
Moreover, those sales had created new problems, such as overgrazing
and careless cultivation. These factors, combined with a new movement
toward the conservation of the public resources, prompted the federal
government to shift its role from land conveyor to land manager.42 The
enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 193443 marked the closing of the
public domain,44 although minor dispositions did subsequently take
place.45 FLPMA's restrictions on public land sales were meant to insure
that the Interior Department remained primarily a manager, rather than
a purveyor, of the public lands.
46
Withdrawals
The withdrawal of public land preserves the status of the land and
Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (repealed 1976); Kinkaid Act of 1904,
ch. 1801, 33 Stat. 547 (repealed 1976); Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed
1976). See generally G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 65-82.
41. See General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39
(1982)); Placer Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217; Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251;
Timber and Stone Act of 1878, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (repealed 1955); Timber Culture Act of
1873, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605, (repealed 1891). See generally G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON,
supra note 23, at 82-88.
42. See S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 31, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 96; Getches, supra note 23, at 283-84. See generally E. PEFFER,
THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951).
43. Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, § 7, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 315-315r (1982)). Pursuant to this Act, the remaining public domain was withdrawn and
classified into grazing districts, See generally PEFFER, supra note 42, at 214-24; Coggins &
Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II" The Commons and the
Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
44. See S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 31, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 96; Getches, supra note 23, at 284.
45. Nearly 2000 acres of homestead entries were approved as recently as 1981-82. PUB-
LIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 23, at 44.
46. See infra notes 424-28 & accompanying text. Recently, the notion that the federal
government should retain ownership of the public lands has been challenged. Adherents of the
so-called "Sagebrush Rebellion" advocated wholesale disposition of federal lands to the states
where they are located. See Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and
Federal Lands, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 317 (1980); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should
Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REv. 505. For a discussion of the policy issues
surrounding proposals for the "privatization" of the public lands, see generally Sax, Why We
Will Not (Should Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing Conceptions of Private Property, 1983
UTAH L. REV. 313.
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prevents its use either permanently or temporarily4 7 for particular pur-
poses, such as homesteading or resource exploitation. 4 8 The history of
public land withdrawals has been marked by controversy. Much of this
controversy has centered on the executive branch's claim of power to
withdraw land without express congressional authorization. Congress
enacted the withdrawal provisions of FLPMA in large part to reclaim its
exclusive right to dictate federal public land withdrawal policy.
49
Federally owned land can be withdrawn in several ways. The Con-
stitution grants Congress power over the disposition and management of
property owned by the federal government. 50 Thus, Congress may make
an express withdrawal of specific land by enacting a statute, such as an
act creating a national park.51 The roles of the two branches in carrying
out an express statutory withdrawal are clear. Congress determines, as a
matter of policy, that a particular tract should be withdrawn from one or
more uses. To implement that policy determination, Congress passes a
statute. If the President disagrees with Congress' policy determination,
he can veto the legislation making the withdrawal. If he fails to do so or
if Congress overrides his veto, the withdrawal goes into effect.
Alternatively, Congress can delegate to the executive branch the au-
thority to make withdrawals.52 Early statutes of this type included spe-
47. Traditionally, the distinction between permanent and temporary withdrawals has re-
lated not to the duration but to the nature of the withdrawal. The former may dedicate land to
a particular use while the latter generally remove public lands from most uses. See Getches,
supra note 23, at 295 n.84 and authorities cited therein.
48. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 197; C. WHEATLEY, JR., STUDY
OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESERVATIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LANDS 1 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WHEATLEY STUDY]; Getches, supra note 23, at 285; Moran, Withdrawals and the
Mineral Landman, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 757, 758 (1971). A withdrawal is thus a
negative act intended to preserve the status of a designated parcel. A "reservation" of land, by
contrast, affirmatively dedicates that land to a particular purpose or use (such as wilderness
use).
The amount of public domain land withdrawn from mineral activities is the subject of
dispute. Estimates range from 165 to 336 million acres. See Tundermann, Preservation vs
Mineral Development of Withdrawn Lands-Much Ado, But Little to Show, 13 ENVTL. L. REP.
10017-18 (1983). In fiscal year 1982, 21,236 acres were newly withdrawn from all uses, while
withdrawals covering more than seven million acres were revoked. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS,
supra note 23, at 49.
49. See infra notes 418-23 & accompanying text.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States.").
51. See, e.g., Redwood National Park Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79q (1982) (establishing the
park to "preserve significant examples of the primeval coastal redwood . .. forests"); see
WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 1; Getches, supra note 23, at 285 n.32.
52. See WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 1; G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra
note 23, at 198; Getches, supra note 23, at 285 n.32.
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cific guidelines for the appropriate purpose of the withdrawal. Various
presidents used such statutes to withdraw land for use as military reser-
vations, trading posts, lighthouses, and townsites.5 3 Throughout most of
the nineteenth century, Congress authorized withdrawals primarily to fa-
cilitate the government's prevailing policy favoring the disposition of fed-
erally owned land.
54
Congress can also delegate withdrawal power to the President by
stating in rather general terms the purposes for which withdrawals are
authorized. In the late nineteenth century, statutes authorizing with-
drawals in the interest of conservation and protection of public lands
began to include much broader guidelines for withdrawals. 55 These stat-
utes authorized withdrawals of land for use as national forests, 56 for irri-
gation and reclamation projects, 57 and for use as national monuments.
58
The last of these, the Antiquities Act of 1906, which contained no strict
limits on duration or acreage,59 was used by various presidents to make
large withdrawals for scenic and general conservation purposes.6° In
53. WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 2.
54. For example, Congress authorized withdrawals in aid of land grants to railroads. Id.
55. Id. at 3. See generally Getches, supra note 23, at 285-90. The Act establishing Yel-
lowstone National Park, now codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1982), was one of the first of
these delegations. See generally A. HAINES, YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK-ITs EXPLO-
RATION AND ESTABLISHMENT (1974).
56. General Revision Act, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891) (repealed 1976) (au-
thorizing the President to withdraw lands covered with timber or undergrowth).
57. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, § 3, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§ 372 (1982)); see also WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 3, 15, 87.
58. Act of June 8, 1906, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1982)).
This Act provides:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by pub-
lic proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and
may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the
objects to be protected.
16 U.S.C. § 431 (1982).
59. The requirement that the lands withdrawn be limited to "the smallest area compati-
ble with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected" has not proved to be a
significant constraint on the President's withdrawal powers. See Getches, supra note 23, at
300; see also infra note 60.
60. Judicial challenges to the exercise of presidential authority under the Antiquities Act
have been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (re-
jecting contention that the Antiquities Act is confined to withdrawals designed to protect
archaeologic sites); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920) (upholding the designation
of the Grand Canyon as a national monument); Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't
Rep. Cas. (ENA) 1853 (D. Ala. 1980) (upholding President Carter's withdrawal of lands for
17 national monuments encompassing 56 million acres in Alaska); Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F.
Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945) (presidential creation of 221,000-acre Jackson Hole National Monu-
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1910 Congress passed the General Withdrawal Act (also referred to as
the Pickett Act),6 1 which empowered the President "temporarily ' 62 to
withdraw and to preserve public lands for water power sites, irrigation,
classification of lands, or "other public purposes."'63 Over the years,
presidents have taken advantage of this broad delegation of authority by
withdrawing large tracts containing resources as diverse as oil, oil shale,
hot springs, and waterholes. 64
These statutes vested in the executive much greater discretion than
did the earlier statutes, whose withdrawal authorizations were more nar-
rowly drawn. 65 The executive branch began to expand its activities from
mere policy implementation to policy formulation. 66 Congress enacted
the withdrawal provisions of FLPMA in reaction to this expansion, at-
tempting to regain control over the formulation of withdrawal policy in
several ways. 67 First, it repealed most of the earlier statutory delegations
of withdrawal authority. 68 Second, it imposed a series of notice and re-
porting requirements designed to make the Secretary of the Interior more
accountable to the legislature in the exercise of delegated withdrawal au-
thority.69 Third, Congress reserved the right to overturn, by concurrent
resolution, secretarial withdrawal decisions in certain situations. 70
These mechanisms were designed to frustrate more than the ten-
dency of presidents to make withdrawals based on an expansive interpre-
tation of the scope of authority expressly delegated to them by Congress.
By enacting FLPMA, Congress also intended to halt more controversial
withdrawals carried out by the executive in the absence of any express
ment was proper); see also WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 17, 35; Getches, supra note
23, at 300-08. See generally Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities Act,
56 WASH. L. REV. 439 (1981).
61. Pickett Act, ch. 421, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (§ 1 and § 3 repealed 1976) (§ 2
codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1982)).
62. See supra note 47.
63. Pickett Act, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976) (withdrawal remained in
force until revoked by the President or by act of Congress).
64. See WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 4. According to the BLM, by mid-1967,
more than 38 million acres of public land containing nonmetalliferous minerals had been with-
drawn under the Pickett Act. Id. at 8. Lands withdrawn under the Pickett Act remained open
to hard-rock mineral entry. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 23, at 131, 198.
65. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 347 (authorizing withdrawals of timber
land to supply the Navy).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 414-15.
67. See infra notes 418-23 & accompanying text.
68. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976). The withdrawal provisions of
the Antiquities Act, however, were not repealed.
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1982).
70. Id. § 1714(c)(1), (e), (1 )(2) (1982).
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congressional delegation of authority. 71 Invalidation of one or more of
these mechanisms of congressional oversight under the Chadha decision
thus interferes, at least in part, with Congress' attempt to constrain exec-
utive branch discretion concerning withdrawals.
Although presidents began to make withdrawals without express
congressional sanction early in the nation's history, this practice Went
essentially unchallenged until the beginning of the twentieth century.
72
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the President's power to with-
draw land absent explicit statutory authorization in United States v. Mid-
west Oil Co.73 In 1909 President Taft withdrew more than three million
acres of land in California and Wyoming from oil and gas exploration
and development to give Congress time to enact legislation that would
restrict private access to these federal resources. 74 When the validity of
the withdrawal was attacked, the government contended that the Presi-
dent had inherent authority under article II of the Constitution to order
the withdrawal. 75 The Court declined to decide this issue7 6 and has not
71. See infra notes 419-20 & accompanying text.
72. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915). But see id. at 492-504
(Day, J., dissenting); Getches, supra note 23, at 291 (asserting that although many withdrawals
had been made by the executive without reference to statutory authorization, in most cases
they were in fact directly or indirectly authorized by statute).
73. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
74. 236 U.S. at 466-67. The President had been informed by the Secretary of the Interior
and the Director of the Geological Survey that federal oil and gas lands in California were
being patented so rapidly that, absent action by the President, all of the government's oil-
bearing lands in California would be purchased in a few months. Id. President Taft withdrew
the land "[ifn aid of proposed legislation affecting the use and disposition of the petroleum
deposits on the public domain." Id. at 467. Comprehensive legislation on this subject, though,
was not enacted until more than a decade later. See Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, ch.
85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 48, 181-287 (1982)); Getches, supra
note 23, at 292.
75. According to the government, the President's power stemmed from his authority as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, since the purpose of the withdrawal was to
preserve fuel supplies for the Navy. 236 U.S. at 468.
76. Id. at 469; see WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 145; PLLRC REPORT, supra
note 23, at 44; Getches, supra note 23, at 287 n.46; Wheatley, Withdrawals Under the Federal
Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. Rv. 311, 316 (1979). One somewhat
confusing lower court opinion may have recognized such a power. See Portland Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977), discussed infra at notes 90-96 & accompany-
ing text. Scholarly views on whether the President possesses inherent withdrawal power have
differed. Compare Getches, supra note 23, at 287 n.46 (contending that, based on Congress'
sweeping authority over the public lands under the property clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2, "inherent executive authority to withdraw public lands cannot be sustained"), with
WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 131-51 (setting forth arguments for and against the
existence of an inherent withdrawal power). Cf. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317,
326 (1942) (stating that, in light of Congress' power under the property clause, "the executive's
power to convey any interest in. . . lands must be traced to Congressional delegation of its
authority").
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done so to this day. Although the executive branch has periodically re-
peated its assertion that the President possesses inherent withdrawal
power,77 this theory has received little support from either Congress 78 or
the courts.79 Those contesting the existence of the executive's inherent
withdrawal authority have argued that such authority would be inconsis-
tent with Congress' power under the property clause to administer feder-
ally owned property.80
The Supreme Court relied upon a different theory in upholding the
validity of the withdrawal in Midwest Oil. The Court held that congres-
sional failure to repudiate past presidential withdrawals made without
express statutory authority constituted an implied grant of authority to
the executive branch to make withdrawals. 81 Congressional silence in
the face of unilateral presidential withdrawals "was equivalent to consent
to continue the practice until the power was revoked by some subsequent
action by Congress."
82
The controversy over the sources and scope of executive authority to
make withdrawals was not laid to rest by the Midwest Oil decision. The
Court's opinion indicated that Congress could revoke its implied grant of
withdrawal authority. 83  The Court declined to consider, however,
whether the Pickett Act,84 which authorized the President to make tem-
porary withdrawals, was such a revocation. 85 Nevertheless, Congress
77. See, e.g., Denver R. Williams, 67 Interior Dec. 315 (1960); P & G Mining Co., 67
Interior Dec. 217 (1960); Noel Teuscher, 62 Interior Dec. 210 (1955); Administration and Use
of Public Lands: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public Lands and
Surveys on the Administration and Use of Public Lands, 79th Cong., 1st. Sess., part 14, 4360,
4366-68 (1945).
78. See S. Doc. No. 610, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) (unilateral executive withdrawal
would constitute a suspension of laws permitting other uses of the land and would therefore
constitute a legislative function).
79. But see infra note 96 & accompanying text.
80. See S. Doc. No. 610, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910); WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48,
at 139.
81. 236 U.S. at 475. According to the Court, the executive acts as Congress' agent in
managing the public lands. Presidential withdrawal orders, known to Congress, were not dis-
approved. Id. Congress acquiesced in the actions of its agent by its silence. Id. at 481.
82. Id. at 481; see also Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859, 861-62 (D.
Wyo. 1977).
83. 236 U.S. at 481.
84. See supra notes 61-64 & accompanying text.
85. The Midwest Oil case was decided five years after the enactment of the Pickett Act.
The Court in Midwest Oil, however, stated that it would not address the effect of the Pickett
Act on the President's implied withdrawal authority, since the statute was passed after the
issuance of the withdrawal order being challenged in Midwest Oil. 236 U.S. at 481-82. The
Pickett Act provided that it should not be "construed as a recognition, abridgment, or enlarge-
ment of any asserted rights or claims initiated upon any oil or gas bearing lands after any
withdrawal of such lands, made prior to the passage of this Act." Pickett Act, ch. 421, § 2, 36
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may have intended to limit the President's withdrawal authority to those
situations expressly provided for in the Pickett Act.
86
The executive branch, however, has disagreed with this analysis. In
a 1941 opinion, 87 the Attorney General asserted that the Pickett Act was
not intended to cover the full scope of the executive's withdrawal power,
but only its power over temporary withdrawals, leaving unimpaired the
President's implied authority to make permanent withdrawals absent ex-
press authority to do so in the Pickett Act or any other statute.8 8 Alter-
natively, the Executive has contended that it regained its implied
withdrawal authority as a result of congressional failure to object to exec-
utive withdrawals after 1910 which were not authorized by the Pickett
Act or other statutes.8
9
A federal district court in Wyoming has endorsed the latter the-
ory.90 In 1968, the Secretary of the Interior issued an order withdrawing
three million acres in Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah from appropriation
under the mining laws governing metalliferous minerals.91 Seven years
later, a plaintiff who had located uranium mining claims on the with-
drawn land filed suit seeking a declaration that the Secretary lacked the
authority to make the withdrawal. 92 The court in Portland General Elec-
tric Co. v. Kleppe held that the withdrawal was valid. 93 The court agreed
that Congress had not expressly authorized the withdrawal, but rejected
the argument that the withdrawal was prohibited, stating that even if the
Pickett Act nullified the executive's implied authority in 1910, Congress,
by its acquiescence to subsequent nonstatutory withdrawals, 94 "restored
Stat. 847 (1910). The legislative history of the Act persuaded the Court that Congress did not
intend to apply the act retroactively or to disaffirm withdrawals made by the President before
the statute's enactment. 236 U.S. at 482.
86. In dicta in Midwest Oil, the Court apparently endorsed the view that the enactment of
the Pickett Act "operated to restrict the greater power already possessed." 236 U.S. at 482-83
(citing S. REP. No. 171, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910)). In his comprehensive study on with-
drawals, Wheatley contends that the legislative history of the Pickett Act strongly supports the
view that the "Act was intended by Congress to embrace the entire range of the President's
withdrawal power (except that expressly conferred by statute) and to limit the future exercise
of that power." WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 453; see also id. at 88-99, 104-06;
Getches, supra note 23, at 292.
87. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73, 76-83 (1941).
88. The Attorney General's Opinion is analyzed in WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at
92-93, 107-11; see also Getches, supra note 23, at 295-96.
89. See Getches, supra note 23, at 297, 300.
90. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859 (D. Wyo. 1977).
91. Id. at 860.
92. Id. at 861.
93. Id. at 862.
94. After 1910, Congress enacted a series of statutes authorizing presidential withdrawals
for particular purposes and subject to specific conditions. See, eg., Alaska Native Claims
September 1984] LEGISLATIVE VETO: SEVER.ABILITY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
that power."' 95 Despite this statement, the basis for the court's holding in
Portland General Electric is unclear, because the court also concluded
that the President had an "inherent authority to withdraw public lands
. . . from all forms of appropriation.
'96
When it enacted FLPMA in 1976, Congress intended to prevent the
executive from inferring the authority to make withdrawals from con-
gressional acquiescence. 97 Congress not only repealed earlier statutory
delegations of withdrawal authority, 98 it also repealed "the implied au-
thority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting
from acquiescence of the Congress." 99 Further, it imposed various re-
porting requirements on the Secretary and subjected certain executive
withdrawal decisions to a legislative veto. 1°° The constitutionality of
FLPMA's legislative veto provisions has serious implications for Con-
gress' effort to restore primacy to the legislative branch in the formula-
tion of withdrawal policy.
The Constitutionality of Legislative Veto Provisions
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
Prior to Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,' 10 the
Supreme Court had never addressed the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto. 102 In Chadha, the Court held unconstitutional the legislative
Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1628 (1982)); Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78
Stat. 986 (expired 1970); Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982)); Defense Withdrawal Act, Pub. L. No. 85-337, 72 Stat. 27
(1958) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 155-158 (1982)); Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch.
865, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1982)); Stock-Raising
Homestead Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (1916) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301) (repealed
in part 1976). Despite these statutes, the Executive continued to make withdrawals without
relying upon express congressional authorization. See WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 6;
Wheatley, supra note 76, at 316-17.
95. 441 F. Supp. at 862. The court found it "obvious... that Congress had knowledge
of and acquiesced in repeated assertions of the implied authority under which the. . . lands in
question were withdrawn." Id.
96. Id. at 861. The court cited two of the Department of the Interior's own administra-
tive decisions supporting the existence of an inherent withdrawal power. See supra note 77.
97. See infra notes 419-23 & accompanying text.
98. See supra note 68 & accompanying text.
99. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976).
100. See supra notes 69-70 & accompanying text.
101. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
102. The issue was before the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), but the Court
disposed of the case on other grounds. Justice White, in a separate opinion in Buckley, con-
tended that the legislative veto was constitutional. Id. at 284 (White, J., concurring and dis-
senting). Three lower federal court opinions had also failed to address the merits of the issue.
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veto provision contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act.10 3 The
analysis employed by the Court, however, casts doubt on the validity of
every other legislative veto provision. ° 4
Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian, born in Kenya and holding a
British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonim-
migrant student visa. 10 5 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported.1
0 6
Chadha filed an application for suspension of deportation. Following a
deportation hearing, an immigration judge granted the suspension pursu-
ant to the statutory authority of the Attorney General. 10 7 As required by
statute, 0 8 the Attorney General sent Congress a report on the suspen-
sion. 109 A year and a half later, acting pursuant to section 244(c)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 110 the House of Representatives
See McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), afj'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431
U.S. 950 (1977); Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 420 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.
Ala. 1976), remanded, 578 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979).
Several court of appeals decisions, however, did address the constitutionality of the legis-
lative veto mechanism. In Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1009 (1978), the court upheld the one-house veto provision of the Federal Salary Act
of 1967, 2 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B) (1976), under which the President's recommendations on salaries
of certain government officials became law unless Congress disapproved them within thirty
days. Legislative veto provisions were declared unconstitutional in American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and in the Chadha, CECA, and Consum-
ers Union cases discussed infra notes 103-210 & accompanying text.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 2788 (holding unconstitutional section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982)).
104. See id. (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Court's decision. . . apparently will invalidate
every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause."); id. at 2792,
2796 (White, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory
provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.'. . . The Court's Article I anal-
ysis appears to invalidate all legislative vetoes irrespective of form or subject."); see also EEOC
v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 570 F. Supp.
1224, 1229 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (Chadha invalidates every use of the legislative veto), appeal
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 3499 (1984). But see EEOC v. Ingersoll-Johnson Steel Co., 583 F. Supp.
983, 986-87 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (declining to rule on the constitutionality of the Reorganization
Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982), but indicating that its legislative veto provisions may
withstand constitutional challenge despite Chadha).
105. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (1982).
109. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). This section provided that in the case of an alien whose
deportation had been suspended by the Attorney General,
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close
of the session of Congress next following the session at which a case is reported,
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passed a resolution opposing the grant of permanent resident status to
Chadha and five other persons.I"I The resolution was neither submitted
to the Senate nor presented to the President for his approval. 112 The
immigration judge then reopened the deportation hearing and ordered
the deportation of Chadha pursuant to the House action, despite
Chadha's contention that the section 244(c)(2) procedure was
unconstitutional. 1
3
The Supreme Court agreed with Chadha's claim that section
244(c)(2) was unconstitutional. 1 4  The Court framed the issue as
whether the House resolution disapproving the suspension of deportation
was an action subject to the procedural requirements of article I of the
Constitution." 5 If so, then the statutory provision authorizing the reso-
lution was unconstitutional because it failed to require compliance with
the presentment" 6 and bicameralism" 17 requirements of article I.
The Court first considered the purposes and functions of article I
procedures. In the Court's view, the presentment and bicameralism re-
quirements were "integral parts of the constitutional design for the sepa-
ration of powers." 1 8  The presentment clauses were meant to
circumscribe the powers conferred on Congress by vesting the President
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in sub-
stance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney Gen-
eral shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at
his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If,
within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation
proceedings.
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
112. Id. at 2771-72.
113. Id. at 2772.
114. Id. at 2788. Before reaching the merits of the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2), the
Court disposed of several threshold challenges to the Court's authority to resolve the issue.
The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to decide the case, id. at 2772-74, 2777-78, that
Chadha had standing and that an article III "case or controversy" existed, id. at 2776, 2778,
that the possibility that Chadha had other forms of relief available did not constitute a pruden-
tial bar to consideration of the merits, id. at 2776-77, and that the case did not present a non-
justiciable political question, id. at 2778-80.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
116. Under the presentment clauses, every "Bill" which has passed the House and the
Senate "shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Presentment to the President is also required of every "Order,
Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary." Id. cl. 3.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cl. 2. The bicameralism provisions require that legislative
powers be exercised by both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
118. 103 S. Ct. at 2781. The Court stated that "the Framers were acutely conscious that
the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional
functions." Id. at 2784.
[Vol. 36
September 1984] LEGISLATIVE VETO: SEVERABILITY
with a limited power to nullify proposed legislation by veto. 19 The op-
portunity for presidential veto would also guard against oppressive, im-
provident, or ill-considered legislative measures and would assure that a
national perspective was part of the legislative process. 120 The bicamera-
lism requirement served equally important functions. Legislative author-
ity, which inclined toward despotism, would be restrained by dividing it
into two independent branches.' 21 Bicameral action would also prevent
special interests from prevailing over the public interest and would pro-
vide adequate representation for the small states. 122 Clearly, then, the
framers of the Constitution intended that the federal legislative power be
exercised "in accord[ance] with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure."'123 The Court concluded that if the congres-
sional veto authorized by section 244(c)(2) constituted an exercise of leg-
islative power, then it was unconstitutional because it failed to comply
with article I procedures.
Addressing the question of what constitutes an exercise of legislative
power, the Court stated that an action taken by either house is an exer-
cise of legislative power if it "contain[s] matter which is properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect."' 124 The Chadha Court
identified three factors which confirmed its conclusion that the legislative
veto pursuant to section 244(c)(2) was "legislative in its character and
effect."1
25
First, the Court found that the House disapproval resolution en-
acted pursuant to section 244(c)(2) had the purpose and effect of altering
the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative
branch. 26 Chadha's legal rights were altered by passage of the resolu-
tion, for if the resolution had not been passed, Chadha would have been
entitled to remain in the United States.127 The disapproval resolution
also altered the legal duties of the Attorney General because, by revers-
ing the decision to suspend Chadha's deportation, the resolution nar-
rowed the Attorney General's discretion to implement the immigration
119. Id. at 2782.
120. Id. at 2782-83.
121. Id. at 2783.
122. Id. at 2783-84.
123. Id. at 2784.
124. Id. (quoting S. REp. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
125. After concluding that the House resolution of disapproval was a legislative action
under the first of the three factors, the Court merely stated that the remaining two factors
"confirmed" this conclusion. 103 S. Ct. at 2785.
126. Id. at 2784-85.
127. Id.
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statute. 128
Second, the Court noted that, absent exercise of the legislative veto,
Congress could have achieved its objective only by enacting legislation
requiring deportation. The Court held that the character of the congres-
sional action supplanted by the legislative veto confirmed that the use of
the veto constituted a legislative action. 29 The legislative veto could not
be upheld as an attempt by Congress either to amend the statutory stan-
dards for suspending deportation or to repeal the statutory delegation
relied upon by the executive in taking that action, because the
"[a]mendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must con-
form with" article I requirements. 1
30
Third, the Court found that the House disapproval resolution repre-
sented an attempt to overrule the Attorney General's decision to permit
Chadha to remain in the country. Thus, the nature of the decision imple-
mented by the veto, stemming from a policy disagreement between the
executive and legislative branches, further confirmed the legislative char-
acter of the action.'31 Congress could not take such action without fully
complying with article I procedures.
A Brief Critique of Chadha
Although based on a straightforward reading of the constitutional
text establishing the procedural prerequisites for enacting federal legisla-
tion, 132 the Court's opinion in Chadha is nevertheless troublesome and
has been extensively analyzed and criticized. 3 3 The opinion fails to con-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2785-86.
130. Id. at 2785.
131. Id.
132. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cls. 2, 3.
133. Post-Chadha commentary is growing. See Bolton & Abrams, The Judicial and Con-
gressional Response to the Invalidation of the Legislative Veto, 1 J.L. & POL. 299 (1984); Breyer,
The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984); Brubaker, Slouching Toward
Constitutional Duty: The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, 1984 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 81; DeConcini & Faucher, The Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Amendment, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 29 (1984); De Seife, Legislative Delegation of Powers: A Hobson's Choice?,
17 J. MAR. L. REV. 279 (1984); Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125; Hutchins, Legislative Vetoes
and the Administrative Process: A Constitutional and Operational Analysis, 15 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 307 (1984); Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of the
Chadha Decision, 36 AD. L. REV. 239 (1984); Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Exec-
utive and Agency Actions After Chadha: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEO. L.J.
801 (1984); Lungren & Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision, 17
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 767 (1984); Smolla, Bring Back the Legslative Veto: A Proposal for a Con-
stitutional Amendment, 37 ARK. L. REV. 509 (1984); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative
Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Spann, Spinning the Legislative Veto, 72 GEo. L.J. 813
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sider fully why these procedures apply to the use of the legislative veto at
issue. Moreover, the separation of powers issues raised by the use of the
legislative veto are treated in an unsatisfactory manner. The Court relies
indirectly on the doctrine of separation of powers,134 stating that the arti-
cle I procedural requirements for enacting legislation are "integral parts
of the constitutional design for the separation of powers,"' 135 yet the
Court never really explains why the legislative veto at issue in Chadha
violates the separation of powers doctrine. Although the Court probably
reached the correct result in Chadha, the decision would have been far
more satisfying had the Court employed a functional analysis of the man-
ner in which the legislative veto at issue usurped for the legislature a
function more properly vested in one of the other two branches of
government.
The logic of the majority is facially attractive.' 36 If Congress en-
gages in a legislative action, it must comply with the procedural require-
ments for the enactment of legislation-bicameral action and
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Spann, Spinning]; Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 633-39 (1984); Strauss,
Was There A Baby In the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto
Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789 [hereinafter cited as Strauss, Comment]; Tribe, The Legislative
Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984); Note, Congres-
sional Oversight Through the Legislative Veto After INS. v. Chadha, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1299
(1984); Note, The Demise of the Legislative Veto: The Struggle for PoliticalAccountability, 17
CREIGHTON L. REv. 915 (1983-84); Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy
Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1182 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Severability Note]; Note, Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha: The Legislative Veto Vanishes, 17 J. MAR. L.
REv. 523 (1984); Note, INS v. Chadha, The Future Demise of Legislative Delegation and the
Need for a ConstitutionalAmendment, I I J. OF LEGIs. 317 (1984); Note, Separation of Power:
No Legislative Veto of Agency Action, 49 Mo. L. REv. 404 (1984); Note, A Defense of the War
Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J. 1330 (1984); Comment, Characterization of the Legislative
Veto: Courts Should Focus on the Power Itself 22 DuQ. L. REv. 927 (1984); Comment, The
Status of Statutes Containing Legislative Veto Provisions After Chahda: Does the EEOC Have
the Authority To Enforce the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?,
59 WASH. L. REV. 549 (1984); Case Comment, Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha: A Legislative "House of Cards" Tumbles, 8 NOVA L.J. 451 (1984); see also Sylvester,
After Chadha, A Legal Void, NAT'L. L.J., April 23, 1984, at 1.
134. Compare the decision of the court of appeals in Chadha, in which the court held that
"the statutory mechanism reviewed here violates the constitutional doctrine of separation [of
powers] because it is a prohibited legislative intrusion upon the Executive and Judicial
branches." Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir.
1980), afi'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
135. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
136. Many commentators have been far less charitable in characterizing the majority opin-
ion in Chadha. Various commentators have called Chief Justice Burger's opinion assertive,
conceptualistic, formalistic, glib, inflexible, literal, manipulative, mechanical, rigid, simplistic,
strict, superficial, and trite. See, eg., Elliott, supra note 133, at 126-27, 132, 137-39, 144, 147,
163; Hutchins, supra note 133, at 343; Spann, Spinning, supra note 133, at 813-14; Strauss,
Comment, supra note 133, at 790, 796, 800, 818.
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presentment to the President. 137 When the House vetoed the Attorney
General's suspension of Chadha's deportation, it took action which was
"legislative in purpose and effect."' 138 Because the one-house veto failed
to comply with the bicameralism requirement or the presentment
clauses, the statute authorizing this legislative veto was constitutionally
invalid. 139
One weakness in the Court's analysis is its reliance on the proposi-
tion that whenever Congress acts it is "presumptively" engaging in "leg-
islative" action. 40 In other words, the character of a particular
governmental action depends at least initially upon the identity of the
actor. 14 1 As the Court itself points out, however, not all actions by one
house of Congress are "legislative" actions subject to the bicameralism
and presentment requirements. 42 As other commentators have recog-
nized, the Court's presumption is not grounded in thorough analysis.
43
The Court relies on three factors to confirm its initial characteriza-
tion of the one-house veto as "essentially legislative in purpose and ef-
fect." 144 The Court's argument is less than compelling. For example,
the Court concludes that the House veto was legislative because it altered
Chadha's legal rights and the Attorney General's legal duties in imple-
menting the Immigration and Nationality Act. 45 But the House veto
arguably had absolutely no effect on Chadha's legal rights. Justice White
argued in his dissent that the Attorney General had no authority to can-
cel Chadha's deportation 146 unless both houses of Congress approved the
137. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781-84.
138. Id. at 2784.
139. Id. at 2787-88.
140. Id. at 2784. Cf. Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 466 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), where the court of
appeals stated that in dealing with separation of powers issues, "the only 'presumption' is that
there will be 'a clashing of interests.' "
141. Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 794.
142. 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
143. Professor Elliott contends that the Court's presumption reflects a "conceptualistic"
approach that conflicts with the Framers' more "pragmatic" approach to delineating the
boundaries of the powers of each branch of the federal government. Elliott, supra note 133, at
132. Cf. Tribe, supra note 133, at 8 ("That 'a law is a law is a law' is hard to refute. But that
statement sheds little light on why the veto at issue in Chadha was so 'law-like' an action that it
'had' to be deemed legislative.").
144. 103 S. Ct. at 2784-85. The three factors are described supra notes 125-31 & accompa-
nying text.
145. 103 S. Ct. at 2784-85.
146. Id. at 2807 (White, J., dissenting). A similar attempt to characterize the effect of a
one-house veto was rejected by the court of appeals in Consumer Energy Council of America
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afl'd sub nom.
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Attorney General's proposal by failing to veto the Attorney General's
action.147 Thus, in Justice White's view, the Attorney General's action
did not vest in Chadha a legal right to remain in the United States, and
the House veto of the Attorney General's recommendation did not alter
Chadha's legal status as an immigrant subject to deportation. 148 Simi-
larly, one can argue that the House veto did not alter the scope of the
Attorney General's discretion under the Immigration and Nationality
Act because the Act did not vest in the Attorney General the uncondi-
tional right to cancel alien deportations. The Act granted only the power
to recommend cancellations to Congress, which would take effect only if
not vetoed by either house.149 This argument presumably could be made
concerning many legislative vetoes. Because the effect of the House veto
on the legal rights of Chadha and the Attorney General can be fairly
characterized in these contrary ways, reliance on that factor to conclude
that the veto was a "legislative" act appears to be arbitrary. 50
The Court's reliance on the two other factors seems equally mis-
placed. To ask whether Congress could have achieved its goal by any
other method short of enacting legislation by bicameral passage and pre-
sentment is to beg the question. The issue is whether Congress can
achieve its objective by use of a one-house legislative veto. Similarly, the
fact that a policy disagreement exists between the executive and legisla-
tive branches when a legislative veto has been used is self-evident. 51
The opinion also fails to delineate the precise role the factors play in
the analysis of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes. The factors
might appear to be conjunctive prerequisites to a conclusion that an ac-
tion of Congress is "legislative in its character and effect." The Court
says, however, that the latter two factors only "confirm" the initial con-
clusion that the one-house veto is "legislative" because it alters the legal
rights and remedies of affected individuals and government officials re-
sponsible for implementing the statute authorizing the veto.
The possibility that the factors are disjunctive tests is of little conse-
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556
(1983). The court of appeals' analysis is discussed in connection with FLPMA's prevention-
type vetoes, infra notes 248-59 & accompanying text.
147. See Brubaker, supra note 133, at 88; Elliott, supra note 133, at 134-35; Strauss, Com-
ment, supra note 133, at 796; Tribe, supra note 133, at 9 n.52.
148. Justice White contended that this characterization of the effect of the actions of the
Attorney General and the House is more consistent with the statutory language than is the
majority's characterization. See 103 S. Ct. at 2807 (White, J., dissenting).
149. Brubaker, supra note 133, at 85-86; Elliott, supra note 133, at 137-38.
150. Elliott, supra note 133, at 135.
151. Professor Elliott contends that the majority engaged in an indefensible manipulation
of formal legal concepts in applying all of its three tests. See id. at 135-38.
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quence because they overlap substantially. A court willing to conclude
that the legal rights of a party have been altered is likely to find that
Congress would have had to enact legislation to achieve its goal had the
legislative veto been unavailable. Further, this goal will have been the
result of a policy decision by Congress which is inconsistent with one
already made by the executive branch.
Even if the House veto was a "legislative" act, it does not necessarily
follow that the article I procedural requirements apply to that act. Since
not every action taken by either house is subject to the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment, 1 52 the real issue before the Court was
whether the House's veto was an action "of the kind to which the proce-
dural requirements of Art. I, § 7 apply."' 153 Although the Court itself
framed the issue in these terms, it has been criticized for offering "no
functional explanation of why the veto ought to be subject to the Article
I enactment procedure."1 54 Instead, the Court simply assumed, based on
a literal reading of the Constitution's text, 155 that all actions which are
"legislative," as the Court defined that term, must comply with the arti-
cle I procedures.
56
The Court's use of the factors to affirm its conclusion that the one-
house veto in Chadha was subject to the bicameralism and presentment
requirements of article I contrasts with its treatment of the acts of the
Attorney General. The Attorney General's suspension of the deporta-
tion affected Chadha's legal rights as significantly as did the House veto
of the Attorney General's suspension. 57 Nevertheless, the Attorney
General's action is not subject to the article I procedural requirements
apparently because the Attorney General, although acting pursuant to a
congressional delegation of authority, is part of the executive branch, and
executive actions, unlike legislative actions, are not governed by the pro-
152. 103 S. Ct. at 2786-87; Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 794.
153. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
154. Spann, Spinning, supra note 133, at 814.
155. One can also argue that the Court never effectively demonstrated that the one-house
veto involved in Chadha was an "Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (empha-
sis added).
156. "To answer this question requires a perspective from outside the system: 'Syllogism'
alone is incapable of resolving such questions." Elliott, supra note 133, at 145; see also Strauss,
Comment, supra note 133, at 794 (the Court answers the question of whether the House's veto
is the kind of congressional activity subject to the article I procedures "by assertion"); Tribe,
supra note 133, at 8 (the Court failed to explain which "actions that a House might seek to
take pursuant to a statutory delegation of power are inherently 'legislative' in nature").
157. Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 795, 797.
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cedural prerequisites for enacting valid legislation. 158 The identity of the
actor seems to be the distinguishing characteristic, 59 although why this
should be determinative is not adequately explained.
The Court's reliance on an explicit presumption that when Congress
acts it engages in "legislative" activity, and its statement that an execu-
tive official acting pursuant to delegated authority is not "legislating"
because that official is part of the executive branch, reflect a formalistic
concept of the separation of powers doctrine. Professor Strauss points
out that, until Chadha, "the Court had seemed to be moving away from
the idea of 'air-tight' categories" in this area "and toward a Madisonian
view, stressing function rather than formality."' 16 Under the Madis-
onian view, the doctrine of separation of powers can be violated in one of
two ways. First, "[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with the
other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function."' 161 Sec-
ond, the doctrine may be violated if "one branch [assumes] a function
that more properly is entrusted to another."' 62 This functional analysis
is arguably more consistent with the Framers' intent than the doctrinaire
interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine reflected in
Chadha.163 The separation of powers doctrine should not be an inflexible
maxim but "a formula for examining the relationship of institutions
which share power."' 64 It may not be exaggeration to contend, as one
member of Congress has, that the Court's opinion in Chadha "displayed
158. See 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16. Professor Elliott comments that this footnote "would do
Lewis Carroll proud." Elliott, supra note 133, at 146.
159. Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 797.
160. Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 804; see, e.g., Nixon v. Admin'r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (rejecting the argument that "the Constitution contemplates a com-
plete division of authority between the three branches. . . [, an] argument [that] rests upon an
'archaic' view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of govern-
ment"); see also Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (White, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 121 (1976); J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (the
government does not have sharply defined boundaries between the branches; the boundaries of
each branch are fixed according to "the inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination");
DeConcini & Faucher, supra note 133, at 41-43 (contending that the Framers did not intend
an absolute separation of powers among the three branches, but rather an overlap of powers,
with each branch checking any tendency in the others to usurp power not properly belonging
to it).
161. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J. concurring); see, eg., Nixon v. Admin'r of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926).
162. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J., concurring); see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 143 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
163. De Seife, supra note 133, at 295.
164. Hutchins, supra note 133, at 331.
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an abysmal ignorance of the way in which our government has evolved
today." 165
Relying as it does upon its rigid conception of the separation of the
functions of the three branches, the Court fails to explain exactly why the
use of the one-house veto in Chadha is inconsistent with the separation of
powers doctrine. As Justice Powell points out, characterizing a power as
legislative, executive, or judicial may provide "some guidance" as to
whether one branch has unconstitutionally assumed or interfered with
the exercise of the function of another branch. 166 "But reasonable minds
may disagree over the character of an act and the more helpful inquiry
. . .is whether the act in question raises the dangers the framers sought
to avoid." 
167
The Framers incorporated the separation of powers concept into the
Constitution "to prevent an unnecessary and therefore dangerous con-
centration of power in one branch." 168 The Court in Chadha does not
indicate why Congress' attempt to retain a check on the Attorney Gen-
eral in the exercise of his congressionally delegated authority over aliens
contravenes this objective. The House's veto in this case arguably did
not interfere with a power vested in the executive branch by the Consti-
tution. Instead, it conditioned the exercise of a power delegated to the
Attorney General in the same statute creating the right of congressional
veto. 169 According to Professor Tribe, "what Congress does in cases like
Chadha hardly seems to involve congressional interference with the 'exe-
165. Levitas & Brand, supra note 133, at 810 (quoting from statement of Rep. Levitas
during congressional hearings). The Court's opinion in Chadha has been criticized as ignoring
the extent to which Congress must delegate broad authority to various executive branch offi-
cials and independent agencies, See infra notes 172-76 & accompanying text.
166. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
167. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Professor Strauss has phrased this inquiry as whether a
particular action (here, the House's veto of the Attorney General's suspension of deportation)
has a "tendency to rearrange power." Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 805.
168. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th Cir. 1980),
afl'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). The Supreme Court stated in Chadha that the bicameralism and
presentment requirements, which are "integral parts of the constitutional design for the sepa-
ration of powers," 103 S. Ct. at 2781, "were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch
and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain pre-
scribed steps." Id. at 2787; see also Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Process Gas Consum-
ers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) ("The fundamen-
tal purpose of this separation is to check the extent of power exercisable by any one branch of
Government in order to protect the people from oppression."). The court of appeals decision
in Chadha also described a second motive for adopting the principle of separation of powers,
"to facilitate administration of a large nation by the assignment of numerous labors to desig-
nated authorities." 634 F.2d at 423.
169. See Elliott, supra note 133, at 143.
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cution' of any enacted law."'170
In fact, the Court's decision in Chadha may present a greater threat
of excessive concentration of power than did the exercise of the one-
house veto. In his dissenting opinion in Chadha, Justice White warned
that "[a] scheme which allows delegation of legislative power to the Pres-
ident and the departments under his control, but forbids a check on its
exercise by Congress obviously denigrates the separation of powers con-
cerns underlying Article I.'171 Congress routinely makes broad delega-
tions of authority to executive branch officials or independent
agencies.' 72 The legislative veto is a means by which Congress can re-
dress the "imbalance created by the practical need to delegate."' 173 If
Chadha and subsequent decisions 174 prohibit all legislative vetoes, in-
cluding the veto of agency rules enacted pursuant to a broad delegation
of authority, these decisions "seemingly countenance both an executive
apparatus and a federal bureaucracy more autonomous and unaccounta-
ble in wielding their power than Congress itself could ever have become
by using the legislative veto device."
175
The Court's decision in Chadha would have been far more convinc-
ing if based not on the conclusion that the House improperly had acted
170. Tribe, supra note 133, at 14.
171. 103 S. Ct. at 2803 n.20 (White, J., dissenting). The majority responded that the au-
thority of the delegate is constrained by the perimeters of the statute making the delegation
and by the opportunity for judicial review in the event the delegate exceeds the scope of his
delegated powers. See id. at 2785 n.16. Therefore, the delegation of rulemaking or other au-
thority to the executive branch would not create an excessive and unconstrained concentration
of authority in the hands of the delegate. But see Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 799
(stating that the House's veto was also authorized by statute and subject to judicial correction
if the terms of the statute were exceeded). The court of appeals in Consumer Energy Council
of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid
sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983), advanced another reason why invalidation of the legislative veto was unlikely to
thwart the objectives of the separation of powers doctrine: "The empirical evidence suggests
that legislative vetoes are not all that efficient in practice ...."
172. Justice White criticized the majority for ignoring this crucial fact, which represents
"the most significant legal trend of the last century." 103 S. Ct. at 2801 (quoting Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also
103 S. Ct. at 2803 (White, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for failing to face "the reality
of administrative lawmaking"). The commentators thus far have agreed almost uniformly
with Justice White's criticism. See, eg., Tribe, supra note 133, at 2; Elliott, supra note 133, at
167, 170-76; Levitas & Brand, supra note 133, at 810. But cf. Brubaker, supra note 133, at 102-
04 (rejecting Justice White's conclusion that the appropriate way to constrain bureaucrats in
their exercise of delegated authority is through the use of a legislative veto and suggesting
instead a revival of the nondelegation doctrine).
173. Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 808.
174. See infra notes 190-210 & accompanying text.
175. Tribe, supra note 133, at 3.
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"legislatively" without compliance with the article I procedures for legis-
lation, but on an analysis of the function of the particular legislative veto
at issue and its effects on the balance of power among the three branches.
Both Justices Powell and White argued that such a functional analysis is
required because the validity of a particular veto will depend upon the
context in which it is exercised.
176
Had the Court employed this kind of analysis, it may well have
reached the same result. The court of appeals in Chadha invalidated the
House's veto of the Attorney General's suspension order in part because
the veto disrupted an essential function of the judicial branch. 177 The
House veto represented a determination that Chadha failed to satisfy the
criteria for permanent residence in the United States. The task of deter-
mining whether and, if so, how a statute applies to the circumstances of a
particular individual, however, is a uniquely judicial function.,7 8 The
House, therefore, had both assumed a function entrusted by the Consti-
tution to the judiciary and interfered with "a central function of the Judi-
ciary,"' 179 thereby violating essential principles of the separation of
powers. Justice Powell would have resolved the case on similar
grounds. 
1 8 0
176. See 103 S. Ct. at 2788 n. 1 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 2792 (White, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals in Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), in its discussion of the article I
procedures, displayed a deeper and more sophisticated analysis than did the majority opinion
in Chadha. Justice Wilkey was not content to conclude that the legislative veto of the incre-
mental pricing rules was invalid simply because it failed to comply with the requirements of
presentment and bicameralism. He added that "[i]n construing the validity of the failure to
present the disapproval resolution to the President, therefore, we must consider both the effect
on the President's ability to protect his authority from encroachment and the effect on his
ability to check unwise legislation." 673 F.2d at 463. For further discussion of this case, see
infra notes 181-83, 190-205 & accompanying text. See also Strauss, Comment, supra note 133,
at 818 n. 106 ("Some vetoes adequately preserve the President's role while also serving proper
congressional interests and, most importantly, equally serving citizens' interests in enjoying a
government of adequate strength and flexibility which yet tends to be held in check by the
natural and continuing competition for political authority among its parts.").
177. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 429-30 (9th Cir.
1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
178. See Brubaker, supra note 133, at 87; Tribe, supra note 133, at 15.
179. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 430.
180. According to Justice Powell, the House "assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to
the federal courts," thus exceeding the scope of its constitutionally prescribed authority in
violation of the separation of powers. 103 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Powell, J., concurring). Professor
Strauss has speculated that Justice Powell was really more concerned with a denial of
Chadha's due process rights than with the legislature's infringement upon judicial powers.
Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 803-04. The House's decision that Chadha should be
deported lacked the procedural safeguards that Chadha would have been entitled to had the
decision been made by an administrative official, subject to judicial review. See id. at 799, 801-
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Had the court taken a functional approach to the separation of pow-
ers issue, the constitutionality of a particular legislative veto provision
may have depended much more on the effect of that veto. The extent to
which Congress assumes or interferes with the functions of the other two
branches may differ depending upon the situation in which a particular
legislative veto is exercised. A legislative veto of an agency rule, for ex-
ample, might present different questions concerning the extent of legisla-
tive assumption of judicial or executive functions than the questions
raised by the Chadha veto. In Consumer Energy Council of America v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,t" t the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals employed a functional analysis to conclude that
the House's veto of agency rules violated the separation of powers doc-
trine because the veto enabled Congress "to expand its role from one of
oversight, with an eye to legislative revision, to one of shared administra-
tion." 82 The difficulty with a legislative veto of agency rules, according
to the court, is that its use "substantially increases [Congress'] total
power by assuming roles that make the work of the other branches
subordinate or irrelevant."
1 83
The legislative veto of the Interior Secretary's withdrawal of lands
from mineral exploitation 84 might present yet another constitutional
analysis under a functional approach to separation of powers issues. Pro-
fessor Strauss argues, for example, that a legislative veto of agency rules,
which he calls a "regulatory use of legislative vetoes," is more constitu-
tionally suspect than a legislative veto employed for political purposes.185
03. In fact, Justice Powell noted that "unlike a court or an administrative agency, [the House]
did not provide Chadha with the right to counsel or a hearing before acting." 103 S. Ct. at
2791 n.8 (Powell, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Chadha reflected similar
concerns. See 634 F.2d at 428-29. Several commentators agree that the House's veto in
Chadha raises serious due process issues. See, eg., Elliott, supra note 133, at 176; see also
Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425,
478 n.226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer En-
ergy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
181. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
182. 673 F.2d at 474.
183. Id. at 477 n.220.
184. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1982).
185. According to Professor Strauss, a regulatory use of the legislative veto operates as a
device for evasion of the president's participation in governance. Strauss, Comment, supra
note 133, at 807-09. A political use, on the other hand, represents an attempt to "mediate a
continuing dialogue between the President and the Congress." Id. at 816-17. A veto used for
"political" purposes has a greater claim to constitutional legitimacy than one used for "regula-
tory" ends because, in the former case, "the authority subject to the veto will be that of the
President himself; no alternative means of control is obvious; precise congressional standard-
setting or structural arrangements are probably inadvisable; and a sharing of political author-
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Among the examples of "political uses of legislative vetoes" cited by Pro-
fessor Strauss is the veto of a withdrawal of federal lands.' 86 Had the
Court taken a functional approach to the separation of powers issue, the
analysis of the FLPMA veto provisions and the conclusion that they are
unconstitutional might have been very different.
Post-Chadha Legislative Veto Decisions
Because the Chadha decision involved a one-house veto of an execu-
tive branch determination in an adjudicatory proceeding, the Court
could have narrowed the precedential value of the decision to this some-
what unusual situation. 187 Within weeks of its decision in Chadha, how-
ever, the Court summarily affirmed two decisions by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which invalidated one- and
two-house vetoes of agency rules. 188 These summary dispositions lend
credence to the concurring and dissenting Justices' projections of the
sweeping impact of the Chadha decision.
89
The decision in Consumer Energy Council ofAmerica v. Federal En-
ity is warranted by Congress' legitimate interests in the subject matter and the consequent
desirability of committing Congress to support of the action to be taken." Id. at 806. Cf.
Breyer, supra note 133, at 797-98 (arguments against the legislative veto are strongest in the
regulatory context); Smolla, supra note 133, at 547 (also contending that a legislative veto may
be constitutional in certain "political" contexts likely to involve a clash between the executive
and legislative branches).
186. See Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 805. But see infra notes 314-77 & accom-
panying text (concluding that the legislative veto provisions of FLPMA are probably
unconstitutional).
187. Justice Powell, concurring, would have decided the case on a narrower ground. In
his view, "[wihen Congress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria
for permanent residence. . . it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of
separation of powers." Id. at 2789. Cf. Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 470 n.185 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) (sug-
gesting that legislative disapproval of an agency adjudication may raise bill of attainder, due
process, or equal protection problems); see also The Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Chadha
and its Implications for Congressional Oversight and Agency Rulemaking: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Comm.,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 219-20 (1983) (statement of Professor Harold H. Bruff that the Court's
rejection of Justice Powell's "plausible ground for decision" indicates the broad implications of
the Court's opinion).
188. See infra notes 190-210 & accompanying text.
189. See supra note 104. The court of appeals in Consumer Energy Council of America v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Pro-
cess Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983),
also noted that its decision "may have far-reaching effects on the operation of the National
Government."
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ergy Regulatory Commission190 (CECA), and its summary affirmance, in-
dicate that a one-house veto of broadly applicable agency rules contains
the same fatal defects as the more narrowly tailored veto invalidated in
Chadha. In the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978191 (NGPA), Congress
directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to imple-
ment an incremental pricing program 192 designed to shift a portion of the
price increases due to the deregulation of certain categories of natural gas
from residential to industrial users. 193 In Phase I of the program, the
FERC was required to enact a rule applying these price increases to
boiler fuel use of natural gas by any industrial boiler fuel facility. 1 94 To
implement phase two, Congress directed the FERC to issue a rule apply-
ing the program to any industrial facility within a category defined by the
FERC.1 95 The agency issued a rule that covered all industrial users not
specifically exempted by statute. 196 Pursuant to section 202(c) of the
NGPA, 197 the House passed a resolution vetoing the rule.
198
The court of appeals, in a decision handed down before Chadha,
held that section 202(c) of the NGPA was unconstitutional for two rea-
sons.199 First, by preventing the President from exercising his veto
power and by permitting legislative action by only one house of Con-
gress, section 202(c) violated the presentment clauses and the bicamera-
lism requirements. 200 Presaging the opinion of the Supreme Court in
190. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affld sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
191. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
192. Id. §§ 3341-3348.
193. 673 F.2d at 433-35.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 3341 (1982).
195. Id. § 3342(a)(1), (b)(2).
196. See 673 F.2d at 436; 45 Fed. Reg. 31,622 (1980).
197. Section 202(c) of the NGPA provides that any rule adopted by FERC to implement
Phase II of incremental pricing "shall take effect" a specified time after promulgation "unless,
during [such time]. . . either House of the Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval." 15
U.S.C. § 3342(c)(1) (1982).
198. H.R. Res. 655, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 11,816-17 (1980).
199. The court did not reach the issue of whether the veto provision was an improper,
standardless delegation of legislative authority by Congress. While the court referred to "evi-
dence that the Supreme Court has not written [the nondelegation doctrine] off," it declined to
"pronounce a revival" of it in this case, especially since to do so would have required extending
the doctrine to congressional delegations to parts of Congress itself. See 673 F.2d at 448 n.82;
cf. id. at 467 (contending that if Congress made no policy determination about Phase II of
incremental pricing when it passed the NGPA, "serious questions as to the validity of the
Phase II delegation itself" would exist). But cf Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380,
388-91 (6th Cir. 1984) (delegation of authority to the President under the Reorganization Act
of 1977, which contains legislative veto provisions, is accompanied by sufficient standards to
withstand attack under the nondelegation doctrine).
200. 673 F.2d at 448, 457. The court deemed these "the fundamental prerequisites to the
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Chadha, the court of appeals in CECA relied largely on the fundamental
purposes of the procedural requirements of article I. By failing to require
that the House disapproval resolution be presented to the President, sec-
tion 202(c) impaired his ability to check unwise legislation and so contra-
vened the fundamental purpose of the presentment clauses. 20 1 Requiring
disapproval by only one house was inconsistent with the overriding ob-
jective of bicameralism: to impose constraints on the exercise of federal
legislative power.
20 2
The court in CECA, unlike the Supreme Court in Chadha, relied
upon the separation of powers doctrine as a second, independent basis for
invalidating the legislative veto. The NGPA veto provision contravened
the principle of separation of powers by authorizing the legislature to
enactment of federal laws." Id. at 456. The President's opportunity to veto the original legis-
lation containing the one-house veto provision was not sufficient to comply with the require-
ments of the presentment clause. Id. at 460 n. 146; cf. infra note 201.
201. Id. at 463. The presentment and bicameralism requirements applied to the House
veto of the Phase II rule because that action constituted a congressional reconsideration of its
previously enacted policy, which is precisely the kind of decision requiring full compliance
with the article I procedures. See id. at 468, 470, 473. This analysis foreshadowed some of the
factors relied on by the Supreme Court in Chadha. See supra notes 125-31 & accompanying
text. The procedure authorized in § 202(c) of the NGPA arguably, however, does not interfere
with the President's ability to protect his authority from encroachment by the legislative
branch. That defensive purpose of the presidential veto was fulfilled by the President's oppor-
tunity to veto the NGPA when it was first enacted in 1978. 673 F.2d at 464 n.166.
202. Id. at 464. The court emphatically rejected the claim that the procedural require-
ments of article I did not apply because the Phase II rule was merely a legislative proposal
rather than an operative legislative action, reasoning that the House "acted" because it affirma-
tively passed a resolution that altered the substantive law. See id. at 465-66 & n. 170.
The court also dismissed two other theories for upholding the one-house veto mechanism
in § 202(c). Congressional amici in the CECA case contended that the one-house veto was
proper under a "reverse legislation" theory, whereby the roles of the legislative and executive
branches are reversed in time but not in substance. Even if the "reverse legislation" theory
were viable, a proposition about which the court expressed "grave" doubts, the theory was
inapplicable to § 202(c) of the NGPA because (1) the FERC, an independent agency, formu-
lated the Phase II rule, not the President; (2) the FERC was required, not merely permitted, to
issue the rule; and (3) the § 202(c) veto disrupted an ongoing administrative program. Id. at
458 n.138, 465 n.167. The "reverse legislation" theory is described in Dixon, The Congres-
sional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive On A Leash, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423, 481-86
(1978).
Nor could the House veto of the Phase 1I rule be sustained on the theory that non-objec-
tion of either house was a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the rule. Under this view,
the rule never became effective because the "condition" (non-objection by both houses) was
never fulfilled. Thus, the veto did not operate to change law that had already gone into effect.
See 673 F.2d at 469. A similar argument could be made concerning the legislative veto in
Chadha. See supra notes 146-50 & accompanying text. The CECA court disposed of this
argument by noting that if it were accepted, Congress could use "conditions" as a means of
circumventing completely the constitutional restrictions on article I legislative power.
"Merely styling something as a condition on a grant of power does not make that condition
constitutional." 673 F.2d at 470.
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share powers properly exercised only by the other two branches of the
federal government. 20 3 By creating a device that enabled it to control
agency rulemaking, the court reasoned, Congress improperly interfered
with administrative discretion vested in the executive branch.2°4 By de-
ciding that the rule issued by the FERC was inconsistent with section
202 of the NGPA, Congress also usurped judicial authority because it
prevented the courts from reviewing the rule's validity. 205
The Supreme Court also summarily affirmed a court of appeals deci-
sion, Consumers Union v. F T.C.,206 invalidating a two-house veto of a
rule promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In August
1981 the FTC issued a rule requiring warranty coverage and disclosure
of information in connection with the sale of used cars.207 The FTC sub-
mitted the rule to Congress as required by section 21(0(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,208 and Congress passed a
concurrent resolution disapproving the rule.209 The court of appeals held
that the resolution was unconstitutional for the same reasons that it in-
validated the FERC's incremental pricing rule in the CECA decision.
210
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the Consumers Union
decision extends the effect of Chadha to a two-house veto of agency rules
even though in this situation the requirement of bicameral action had
been fully satisfied. Apparently, a violation of the presentment clauses is
a sufficient basis for invalidating a congressional veto mechanism.
The Constitutionality of the FLPMA Veto Provisions
The provisions of FLPMA reflect Congress' attempt to allocate be-
tween the executive and legislative branches the power to formulate and
203. Id. at 448, 470-71.
204. Id. at 471-72. The court rejected the notion that "separation of powers is a mere
theoretical construct with little or no practical significance." Id. Further, the court held that
the separation of powers doctrine applies to independent regulatory agencies. Id. at 472. The
one-house veto in § 202(c) violates the doctrine because it enables Congress to participate pro-
spectively in the approval or disapproval of "law" "enacted" by the executive branch pursuant
to a congressional delegation of authority. As a result, Congress improperly expands its role
from oversight to shared administration of an executive branch function. Id. at 474.
205. Id. at 477-78.
206. 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983).
207. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a) (1982). The rule would become effective unless both houses of
Congress adopted a concurrent resolution of disapproval within a specified time. Id. § 57a-
l(a)(2).
209. S. Con. Res. 60, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S5402 (daily ed. May 18,
1982), 128 CONG. REC. H2883 (daily ed. May 26, 1982).
210. 691 F.2d at 577-78.
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to implement public lands management policy. The Act delegates to the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to manage the public lands
through various techniques such as sales, withdrawals, and other man-
agement decisions. The Act also imposes clear limits on the Secretary's
power to sell211 or to withdraw land.21 2 For example, the Secretary must
notify Congress of certain decisions, which Congress may then review
and reverse by legislative veto. If the legislative veto provisions are un-
constitutional under the analysis of Chadha, CECA, and Consumers
Union, then FLPMA's principal mechanism for limiting the Secretary's
discretion will be stricken from the statute. The result is a re-allocation
of power over the public lands that differs from the one Congress envi-
sioned when it enacted FLPMA.
If the FLPMA vetoes can be distinguished from those in Chadha,
then the balance of power over public lands policy struck by Congress in
1976 will remain in effect. This part analyzes two possible bases for dis-
tinguishing the legislative veto provisions of FLPMA from those invali-
dated in Chadha, CECA, and Consumers Union. This section first
considers whether the three different types of congressional vetoes in
FLPMA exhibit the Chadha factors and so are "legislative" in their char-
acter and effect. Under the first type (the termination veto), the Secre-
tary makes a decision pursuant to the authority delegated to him in the
Act. After that decision goes into effect, Congress may terminate the
action by enacting a concurrent resolution of disapproval. 213 Under the
second type (the prevention veto), the Secretary proposes to undertake
certain action, but Congress may veto the proposal by concurrent resolu-
tion before it ever becomes effective.2 4 The third type of veto in
FLPMA (the committee-directive veto) involves a directive by a commit-
tee of one house to the Secretary to take certain action that the Secretary
would not necessarily have taken on his own. 215
This section then considers whether, assuming that congressional
actions under the various types of vetoes in FLPMA are legislative ac-
tions, congressional vetoes under FLPMA may nevertheless prove to be
constitutional. The unique issue raised by the FLPMA veto provisions is
whether Congress can implement its broad authority over the public
lands under the property clause of the Constitution without complying
211. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1), (10) (1982); see infra notes 424-28 & accompanying text.
212. Id. § 1701(a)(4); see infra notes 418-23 & accompanying text.
213. E.g., id. § 1714(c)(1).
214. E.g., id. § 1713(c).
215. E.g., id. § 1714(e).
[Vol. 36
LEGISLATIVE VETO: SEVERABILITY
with the article I requirements of bicameral action and presidential
presentment.
This section concludes that each of the three types of veto provisions
in FLPMA involves action that is legislative in character and effect. This
section also concludes that those provisions are unconstitutional because,
although the question is a difficult one, congressional actions under the
property clause2 16 are not exempt from article I procedural requirements.
The Legislative Character and Effect of the FLPMA Veto Provisions
The Termination Vetoes
'Withdrawals
FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to make withdraw-
als21 7 of public lands pursuant to certain procedures.218 The Secretary is
authorized to initiate a withdrawal aggregating less than five thousand
acres upon his own initiative or upon request by a federal department or
agency head.219 Such a withdrawal may last for as long as the Secretary
deems desirable if the withdrawal is for a resource use.220 For any other
use,221 the withdrawal may not exceed twenty years.222
216. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto mechanisms of FLPMA, see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LI-
BRARY OF CONGRESS, THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v
.CHADHA ON CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT
(1983) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT]; Comment,
Chadha and the Public Lands: Is FLPMA Affected?, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 55 (1984).
217. Under FLPMA, the term "withdrawal" means
withholding an area of Federal land from settlement, sale, location, or entry, under
some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of limiting activities under those
laws in order to maintain other public values in the area or reserving the area for a
particular public purpose or program; or transferring jurisdiction over an area of
Federal land other than "property" governed by the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act, as amended (40 U.S.C. 472) from one department, bureau or
agency to another department, bureau or agency.
43 U.S.C. § 17020) (1982). The Secretary cannot (1) make, modify, or revoke any withdrawal
created by act of Congress, (2) make a withdrawal which can be made only by act of Congress,
(3) modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under the Antiquities Act,
or (4) modify or revoke any withdrawal which added lands to the National Wildlife Refuge
System prior to the enactment of FLPMA. Id. § 1714(j).
218. Id. § 1714(a)-(1 ). "The Secretary may delegate this withdrawal authority only to
individuals in the Office of the Secretary who have been appointed by the President" with
Senate approval. Id. § 1714(a).
219. Id. § 1714(d). The Secretary must publish a notice in the Federal Register whenever
he receives an application for a withdrawal or proposes a withdrawal, other than an emergency
withdrawal, on his own motion. Id. § 1714(b)(1).
220. Id. § 1714(d)(1), (2).
221. Such uses include, but are not limited to, administrative sites, location of facilities,
and other proprietary purposes. Id. § 1714(d)(2).
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Secretarial withdrawals of five thousand acres or more (large-tract
withdrawals) are subject to congressional veto. 223 The Secretary is au-
thorized to make such a withdrawal for a period of twenty years or
less, 224 but he must notify both houses of Congress no later than the
effective date of the withdrawal225 and submit certain information to the
appropriate congressional committees so that Congress can decide
whether to disapprove the withdrawal. 226 If Congress adopts a concur-
rent resolution of disapproval within ninety days of the notice, 227 the
withdrawal is terminated.228 Thus, Congress' authority under section
204(c)(1) to veto a large-tract withdrawal by concurrent resolution is a
termination veto because the veto terminates a withdrawal that has al-
ready gone into effect.
Congressional disapproval of a large-tract withdrawal must comply
with the presentment and bicameralism requirements of article I if that
disapproval constitutes action that is "legislative in its character and ef-
fect. ' '229 The Chadha Court said that a congressional action has this
character if it alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons
outside the legislative branch.230 A veto of a large-tract withdrawal
would alter the Secretary of the Interior's legal duties by restricting the
scope of his discretion in managing the affected land.231 Unless Congress
222. Id. Withdrawals to preserve a tract for a specific use then under consideration by
Congress may not last more than five years. Id. § 1714(d)(3).
223. Id. § 1714(c).
224. Id. § 1714(c)(1). The Secretary is required to review all withdrawals having a specific
period whether they were made before or after the passage of FLPMA. If the Secretary de-
cides to extend a withdrawal aggregating 5,000 acres or more, that extension is subject to the
same notice requirements and congressional veto procedures applicable to original withdraw-
als of such size. Id. §§ 1714(0, 1714(c)(1). The Secretary can extend a withdrawal only if he
determines that the purpose for which the withdrawal was originally made requires the exten-
sion, and the period of the extension may not exceed the length of the original withdrawal. Id.
§ 1714(f).
225. Id. § 1714(c)(1).
226. Id. § 1714(c)(2). The Secretary has three months following submission to Congress
of notice of an emergency withdrawal to provide this information. Id. Emergency withdraw-
als are discussed infra notes 269-313 & accompanying text.
227. The 90-day period begins on the date of submission but does not include days on
which the Senate or House has adjourned for more than three consecutive days. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1714(c)(1) (1982).
228. Id; see also id. §§ 1712(e)(2), 1713(c), 1714(l )(2).
229. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
230. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
231. In CECA, the court held that the one-house veto of the FERC's Phase II rule consti-
tuted "legislative" action because, though the veto did not amend the statute delegating au-
thority to the agency, it did "alter the scope of the agency's discretion." 673 F.2d at 469. In
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1155 (D.D.C. 1983), the court held that
congressional action forcing the Secretary of the Interior to make an emergency withdrawal
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fully complies with article I procedures, it cannot preempt the Secre-
tary's attempt to exercise the discretion vested in him in FLPMA to
make withdrawals. 232 In addition, in certain situations congressional re-
jection of a large-tract withdrawal could affect the rights of private par-
ties, such as the holders of lease applications under the mining laws.
233
Congressional disapproval of a large-tract withdrawal would also
change the status of the land in question.234 The withdrawal takes effect
when the Secretary acts; upon enactment of a concurrent resolution, the
withdrawal "shall terminate and become ineffective. ' 235 When Congress
under § 204(e) of FLPMA "alters the legal rights and duties of the Secretary of the Interior,
and this cannot be done, according to Chadha, without bicameral passage and presidential
presentment." The same conclusion follows in the situation where Congress in essence
"forces" the Secretary to terminate his large-tract withdrawal. National Wildlife Fed'n is dis-
cussed in more detail infra notes 296-309 & accompanying text. Contra Atkins v. United
States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1065 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (Senate veto of
presidential recommendations under the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361
(1982), that judicial salaries be increased did not violate the requirements of bicameral action
or presidential presentment because the veto did not disrupt "an ongoing or continuing pro-
gram, or . . .interfere with executive discretion in new or existing programs of substantive
character.").
232. See The U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 121 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Legislative Veto Hearings] (statement of Professor Eugene Gressman, interpreting the rules
announced in Chadha).
233. Assume, for example, that the Secretary withdraws a tract of land from mineral loca-
tion or entry under the mineral laws. If nobody had submitted lease applications prior to the
withdrawal, then neither the withdrawal nor its subsequent disapproval would affect anybody's
legal rights in the withdrawn land. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471,
475 (1915).
Even if noncompetitive lease applications under a statute such as the Mineral Lands Leas-
ing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982), had been submitted prior to withdrawal, the
holders of such applications would have no vested property rights to be affected by either the
withdrawal or its disapproval. See Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976); Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1966); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.
1984). Submission of a noncompetitive lease application, however, does give the applicant a
right to have the application properly processed and considered under applicable statutory
criteria. Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1976). If withdrawal did not consti-
tute automatic rejection of the application and if the Secretary did not otherwise reject the
application between the withdrawal and its congressional veto, then the veto could affect pri-
vate rights. Absent the veto, the application eventually would be denied. Congressional veto
of the withdrawal restores the possibility that the application will be granted. Cf. 43 C.F.R.
§ 2310.3-5 (1983) (requiring government compensation for improvements to holders of record
of permits, licenses, or leases terminated or revoked after a withdrawal).
234. For example, if the Secretary of the Interior made a large-tract withdrawal withhold-
ing an area of land from location or entry under the mining laws, the veto would again permit
public access to that land. Cf. 43 U.S.C. § 17020) (1982) (defining "withdrawal") (reprinted
supra note 217).
235. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 26, at 9,
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 439.
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adopts a concurrent resolution disapproving a large-tract withdrawal, "it
affirmatively passes some . . . resolution that alters the substantive
law."' 236 The alteration of the status of the land covered by the with-
drawal thus provides additional support for the contention that congres-
sional veto of a large-tract withdrawal is "legislative" action under the
Chadha analysis.
The other two factors cited by the Chadha court as confirming the
legislative character of an action are also present in a termination veto.
Absent its resolution of disapproval, Congress could terminate a large-
tract withdrawal only by enacting legislation.237 An attempt to do so
through the exercise of a one-house veto is tantamount to an attempt to
amend or repeal the initial delegation to the Secretary to make large-tract
withdrawals and thus constitutes "legislative" action under the Chadha
analysis. 238 If, in addition, the resolution reflects a disagreement between
the executive and legislative branches on policy grounds, rather than a
congressional determination that the Secretary has failed to comply with
statutory procedures, 23 9 then the veto also constitutes legislative action
under the third Chadha factor. The veto of a large-tract withdrawal is
therefore a "legislative" action according to the Chadha analysis and
must comply with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of ar-
ticle I.2
4°
236. Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673
F.2d 425, 466 n.170 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub noma. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Con-
sumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
237. H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 26, at 9, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 439. The property clause, U.S. CONT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, may vest
in Congress the power to administer the public lands free of article I constraints. If so, then
Congress can terminate a large-tract withdrawal without enacting legislation, and a concurrent
resolution disapproving a large-tract withdrawal would not be a "legislative" action in the
Chadha sense. The issue of whether the property clause authorizes congressional action with-
out full compliance with the requirements of presentment and bicameralism of article I is
discussed infra notes 314-77 & accompanying text.
238. See supra note 130 & accompanying text.
239. The disputes arising from Secretary of the Interior Watt's reluctance to implement
emergency measures ordered by a House Committee reflects a policy disagreement between the
two branches. See infra notes 276-309.
240. Congressional use of any of the FLPMA veto provisions apparently would reflect in
most cases disagreement with executive branch action on policy grounds. Cf. CECA, 673 F.2d
at 468-70 (one-house veto of the FERC's incremental pricing rule changed congressional pol-
icy determinations made at the time of enactment of the NGPA); Legislative Veto Hearings,
supra note 232, at 32 (testimony of Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the Clerk, House of
Representatives, that after Chadha, "[a]ny time you make policy you have to do it by passing a
bicameral bill and presentment to the President"); Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at 801
(suggesting that Chadha means "that whatever is done by the House or Senate is definitionally




FLPMA requires that the Secretary develop land use plans for all of
the public lands.24 1 The Secretary must comply with a series of direc-
tives, such as adherence to the principles of multiple use and sustained
yield, in formulating. these plans.242 The Secretary may issue manage-
ment decisions to implement the land use plans.243 If, however, a man-
agement decision concerning a tract of 100,000 acres or more (large-tract
management decision) totally eliminates one or more of the principal or
major uses244 of that tract for two or more years, the Secretary must
report that decision to Congress. 245 If Congress adopts a concurrent res-
olution disapproving the management decision within thirty days of noti-
fication, the Secretary must terminate that decision. 246
Congressional disapproval of a large-tract management decision,
like the veto of a large-tract withdrawal, would reverse a secretarial ac-
tion that had already gone into effect, altering both the scope of the Sec-
retary's discretion in managing the public lands and the status of the
affected land.247 Moreover, lacking the legislative veto mechanism, Con-
gress could overrule a management decision only by enacting new legisla-
tion that amended or repealed the original delegation of management
authority to the Secretary. Finally, congressional reversal of a large-tract
241. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982).
242. The Secretary is also required, among other things, to
give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental con-
cern;. , . consider present and potential uses of the public lands; consider the rela-
tive scarcity of the values involved and the availability of alternative means. . . and
sites for realization of those values; weigh long-term benefits to the public against
short-term benefits; [and] provide for compliance with applicable pollution control
laws.
Id. § 1712(c)(3), (5)-(8).
243. Id. § 1712(e).
244. The term "principal or major uses" means "domestic livestock grazing, fish and wild-
life development and utilization, mineral exploration and production, rights-of-way, outdoor
recreation, and timber production." Id. § 1702(o.
245. Id. § 1712(e)(2).
246. The 90-day period excludes days on which either House has adjourned for more than
three consecutive days. Id.
247. Cf supra notes 230-36 & accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note
26, at 46, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 476 (This reflects
the Interior Department's view that congressional veto of a large-tract management decision
"could completely disrupt an on-going management program. The budgetary implications and
potential for disruption are enormous. The entire process may involve Congress in managerial
rather than policy aspects of programs that are not within its organizational capabilities."):
The application of the first Chadha test to large-tract management decisions would be
identical to the analysis applicable to large-tract withdrawals if the management decision in-
cluded a withdrawal. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(3) (1982) (withdrawals under § 204 of FLPMA
may be used in carrying out management decisions under § 202(e)).
September 1984]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
management decision would represent a disagreement with secretarial
actions on policy grounds. Thus, the veto of a large-tract management
decision is a legislative action under the Chadha analysis.
The Prevention Vetoes
Terminations of Withdrawals
FLPMA authorizes Congress to reject attempts by the Secretary to
terminate certain withdrawals. Within fifteen years of the enactment of
FLPMA, the Secretary must review withdrawals that were made before
FLPMA took effect 248 and recommend to the President whether to con-
tinue or to terminate such withdrawals. 249 The President must transmit
his and the Secretary's recommendations to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House.250 The Secretary can terminate these
withdrawals (other than those made by an act of Congress) in accordance
with the President's recommendations unless within ninety days Con-
gress adopts a concurrent resolution to the contrary.
251
The legal effect of the Secretary's decision to terminate these with-
drawals is unclear. On the one hand, a secretarial termination can be
interpreted as taking effect immediately, subject to congressional reversal
by concurrent resolution. If this interpretation of the statute is correct,
then FLPMA's mechanism for congressional disapproval of a termina-
tion of withdrawal is a termination veto because the disapproval resolu-
tion would terminate a secretarial decision that had already gone into
effect. The disapproval resolution would then be a "legislative" action
under the Chadha analysis for the same reasons that the other two
FLPMA termination vetoes would be.
252
248. The review process encompasses withdrawals of lands in Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 43
U.S.C. § 1714(/)(1) (1982). The Secretary's review must include (1) withdrawals of federal
lands administered by agencies other than the BLM (with certain exceptions, such as Indian
reservations and lands included within the National Forest System, the National Park System,
the National Wildlife Refuge System, the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and the
National System of Trails), and (2) withdrawals of public lands administered by the BLM and
of lands in the National Forest System (except those in wilderness areas and those designated
as primitive or natural areas or as national recreation areas) which closed those lands to min-
eral appropriation. Id.
249. A withdrawal should be continued if such action would be "consistent with the statu-
tory objectives of the programs for which the lands were dedicated and of the other relevant
programs." Id. § 1714(l )(2).
250. Id.
251. Id. The 90-day period begins running on the date the President's recommendations
are submitted, but does not include days on which the Senate and House have adjourned for
more than three consecutive days.
252. Congressional rejection of a secretarial termination of withdrawal would both limit
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On the other hand, one can interpret FLPMA as merely authorizing
the Secretary to propose a termination of withdrawal. The termination
would not actually occur until the review period expired without con-
gressional disapproval, and Congress could prevent the termination by
enacting a disapproval resolution. This interpretation of the termination
provisions of the Act seems more consistent with the language of the
statute253 and with Congress' apparent purpose in retaining a veto power.
If the Secretary's termination of a withdrawal were immediately effective,
then the Secretary could authorize activities on the land which could
irreparably alter the character of the land before Congress had an oppor-
tunity to act. Delaying the effective date of the termination until the end
of the review period would ensure that Congress retains the ability to
override the Secretary's decision.
If the Secretary's termination does not take effect until the end of
the review period, then a congressional veto of a decision to terminate a
withdrawal has an effect different from that of the two termination vetoes
considered above. Arguably, the use of the prevention veto would not
constitute an action that is "legislative in its character and effect." Con-
gressional disapproval of the Secretary's proposed termination would al-
ter neither the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch nor
the status of the land, because that disapproval would merely prevent the
Secretary's proposal from ever becoming operative. The veto would not
alter the Secretary's discretion because the Secretary's authority to termi-
nate withdrawals was subject to a condition precedent-the failure of
Congress to enact a disapproval resolution. The land would remain
withdrawn throughout the process of secretarial proposal and congres-
sional review. Similarly, the veto of a proposed termination would not
constitute an attempt to amend or repeal the initial statutory delegation,
because that delegation did not authorize the Secretary to terminate
withdrawals unless Congress failed to object within the prescribed period
for review. Applying the Chadha factors, then, the veto would not be a
legislative action.
254
the Secretary's discretion and alter the status of the land. It would also represent an attempt to
amend or repeal the initial delegation of authority to the Secretary and an attempt by Congress
to overturn a secretarial decision on policy grounds without enacting legislation. See supra
text accompanying notes 230-40.
253. Section 204(1 )(2) authorizes the Secretary to terminate a withdrawal "unless before
the end of ninety days. . . the Congress has adopted a concurrent resolution indicating other-
wise." 43 U.S.C. § 1714(l)(2) (1982); cf id. § 1714(c)(1) (Secretary must notify Congress of a
large-tract withdrawal "no later than its effective date and the withdrawal shall terminate and
become ineffective" if Congress enacts a disapproval resolution).
254. This attempt to distinguish a prevention-type veto from a termination-type veto
would be less convincing with respect to the third of the Chadha factors for legislative action.
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The court of appeals in CECA, however, rejected a similar argument
that a prevention veto was not subject to article I procedural require-
ments. Section 202 of the NGPA provided that the Phase II incremental
pricing rule would take effect unless disapproved by Congress. 25 5 The
court dismissed the contention that the Phase II rule was merely a pro-
posed regulation. 256 The veto "prevent[ed] an otherwise valid regulation
from taking effect" and therefore altered the status quo.257 Similarly,
even if a secretarial decision to terminate a withdrawal is not immedi-
ately effective, a congressional veto prevents it from becoming so and is
therefore a legislative act. Furthermore, like the termination veto, 258 the
prevention veto alters the Secretary's discretion, because the Secretary is
prevented from authorizing uses of the land that would have been per-
missible had the withdrawal been terminated.
259
The other factors confirming legislative character in Chadha are also
demonstrated by the prevention veto. If the Secretary properly termi-
nates a withdrawal pursuant to his statutory authority,260 then Congress
has no mechanism (other than the prevention veto) to prevent that termi-
nation except through the enactment of legislation.26' The use of the
Congressional rejection of the Secretary's proposed termination would appear to reflect a pol-
icy disagreement between the two branches.
255. 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c)(1) (1982); supra note 197. Similarly, the legislative veto provi-
sion invalidated in Consumers Union stated that FTC rules would become effective unless both
houses of Congress adopted a disapproval resolution. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a) (1982); supra note
208.
256. This argument was made in two different contexts in CECA. Following congressional
disapproval of the rule, the FERC revoked it. Petitioners claimed first that this revocation was
invalid because the agency did not comply with the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982). The court agreed, rejecting the
view that the FERC revoked proposed regulations rather than a final rule. 673 F.2d at 446
n.74. Second, congressional amici submitted that the article I procedures did not apply to the
congressional veto of the Phase II rule since it was never an effective law, but merely a propo-
sal to be accepted or rejected by Congress. The court disagreed. 673 F.2d at 465.
257. 673 F.2d at 465. But cf. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1063 (Ct. Cl. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (The President's recommendations for judicial salary in-
creases pursuant to the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1982), have "only the
potentiality of becoming law." Therefore, a one-house veto of such recommendations "only
preserves the legal status quo.").
258. See supra notes 230-32 & accompanying text; cf CECA, 673 F.2d at 465, 469 ("there
is no question that the effect of a congressional veto [of the Phase II rule] is to alter the scope
of the agency's discretion").
259. The veto of a secretarial proposal to terminate a withdrawal could also affect the
rights of persons outside the government. See supra note 233 for a discussion of the applicant's
right to have a lease application fully considered. But see Strauss, Comment, supra note 133, at
805-06 (withdrawal of federal lands affects the interests of private persons only indirectly).
260. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1982).
261. Cf. Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 999-1000 (D. Mont. 1981) (hold-
ing that the Secretary alone has the authority to set the terms and duration of a withdrawal),
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veto, therefore, would be tantamount to the repeal or amendment of the
initial statutory delegation of authority to terminate withdrawals. In ad-
dition, overturning a termination through a two-house veto would consti-
tute a reversal on policy grounds of the Secretary's decision. Chadha
indicates that such a reversal is a "legislative" act.
Sales
The Secretary is authorized by FLPMA to sell a tract of the public
lands if he determines, as part of a comprehensive planning process en-
compassing all of the public lands, 262 that the sale would meet the Act's
specific disposal criteria. 263 If the Secretary decides to sell a tract of
more than 2,500 acres (large-tract sale), 264 he must first notify both
houses of Congress. 265 The sale may proceed only if Congress does not
adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval within ninety days of the
notice.
2 66
The statute clearly prohibits any proposed large-tract sale from be-
coming effective until the end of the congressional review period. 267
Thus, like terminations of withdrawals, large-tract sales are subject to a
prevention veto. Enactment of a concurrent resolution disapproving a
large-tract sale would alter the status quo, thereby satisfing Chadha's
modified and clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont. 1982). But see National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1155 (D.D.C. 1983) (stating that such an interpretation of § 204(e)
would deprive the provision of all its force). The statement in the text is subject to qualifica-
tion if Congress is authorized by the property clause to govern the public lands without adher-
ence to article I procedures. See infra notes 314-77 & accompanying text.
262. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1982). For a discussion of the provisions of FLPMA concerning
disposals of the public lands, see generally Note, Sales of Public Land: A Problem in Legisla-
tive and Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 96 HARV. L. REV. 927 (1983).
263. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1982). The land use planning process is described supra notes
241-46 & accompanying text. See 43 U.S.C. § 1713 (1982) for a list of requirements, both
substantive and procedural, imposed on the Secretary in the exercise of his land disposal
authority.
264. "The Secretary shall determine. . . the size of tracts. . . to be sold on the basis of
the land use capabilities and development requirements of the lands ..... 43 U.S.C.
§ 1713(e) (1982).
265. Id. § 1713(c).
266. The 90 days include the date on'which the notice was submitted, but not days on
which either the House or Senate has adjourned for more than three consecutive days. Id.
The Secretary is obligated to provide writteh acceptance or rejection of competitive bidding
offers to purchase no later than 30 days after the receipt of the offer or at the end of 30 days
after the congressional review period, whichever is later. Id. § 1713(g). Prior to the expiration
of those time periods, the Secretary may refuse to accept any offer or withdraw any land from
sale if the sale would not be consistent with FLPMA or another law. Id.
267. The statutory language governing large-tract sales does not appear to be subject to
the same ambiguity as the provisions governing termination of withdrawals. See supra notes
252-54 & accompanying text.
September 1984]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
legal rights standard for reasons analogous to those applicable to a termi-
nation of withdrawal. 268 The veto of a large-tract sale would also consti-
tute legislative action under the other Chadha factors. Unless it uses the
congressional veto mechanism or enacts a statute prohibiting the sale,
Congress cannot stop a sale once it has delegated the authority to make
sales to the Secretary. In addition, any attempt to veto a large-tract sale
would represent a disagreement with the Secretary on policy grounds.
The veto of a large-tract sale would therefore be characterized as a legis-
lative act under the Chadha analysis.
The Committee-Directive Veto: Emergency Withdrawals
FLPMA authorizes the Secretary to make an emergency withdrawal
whenever it is determined that "an emergency situation exists and that
extraordinary measures must be taken to preserve values that would
otherwise be lost."'2 69 If the appropriate House or Senate committee
2 70
notifies the Secretary that it has made such a determination, then the
Secretary must immediately make a withdrawal (committee-initiated
emergency withdrawal) of the land described in the committee's notifica-
tion.2 7 1 An emergency withdrawal, whether initiated by the Secretary or
by a congressional committee, is effective when made and cannot last
more than three years.
272
It is not immediately apparent that the emergency-withdrawal pro-
visions of FLPMA possess the attributes of a legislative veto. These pro-
visions make possible congressional oversight of emergency withdrawals
in two situations. In the first situation, the Secretary is required to notify
one committee in each house if he decides that an emergency withdrawal
is appropriate. The emergency withdrawal becomes effective as soon as
the Secretary orders it,273 but Congress can enact a statute terminating
the emergency withdrawal if it disagrees with the Secretary's decision.
268. See supra notes 231-33, 258-59 & accompanying text.
269. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982).
270. FLPMA authorizes the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of either the
House or the Senate to issue the determination that initiates the emergency-withdrawal pro-
cess. Id. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs was replaced by the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources effective February 11, 1977. See Pacific Legal
Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 986 n.5 (D. Mont. 1981).
271. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982). The Secretary must notify both committees that he has
made the emergency withdrawal in accordance with the committee's directive. Id.
272. Id. Extension of an emergency withdrawal aggregating 5000 or more acres is subject
to the notice and congressional veto provisions applicable to original withdrawals of corre-
sponding size. Id. §§ 1714(c)(1), (e). If an emergency withdrawal of less than 5000 acres is
extended, these procedures do not apply. Id. §§ 1714(d), (e).
273. Id. § 1714(e).
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Such a procedure implicates none of the constitutional questions raised
by the termination or prevention vetoes in FLPMA. 274
FLPMA also makes congressional oversight of emergency with-
drawals possible by authorizing either of the appropriate congressional
committees to direct the Secretary to make an emergency withdrawal.
The issuance of congressional directives to the executive branch is com-
monplace, and statutory directives are not normally viewed as legislative
vetoes of administrative action. FLPMA's committee-initiated emer-
gency withdrawal provisions present a difficulty, however, because the
directive comes from a committee of one house, rather than the full Con-
gress. The courts have addressed the constitutionality of these provisions
in two recent cases. 275 These decisions indicate that the committee-initi-
ated emergency-withdrawal provisions of FLPMA may indeed have the
same infirmities as the termination and prevention vetoes of the Act.
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt
In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt,276 an organization whose mem-
bers included holders of noncompetitive lease applications to lands
within three wilderness areas challenged the validity of a withdrawal or-
der issued by the Secretary of the Interior. Beginning in 1970, more than
three hundred noncompetitive lease applications were filed with the
BLM in three parts of the National Wilderness Preservation System.277
On May 21, 1981, the Forest Service published a notice of preparation of
an environmental impact statement as the basis for recommendations to
274. Reversal of the Secretary's emergency withdrawal by this procedure would seem even
less objectionable than use by Congress of a report-and-wait requirement. Under that proce-
dure, also known as the "laying system," Congress requires that agency action lay before Con-
gress for a specified time before going into effect, thus allowing Congress to review the agency
action. During that time, Congress has the opportunity to nullify the agency action by passing
a statute, which does not become effective until presentment to, and approval by, the Presi-
dent. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2776 n.9; Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941); CECA,
673 F.2d at 474 n.206; Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 648-49 (D.C. Cir.), affid mem. sub nom.
Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977). The report-and-wait procedure is constitutionally valid
because it fully comports with the procedures in article I. The FLPMA committee-directive
provision places even less constraint on the Secretary's decision to make an emergency with-
drawal, since that decision is immediately effective, subject to termination only upon subse-
quent enactment of a statute.
275. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 577 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1984), 571 F. Supp. 1145
(D.D.C. 1983); Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981), modified and
clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont. 1982).
276. 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1982), modified and clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D.
Mont. 1982). This decision is analyzed in Zafferano, Legal And Policy Implications of Pacific
Legal Foundation v. James Watt, 3 PuB. LAND L. Rtv. 51 (1982).
277. The lease applications had been filed in the Bob Marshall, Great Bear, and Scapegoat
Wilderness Areas. 529 F. Supp. at 985.
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the Secretary of the Interior on pending leases, including those in the
three wilderness areas.278 On the same day, the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs adopted a resolution stating that an emer-
gency situation existed in the three wilderness areas and directing the
Secretary immediately to withdraw the lands from all forms of disposi-
tion under the mineral laws until January 1, 1984.279 The Secretary is-
sued an order withdrawing 1.5 million acres of land in the three
wilderness areas, although he questioned the Committee's finding that an
emergency existed, as well as the constitutionality of the Committee's
directive and his statutory authority to make the withdrawal. 280
The Pacific Legal Foundation contended that the committee-initi-
ated emergency-withdrawal provisions of FLPMA violated the require-
ments of presidential presentment and bicameral action and the principle
of separation of powers.28' The district court avoided ruling on the con-
stitutional question by concluding that, although the Act permits a com-
mittee of either house to direct an emergency withdrawal by the
Secretary, the Secretary retains the exclusive authority to set the terms
and duration of the withdrawal.
282
The court stated in dicta that without such a limitation on the au-
thority of the committees, the committee-initiated emergency-with-
drawal provisions would be unconstitutional on two grounds.28 3 First, if
a committee of one house could dictate the terms and duration of an
emergency withdrawal, then FLPMA would violate the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers by authorizing the legislature to interfere with the exclu-
sive functions of the executive and judicial branches.284 Under that
278. Id. at 985-86; 46 Fed. Reg. 27,735 (1981).
279. 529 F. Supp. at 986. The Wilderness Act provided that all mineral exploration and
new leasing in designated wilderness leases would cease permanently at midnight December
31, 1983. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1982).
280. 529 F. Supp. at 986-87. The court rejected the Secretary's assertion that FLPMA
does not authorize withdrawals from disposition under the mineral leasing laws, noting various
provisions of the statute that specifically address withdrawals from mineral leasing. Id. at 995-
98.
281. Id. at 987. Plaintiffs also argued that the committee's action deprived them of due
process but the court's opinion focused on the separation of powers issue. Id. at 1002-04.
282. Id. at 998-1000, 1004. The court stated that the Secretary must exercise this discre-
tion in a manner consistent with the goals and procedural requirements of FLPMA. Although
§ 204(e) authorizes the appropriate committees to find that an emergency situation exists, the
Secretary can revoke a withdrawal ordered by a committee after a "reasonable time." Id. at
1000. In dictum, the court stated that an emergency withdrawal should remain in effect at
least until the Secretary files with the committee the reports required by § 204(e) of FLPMA.
Id. at 1000 n.35; see also supra note 226 & accompanying text.
283. The court's analysis of the constitutional issue relied heavily on the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Chadha, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
284. Pacific Legal Found., 529 F. Supp. at 1002-04. The court's separation of powers
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interpretation, the statute could be viewed as a device for correcting ex-
ecutive misapplication of the public lands legislation. It would thus in-
terfere with the functions of the courts, which would thereby be
prevented from reviewing executive action under those statutes.285 Fur-
thermore, if the Act's committee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provi-
sion authorized the executive and legislative branches continually to
share the administration of the public lands, then the provision would
permit undue legislative interference with executive implementation of
the statute and so would contravene the doctrine of separation of
powers.
286
Second, unless committee authority under FLPMA's emergency-
withdrawal provisions were construed narrowly, those provisions would
violate the Constitution by authorizing legislative action absent full com-
pliance with article I procedures. 28 7 An unrestricted committee-initiated
emergency-withdrawal power could be viewed as the exercise of a
residual legislative power. In this case, the House committee's resolution
effectively would have reversed, at least temporarily, 288 a decision
reached by Congress and approved by the President when the Wilderness
Act was passed in 1964. In that Act, Congress forged a compromise
between conservationists, who wanted an immediate end to mineral ex-
ploration and leasing in wilderness areas, and the mining industry, which
opposed closing any wilderness areas to mineral disposition. 289 The Wil-
derness Act prohibited mineral exploration and leasing in wilderness ar-
eas only until December 31, 1983.290 If the duration of the emergency
withdrawal at issue in Pacific Legal Foundation could be set by a con-
gressional committee, then the committee in effect could alter the provi-
analysis foreshadowed the court of appeal's opinion in the CECA decision. See supra notes
203-05 & accompanying text. The Supreme Court in Chadha, unlike the courts in Pacific
Legal Found. and CECA, did not employ the separation of powers doctrine as a separate
ground for invalidating the legislative veto provision before it. Instead, the Supreme Court
held that § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act violated the article I bicameral
and presentment requirements. Those procedural prerequisites to legislative action reflected
the Framers' separation of powers concerns. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2780-88.
285. 529 F. Supp. at 1002-03. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Chadha would have
invalidated § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the ground that through its
enactment, Congress had assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation
of powers. 103 S. Ct. at 2789.
286. 529 F. Supp. at 1003.
287. Id. This ground, of course, is the basis of the Court's holding in Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
at 2780-88.
288. Emergency withdrawals cannot last more than three years, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e)
(1982), although they can be extended, id. § 1714(c)(1), (d).
289. See 529 F. Supp. at 1003.
290. Id.
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sions of the Wilderness Act by permitting mineral exploration and
leasing before the December 31, 1983 deadline.
The court in Pacific Legal Foundation interpreted the committee-
initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions to avoid the separation of
powers question.29' According to the court, FLPMA impliedly grants
the secretary discretion to set the scope and duration of withdrawals pur-
suant to the goals and procedures of the Act. Because his actions are
subject to judicial review, the provisions do not foster improper interfer-
ence with judicial functions. The Secretary's power to define the parame-
ters of an emergency withdrawal also prevents the legislature from
interfering with the executive branch by changing previously enacted
statutory standards on a case-by-case basis. Finally, as narrowed by the
court, the power of either committee to direct an emergency withdrawal
does not amount to a statutory amendment. Although a committee's
order to make an emergency withdrawal would still require the Secretary
to take affirmative action at the request of a single congressional commit-
tee, the Secretary would retain some discretion in implementing that re-
quest. Under these circumstances, the court deemed the committee's
power sufficiently similar to traditional committee powers and to proper
report-and-wait provisions that it was not subject to the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of article 1.292
If the court's interpretation of the committee-initiated emergency-
withdrawal provisions is correct, a committee-directive to make an emer-
gency withdrawal might escape characterization as a "legislative" action
in the Chadha sense.2 93 The court's conclusion, however, that Congress
intended to vest in the Secretary the exclusive authority to set the terms
and duration of the emergency withdrawal is questionable. As the court
in Pacific Legal Foundation construes the statute, the committee's power
over emergency withdrawals becomes almost nonexistent. If the Secre-
tary is virtually free to ignore a committee-directive to make a with-
drawal,294 that directive is stripped of most, if not all, of its force.2 95 It is
unlikely that Congress meant first to vest oversight functions in the com-
mittee, only to divest it later of those same functions.
291. Id. at 1004.
292. Id.
293. But see infra notes 310-13 & accompanying text.
294. But see supra note 282.
295. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1155 (D.D.C. 1983); see also
infra note 310.
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The district court in Pacific Legal Foundation reached its conclu-
sions prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha. But the validity
of the committee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions was also ad-
dressed by a district court after Chadha was decided. National Wildlife
Federation v. Watt296 involved an emergency withdrawal of lands from
coal leasing. After a lengthy review process2 97 and publication of an en-
vironmental impact statement, the Secretary of the Interior approved an
offer of 790.2 million tons of coal for production and maintenance tracts
in the Fort Union Region of North Dakota and Montana.298 When the
Secretary scheduled a sale of the Fort Union leases, the House Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs requested that the sales be delayed
pending Committee review. 299 The Secretary refused, and the Commit-
tee adopted a resolution directing the Secretary to make an emergency
withdrawal of the Fort Union tracts. 3°° The Secretary nevertheless con-
tinued preparation for the sales, informing the Committee that the com-
mittee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions were unconstitutional
under Chadha and that the Committee's conclusion that an emergency
existed was erroneous. 301 Two environmental protection organizations,
supported by the intervention of the Chairman of the House Committee,
sued to declare the planned sales illegal and to enjoin the Secretary from
implementing them. 302
In granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the court
reasoned that congressional powers under the property clause may not be
subject to the procedural requirements of article 1.303 The court held,
however, that even if the Act's mechanism for committee-initiated emer-
gency withdrawals was unconstitutional, the Interior Department's own
regulations required the Secretary to make an emergency withdrawal
296. 577 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1984) (granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment);
571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983) (granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction).
297. 571 F. Supp. at 1151.
298. Id. at 1152.
299. The House Committee's desire to review the Fort Union sales stemmed from the
same concerns that prompted the creation of a commission to review coal leasing procedures
and to report on methods to insure that fair market value was received for the leases. See 571
F. Supp. at 1152. See generally COMMISSION ON FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY FOR FED-
ERAL COAL LEASING, FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING (1984).
300. 571 F. Supp. at 1152.
301. Id. at 1152-53.
302. Id. at 1149.
303. 571 F. Supp. at 1147-48, 1156-57; see infra notes 319-23, 335-37 & accompanying
text.
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when requested by the Committee. 3°4 The court stated that the regula-
tions "could be viewed as a binding commitment by the Secretary to ex-
ercise this discretionary authority [vested in him by the Act] . . . to
effect such a temporary withholding whenever the designated congres-
sional committees deemed such action appropriate. '30 5 The Administra-
tive Procedure Act 30 6 (APA) obligated the Secretary to comply with the
regulation until it was properly rescinded.
30 7
The court also stated that the Committee resolution probably consti-
tuted impermissible legislative activity, undertaken without bicameral
passage and presidential presentment. The court disagreed with the
plaintiffs' contention that the committee-initiated emergency-withdrawal
provisions were analogous to a report-and-wait provision and therefore
distinguishable from the veto provision invalidated in Chadha.308 While
a report-and-wait provision uniformly applies a grace period to a cate-
gory of executive actions, providing an opportunity for enactment of a
statute to change or reject the executive action, the FLPMA provisions
as applied to coal leases lacked a uniform rule of postponement. Instead,
the Act authorizes a congressional committee selectively to review and to
delay particular leases. Such interference with executive branch actions
by less than the full Congress falls short of the article I requirements.
30 9
304. 571 F. Supp. at 1157-58; 43 C.F.R. § 2310.5 (1983).
305. Id. at 1155.
306. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
307. 571 F. Supp. at 1158. See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 825
(D.D.C. 1984), where the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and enjoined
the Secretary from selling the Fort Union leases until either the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs revoked its resolution of emergency withdrawal, or the Secretary properly
rescinded the provisions of 43 C.F.R. § 2310.5. The court concluded that the Secretary could
not revoke § 2310.5 of the Interior Department's regulations by adjudication rather than by
rulemaking. Accordingly, the rule was still in force, and the Secretary had to comply by ad-
hering to the directions of the House Committee to withdraw temporarily the Fort Union
tracts from leasing. 577 F. Supp. at 828-29.
308. Id. at 1158.
309. Id. at 1155-56. The court's analysis also appears to invalidate the review mechanism
in § 214(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1722(b) (1982), concerning conveyance of lands to prefer-
ence-rights claimants. If the Secretary decides not to convey land to those claimants, he is
prohibited from taking any other action to convey the land during a specified congressional
review period. If the statutory review process ended at that point, and the Secretary could
carry out the sales at the end of the review period absent passage of a statute to the contrary,
the process would constitute a valid report-and-wait mechanism. Congress can extend the
suspension on sale, however, by enacting a concurrent resolution during the review period. 43
U.S.C. § 1722(b) (1982). The National Wildlife Fed'n decision indicates that this selective
suspension of sales is inappropriate absent both bicameral action and presidential presentment.
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Application of the Chadha Factors to Committee-Directive Vetoes
The courts in both the Pacific Legal Foundation and National Wild-
life Federation cases avoided a direct ruling on the constitutionality of
FLPMA's committee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions. The
validity of these provisions is highly questionable, however, especially in
light of the National Wildlife Federation court's treatment of the provi-
sions under the Chadha analysis. A committee resolution directing the
Secretary to make an emergency withdrawal alters the legal rights and
duties of the Secretary in managing part of the public lands.310 For ex-
ample, a committee-directive may prevent the Secretary from leasing
tracts that otherwise could have been leased. Moreover, absent a com-
mittee-directive, Congress could not force the withdrawal without enact-
ing a statute. 311 The directive essentially amends or repeals the statutes
authorizing the Secretary to manage the public lands.312 Finally, as the
controversies in both Pacific Legal Foundation and National Wildlife
Federation clearly indicate, a committee resolution directing an emer-
gency withdrawal is likely to represent congressional disagreement on
policy grounds with the Secretary's decision on the proper use of the
land.313 Thus, the committee-directive emergency withdrawal can be
characterized as a legislative action under the Chadha test.
Congress' Authority Under the Property Clause to Avoid Article I
Procedures
The courts in Chadha, CECA, and Consumers Union concluded in
each case that congressional implementation of the legislative veto provi-
sion violated the article I requirements of bicameral action and presiden-
tial presentment, which are applicable to all "legislative" actions. This
section considers whether the FLPMA veto provisions, unlike those in
310. 571 F. Supp. at 1155. The court in National WildlifeFed'n indicated that it could not
agree with the court in Pacific Legal Found. that § 204(e) grants to the Secretary total discre-
tion over the duration of the withdrawal. Under this reading of § 204(e), "the section would
lose all force." Id. Once the statute is construed to mandate withdrawal for any length of
time, the initial statutory delegation of authority to the Secretary to make withdrawals has
been altered. Id.
By forcing withdrawal of the land, the resolution may also affect the rights of mineral
lease applicants to have their applications considered. See Pacific Legal Found., 529 F. Supp.
at 990-91; supra note 233.
311. But see infra notes 314-77 & accompanying text (discussion of the property clause).
312. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary to manage the public
lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield).
313. See Pacific Legal Found., 529 F. Supp. at 1002 n.39 (quoting statements from mem-
bers of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs that the Committee needed to
"ride herd" on the Interior Department to enforce statutes governing wilderness areas by forc-
ing an emergency withdrawal).
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the three legislative veto decisions, are exempt from the article I
requirements.
Under Chadha, the exercise of a legislative veto may constitute leg-
islative action if the only means, other than the one chosen, for accom-
plishing the result is the enactment of legislation in full compliance with
bicameralism and presentment requirements. 31 4 If Congress' proprietary
powers over the public lands can be exercised in a manner other than the
enactment of legislation, then the use of the legislative veto to reverse an
executive branch decision does not necessarily constitute "legislative ac-
tion" which must be accomplished in accordance with article I
procedures.
The property clause of article IV empowers Congress "to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations" concerning government-
owned property. 31 5 The Supreme Court has consistently described Con-
gress' power under this clause in the broadest terms316 and has demon-
strated a willingness to impose less stringent procedural constraints on
that power than those imposed on Congress' article I legislative pow-
ers.317 Arguably, then, congressional activity under the property clause,
including the exercise of one of FLPMA's legislative veto provisions, is
simply not the type of activity to which the procedural requirements of
article I, section 7 apply.318 The Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed this issue.
Judicial Treatment of the Property Clause Alternative
Failure to Resolve the Issue in Previous Cases
The plaintiffs in the National Wildlife Federation case argued that
congressional action pursuant to the article IV property clause is not sub-
314. 103 S. Ct. at 2785.
315. The property clause provides in full: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
316. See infra notes 324, 360-64 & accompanying text.
317. See infra notes 365-70 & accompanying text.
318. 103 S. Ct. at 2784. Not every action taken by Congress or one of its houses is subject
to the article I procedures. The Constitution explicitly authorizes the House of Representa-
tives or Senate to act unicamerally and without presidential presentment in four situations
noted by the Court in Chadha: (1) the House alone has the power to initiate impeachments,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 6; (2) the Senate alone has the power to conduct trials following
impeachment by the House, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5; (3) the Senate alone has the unreviewable
power to approve or disapprove presidential appointments, id. art. I1, § 2, cl. 2; and (4) the




ject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of article I. The
court deemed this "original constitutional question" a "complex and del-
icate" one.319 In granting a preliminary injunction to halt the sale of
Fort Union coal leases, the court rejected the government's contention
that the committee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions of
FLPMA were "patently unconstitutional" and noted that these provi-
sions "may well be" authorized by the property clause. 320 The court dis-
posed of the case, however, without resolving the constitutional issue.321
In Pacific Legal Foundation, the court construed the committee-initiated
emergency-withdrawal provisions of FLPMA in a manner that avoided
the need to resolve this question,322 although the court stated in dicta
that congressional action under the property clause is subject to the re-
quirements of bicameralism.
323
The property clause grants Congress the authority to administer
federal territory not incorporated as a state and other federally owned
property. The Supreme Court has often stated that Congress' powers
under the property clause are without limitations.324 The opinions inter-
preting the scope of the property clause, however, have focused on the
substantive scope of congressional authority under the clause, rather
than the procedures by which Congress can implement an objective
within its substantive authority.3
25
A case that appears to address the issue of whether Congress can
319. 571 F. Supp. at 1158; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 825, 829
(D.D.C. 1984).
320. 571 F. Supp. at 1156-57; see also id. at 1147 ("It is not at all clear that section 204(e)
[is] void. Indeed, [it] may well be authorized by Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution,
independently of Article I, the subject of the Chadha decision.").
321. See 577 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1984); supra notes 304-07 & accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 282, 291-92 & accompanying text.
323. See 529 F. Supp. at 1003; supra notes 283-90 & accompanying text. The court did
not discuss whether presidential presentment is also required. 529 F. Supp. at 1004 n.43.
324. E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) and cases cited therein; cf
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819) (Congress' power under the prop-
erty clause "is not more comprehensive, than the power 'to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution' the powers of the government."). For a
discussion of the scope of Congress' authority under the property clause, see generally Power of
Congress to Dispose of U.S. Property: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property
Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381 (1981); Comment, The Scope of Congress' Constitutional Power
Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Purpose of Na-
tional Parks and Wilderness Areas, I I B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1984).
325. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 216, at CRS-26; De-
fendant's Supplemental Statement of Points and Authorities in Response to the Court's Order
Dated September 23, 1983 at 7, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C.
1983).
September 1984]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
implement its property clause powers without complying with article I
procedures is United States v. California.326 Bringing suit under the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General of the
United States sought to enjoin California from issuing mineral leases for
the land under the Pacific Ocean off the California coast. Although Con-
gress had enacted statutes broadly authorizing the Attorney General to
file suits to safeguard government properties, 327 the state nevertheless ar-
gued for dismissal, contending that the Attorney General lacked the
power to file in this case.328 California argued that Congress' actions
over the years implicitly manifested a policy that the states, and not the
federal government, had title to the offshore lands in question. California
maintained that the federal government no longer had property rights for
the Attorney General to protect.32
9
The Court rejected the state's contention that congressional failure
to interfere with state actions off the coast constituted an implicit amend-
ment to the statutory authority of the Attorney General to sue to protect
federal property rights. 330 Although Congress could have passed a stat-
ute limiting the power previously granted to the Attorney General to
prosecute those who interfered with federal property rights, Congress
had not explicitly done so. The Court thus found insufficient evidence
that Congress intended by implication to strip the Attorney General of
his power to sue California. 3
31
California also pointed to a joint resolution quitclaiming to the
states land within the three-mile coastal zone as evidence of Congress'
intent to limit the Attorney General's authority to sue coastal states.332
The Court responded that the resolution could not have divested the At-
torney General of his authority to sue because it was vetoed by the Presi-
dent. The Court stated that "the resolution does not represent an
exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to dispose of public
property under Article IV, § 3, Cl. 2.1'333 Even though the Court re-
ferred to the broad scope of Congress' powers under the property
clause, 334 the Court refused to give binding effect to a property transfer
that received congressional, but not presidential, approval.
326. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
327. See, e.g., authorities cited id. at 27 n.3.
328. 322 U.S. at 26.
329. Id. at 24, 26-27.
330. Id. at 27-29.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 28.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 27.
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The California decision, however, does not necessarily compel the
conclusion that the FLPMA veto provisions must comply fully with the
article I requirements of bicameral action and presidential presentment.
In fact, the district court in the National Wildlife Federation case took
precisely the opposite position. According to Judge Oberdorfer, the Cali-
fornia opinion "may prove fatal" to the contention that Congress must
always comply with article I procedures in exercising its property clause
powers. 335 After describing Congress' property clause powers as "with-
out limitation," the Supreme Court stated in California that "neither the
courts nor the executive agencies could proceed contrary to an Act of
Congress in this congressional area of national power. ' 336 Because Con-
gress enacted section 204(e) of FLPMA and the President signed it, the
committee-initiated emergency-withdraWal provisions are part of an
"Act of Congress." Judge Oberdorfer stated that the Supreme Court's
decision in California therefore might preclude the executive from "pro-
ceeding contrary to" that statute by refusing to implement a committee-
initiated emergency withdrawal.
337
The National Wildlife Federation court's tentative basis for distin-
guishing the California case is not a very convincing one. Judge
Oberdorfer appears to be saying that as long as the committee-directive
veto is implemented in accordance with the terms of FLPMA, the execu-
tive branch cannot demand the right to participate in the congressional
decision to withdraw land. All of the legislative vetoes invalidated in
Chadha, CECA, and Consumers Union, however, were implemented in
accordance with previously enacted statutes. Judge Oberdorfer's argu-
ment seems to reflect the notion that once the President signs a statute
containing a legislative veto, he cannot prevent subsequent congressional
reversals of executive decisions made pursuant to the original statutory
delegation. Justice White made a similar argument in his dissent in
Buckley v. Valeo.338 This argument, of course, was rejected by the major-
ity in Chadha. Chadha and the two courts of appeals decisions indicate
clearly that the presentment requirement is not satisfied merely because
the President has the opportunity to veto or approve the statute contain-
335. 571 F. Supp. at 1157.
336. 332 U.S. at 27.
337. 571 F. Supp. at 1157.
338. Justice White stated that "the provision for congressional disapproval of agency regu-
lations does not appear to transgress the constitutional design, at least where the President has
agreed to legislation establishing the disapproval procedure or the legislation has been passed
over his veto." 424 U.S. 1, 286 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
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ing the legislative veto provisions.
339
There is a more convincing reason, however, why the Supreme
Court's statements in California do not resolve the property clause issues
raised by the FLPMA legislative vetoes. When Congress acts pursuant
to its property clause powers, it is undoubtedly free to do so through two
different mechanisms. First, Congress can, and usually does, implement
its property clause powers by enacting legislation and presenting it to the
President for his approval. Alternatively, Congress can adopt a joint res-
olution rather than a bill. If Congress chooses to exercise its property
clause powers through the first procedure, the enactment of legislation, it
cannot properly contend that its action has the force of law if the Presi-
dent vetoes the legislation and Congress fails to override that veto. Simi-
larly, if Congress chooses, as it did in California, to act pursuant to joint
resolution, the procedural prerequisites accompanying that form of ac-
tion apply. Thus, the resolution must be presented to the President, and
it has no effect if vetoed by the President. 340 Nothing more than this was
at issue in California. The Court merely said that if Congress chooses to
implement its property clause powers by adopting a joint resolution, one
of the two mechanisms that require presidential presentment, then Con-
gress is bound by the procedural prerequisites accompanying its choice.
Since the President vetoed the joint resolution purporting to quitclaim to
the states the federal government's property rights in offshore lands, the
Court had no choice but to deny the resolution legal effect.
The issue raised by the FLPMA termination and prevention veto
provisions, however, is whether Congress can implement its property
clause powers through a third mechanism, concurrent resolution without
presidential presentment and approval. Unlike joint resolutions, concur-
rent resolutions are not intended to have a binding effect and so are not
presented for presidential approval. 34 1 They lack the force of law342 pre-
cisely because they fail to comply with the presentment clauses. The Cal-
ifornia case did not address the issue raised by FLPMA,3 43 i.e., whether
339. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2787 n.22; Consumers Union, 691 F.2d at 576-78; CECA, 673
F.2d at 460 n.146.
340. United States ex rel. Levy v. Stockslager, 129 U.S. 470, 475 (1889); S. REP. No. 1335,
54th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1897). See generally Comment, Legislative Resolutions: Their Func-
tions and Effect, 31 TEX. L. REV. 417 (1953).
341. See S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1897).
342. See, e.g., id. at 7-8; F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir.
1945).
343. The California decision does not mandate rejection of a congressional power to act
under the property clause without presidential presentment for still another reason. California
never contended to the Supreme Court that Congress could quitclaim federal property to the
states by enacting a joint resolution without the President's participation. It argued instead
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congressional action under the property clause, unlike action undertaken
pursuant to article I powers, is effective even without presidential
presentment. 34
4
Because the courts have not resolved whether Congress can circum-
vent the article I procedures when it acts under the property clause, one
must turn to other sources to assess the validity of the FLPMA veto
provisions. Accordingly, the following sections will review the origins,
history, and the characteristics of the property clause.
The Origins and History of the Property Clause
The Constitutional Convention grappled with issues concerning the
admission of new states to the Union345 and the resolution of conflicting
claims of the federal and state governments to the western territory east
of the Mississippi River, which recently had been ceded to the United
States by Great Britain.346 In authorizing Congress to dispose of govern-
ment property, the Framers were concerned with providing a source of
revenue to the federal government, 347 while the "Rules and Regulations"
provisions were meant to insure Congress' ability to govern the new gov-
ernment's expansive territorial possessions.3 48 The necessity of exercis-
that Congress had never authorized the Attorney General to sue for adjudication of title to
submerged lands and that the Attorney General could not act without congressional participa-
tion, since such exclusive executive branch action would conflict with Congress' property
clause powers. See Brief for the State of California in Opposition to Motion for Judgment,
Appendix B, at 36-38, United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The issue raised by the
state was thus whether the property clause demanded congressional participation. The
FLPMA veto provisions present a different question: whether the property clause permits
congressional action without presidential participation.
344. Cf. S. RP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1897), where the Senate Judiciary
Committee indicated that
no mere resolution, joint, concurrent, or otherwise, need be presented to the Presi-
dent for his approval unless it relates to matter [sic] of legislation to which the Con-
stitution requires the concurrence of both Houses of Congress and the approval of
the President-in other words, unless such Congressional action be the exercise of
"legislative powers" vested in Congress under the provisions of section 1, article 1.
345. These provisions currently appear at U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
346. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1717 459,
465-66 (1911); Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 283,
291 n.24 (1976).
347. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 505 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 539 (McLean, J., dissenting). But see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936) (the Framers were gravely concerned that the disposal of
government property might become a source of such immense revenue as to make the federal
government independent of the people); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1078 (D.C. Cir.)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) ("the recognized intent of the Convention in [the property clause]
was to restrict the power to dispose of territory or [other] property"), cerL denied, 436 U.S.
907 (1978).
348. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936). The deliberations
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ing these powers pursuant to bicameral action and presidential
presentment was not discussed.
The early Congresses exercised their property clause power in a
manner analogous to that incorporated in the FLPMA veto provi-
sions.349 For example, Congress enacted several statutes delegating au-
thority to territorial legislatures to enact laws, which would be valid
unless disapproved by Congress. 350 On at least two occasions, Congress
attempted to disapprove territorial laws by concurrent resolution, but the
Senate failed to approve the resolution adopted by the House. 35' Con-
temporaneous congressional documents do not reflect the belief that
presidential presentment of such a concurrent resolution of disapproval
was necessary. 3 52 The Supreme Court has analogized this early congres-
sional practice to a report-and-wait procedure, 35 3 a mechanism that is
of the Framers of the Constitution do not shed much light on the procedural requirements of
Congress' property clause powers. The Framers spent very little time discussing that portion
of the property clause that authorizes the Congress to "dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations" concerning government property. See Engdahl, supra note 346, at 291 n.24.
349. The Supreme Court has accorded particular weight in resolving constitutional issues
to the practices of the First Congress, many of whose members sat at the Constitutional Con-
vention. See Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928).
350. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 283, 284; statutes cited in Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 n.17 (1941); see also Boner & Stayton, The Plastic Code in
Operation IV, Co-ordination in Government: A Legislative Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 20,
22 (1960).
The court in National Wildlife Fed'n suggests one reason for early congressional use of a
veto mechanism. The early Congresses were in session for only brief periods and in recess for
many months at a time. The public lands and territories, however, required constant supervi-
sion. Congress therefore delegated authority to the executive branch of the federal government
or to the territorial legislatures, while reserving the power to reverse actions with which it
disagreed. 571 F. Supp. at 1157; see also DeConcini & Faucher, supra note 133, at 35 (These
early delegations to the territorial legislatures "can be seen as a decision by ... Congress that
the day-to-day administration of the nation's territories and the concomitant requirement of
rulemaking would have been an inefficient use of its limited time."). The court in National
Wildlife Fed'n stated that "[i]t is not inconceivable that courts will decide from the text and
context of Article IV, Section 3, that its Framers contemplated that Congress' proprietary
power to 'dispose of' public lands included the power to delegate power to dispose of public
land to the Executive as a trustee," as well as the power to subject such a delegation to the
condition that Congress retain the power to disapprove particular actions. 571 F. Supp. at
1157.
351. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2800 n.18 (White, J., dissenting).
352. Id.
353. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 n.17 (1941); cf Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 595, 596 (1856) (discussing, without any indication of doubt as to its constitutional
validity, a statute containing a mechanism for congressional disapproval of laws enacted by the
legislature of the Northwest Territory). But see Comment, Congress Steps Out: A Look at
Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALF. L. REV. 983, 994 n.37 (1975) (contending





The early Congresses apparently considered the legislative veto ap-
propriate in a context much broader than the property clause. As early
as 1385, the British Parliament had delegated authority to various execu-
tive agents to make rules and regulations. 355 It frequently required that
such rules "lay before" Parliament and receive parliamentary approval
before becoming effective.3 5 6 The early Congresses may have employed
the legislative veto in statutes concerning territorial governance based on
their belief that the Framers incorporated this parliamentary legislative
mechanism into the general powers of Congress under article 1, 357 rather
than on the belief that the Framers intended to vest Congress with
unique power under the property clause.358 If so, then these early veto
statutes do not support Congress' power to implement its property clause
powers without bicameral action and presidential presentment.
The Unique Characteristics of Congressional Authority Under the Property
Clause
Certain distinctions between the proprietary power 359 and the legis-
lative power suggest that the broad scope of Congress' proprietary power
includes the freedom to operate without the constraints of article I.
360
354. See supra note 274 & accompanying text.
355. Legislative Veto and the "Chadha" Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ad-
ministrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Chadha Decision Hearings]; Deconcini & Faucher, supra note
133, at 30-31; see statutes cited in A Motion For Leave To File Amici Curiae Brief at 2-3,
United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Consumers Union
Amici Curiae Brief], reprinted in Chadha Decision Hearings, supra.
356. See statutes cited in Consumers Union Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 355, at 4, re-
printed in Chadha Decision Hearings, supra note 355, at 25; DeConcini & Faucher, supra note
133, at 31.
357. See Consumers Union Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 355, at 5, reprinted in Chadha
Decision Hearings, supra note 355, at 26; DeConcini & Faucher, supra note 133, at 31. It is
just this view, of course, that the Supreme Court rejected in Chadha.
358. But see supra note 350 (discussing the National Wildlife Fed'n court's explanation for
the early territorial veto provisions).
359. The courts have traditionally defined the government's proprietary powers as powers
conferred on it as a result of its status as a property owner or trader. See Engdahl, supra note
346, at 308-309.
360. Two other characteristics of the property clause may support the same argument.
First, the property clause is located in article IV of the Constitution, not in article I. The
article I requirements of bicameral action and presidential presentment simply may not apply
to actions taken pursuant to article IV powers. Second, the property clause authorizes Con-
gress to enact "Rules and Regulations" rather than "Bills." Perhaps the procedures applicable
to such "Rules and Regulations" differ from those normally required when legislation is en-
acted.
These two characteristics, however, do not provide strong support for the contention that
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The Supreme Court has frequently distinguished congressional at-
Congress' exercise of its property clause powers is not subject to article I procedural con-
straints. The location of the property clause in article IV probably reflects the Framers' focus
in enacting article IV, section 3 on the admission of new states to the union and on the resolu-
tion of the conflicting claims of the federal and state governments to the territories. See supra
notes 345-46 & accompanying text. The property clause was therefore placed in article IV,
which deals with relations among the states, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, cls. 1, 2, 3,
and between the states and the federal government, see, e.g., id. § 4, rather than in article I,
which deals with legislative powers. See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1078 (D.C. Cir.)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); Statement of Points and Au-
thorities in Support of Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment at 20, National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Interior Summary Judg-
ment Briefi.
Judge MacKinnon, dissenting in Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978), contended that the placement of the property clause in article IV
"carries with it somewhat the... purpose to indicate exclusive congressional power that one
derives from the location outside Art. I." Id. at 1073. The Edwards case, however, involved
the question of whether the President could dispose of federally-owned property (in that case,
by self-executing treaty) without congressional participation in the form of implementing legis-
lation. Id. at 1057. The majority upheld the constitutionality of the President's action in that
case. The issue under the FLPMA veto provisions is precisely the converse-whether Con-
gress can administer the public lands without presidential participation. Cf Sioux Tribe v.
United States, 316 U.S. 317, 326 (1942) ("the Constitution places the authority to dispose of
public lands exclusively in Congress"); Engdahl, supra note 346, at 352, 362 (Congress, not the
states, has "exclusive" power to create private rights in federal land).
The placement of the property clause in article IV need not indicate that Congress' exer-
cise of its property clause powers is exempt from article I procedural requirements. The De-
partment of the Interior contended in National Wildlife Fed'n that even though the property
clause is located in article IV, it is essentially pulled into and "inextricably tied to" the proce-
dural requirements of article I through the necessary and proper clause. That clause vests in
Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution . . .all other Powers [i.e., other than those listed in article I, section 8] vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). Since the power to dispose of or
administer government property is an "other" power, it must be implemented through the
enactment of legislation. See Interior Summary Judgment Brief, supra, at 9, 11; cf. McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819), quoted supra note 324. But cf CECA, 673 F.
2d 425, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affid sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer
Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), where the court stated, "By not mention-
ing presidential participation, Article V, which sets forth the procedure for amending the Con-
stitution, makes clear that proposals for constitutional amendments are congressional actions
to which the presentation requirement does not apply." (footnote omitted). The same argu-
ment can be made concerning the article IV power to dispose of and administer federally-
owned property.
The use of the term "Rules and Regulations" rather than "Legislation," e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1, (all "legislative" powers vested in Congress); id. § 8, cl. 17 (Congress has power to
"exercise exclusive legislation" over federal enclaves); id. § 8, cl. 18 (Congress has the power to
"make all Laws" which are necessary and proper for executing enumerated congressional pow-
ers), or "Bills," e.g., id. § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills" for raising revenue to originate in the House); id.
cl. 2 ("Every Bill" requires bicameral action and presidential presentment), in the property
clause also appears to lack significance. The legislative veto provision in § 244(c)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act was an exercise of Congress' power to "establish an uniform
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tempts to dispose of or administer the public lands from the exercise of
other congressional powers. The Court has stated that "the land laws are
not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term 'but savor
somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner of property for its dispo-
sal.' "36 Congress' powers as a property owner, which include the
power to grant and to deny permits for the use of public lands, 362 are in
addition to the legislative powers conferred upon it by article 1.363 Argua-
Rule of Naturalization." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Yet, the Supreme Court in Chadha
held that Congress was compelled to adhere to the constraints of bicameral action and presi-
dential presentment in overruling the Attorney General's suspension of deportation. See CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, supra note 216, at CRS-22. Furthermore, the
courts have tended to equate constitutional references to the power to enact "Rules" with the
authority to adopt legislation. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904) (the
property clause power to make regulations "must mean laws, for as well as States, territories
must be governed by laws"); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1076 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting) ("Certainly to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations' refers to legislation."),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); 580 F.2d at 1077, 1078 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (prop-
erty clause power is "essentially legislative"). But see Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 436-37 (1857) (the words "Rules and Regulations" are "not the words usually employed
by statesmen in giving supreme power of legislation"); id. at 440 (words "Rules and Regula-
tions" not usually employed in the Constitution "when granting general powers of legisla-
tion").
Even if the use of the term "Rules and Regulations" was meant to preclude the necessity
for presidential presentment, the property clause vests the power to make such "Rules and
Regulations" in "the Congress." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cI. 2. The Congress consists of "a
Senate and a House of Representatives." Id. art. I, § I (emphasis added). Bicameral action is
therefore arguably required even if presidential presentment is not. See Edwards, 580 F.2d at
1071 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (property clause requires "action by both Houses of Con-
gress"); id. at 1075.
Legislative veto provisions which require the enactment of a concurrent resolution of dis-
approval, as do most of those in FLPMA, fulfill the requirement of bicameral action. Commit-
tee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions, however, authorize a single committee of one
house to mandate such a withdrawal. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982). The committee-directive
veto, unlike the others, is therefore suspect even if presidential presentment is unnecessary.
361. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (quoting Butte City
Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905)). In Midwest Oil, the Court upheld the Presi-
dent's power to make a temporary withdrawal in aid of proposed legislation. But see PLLRC
REPORT, supra note 23, at 36 ("As a matter of constitutional law, there is no legal significance
in the different roles of the Federal Government as sovereign and as proprietor ....").
362. Engdahl, supra note 346, at 309. But see id. at 367 ("the power Congress had over
article IV property in respects other than the creation of rights therein was not a sovereign
power of governmental jurisdiction, but rather the power of a proprietor").
363. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (and cases cited therein); National
Wildlife Fed'n, 571 F. Supp. at 1147, 1156-57; Engdahl, supra note 346, at 308-09 (the "sover-
eign, governmental, or legislative power. . . could be exerted over article IV property no less,
and no more, than over any property in the nation; but. . . the proprietary power. . . gave
the United States additional rights and powers over article IV property").
David Engdahl has argued that Supreme Court cases before Kleppe stood for the proposi-
tion that "beyond its enumerated legislative powers exercisable on article IV property as else-
where, the federal government has power by virtue of its proprietorship to do things with
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bly, when Congress acts in its proprietary capacity, the procedural re-
strictions that apply to the exercise of legislative powers can be
ignored.3
64
The Supreme Court, for example, permitted Congress to delegate
freely its authority to exercise proprietary powers at a time when the
Court more narrowly circumscribed legislative delegations of other pow-
ers .365 In Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,366 the Court addressed the
validity of a statute delegating to the states and to private miners the
power to make regulations governing the location, manner of recording,
and amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim. A
person alleging mineral rights in a parcel of land contended that the stat-
utory delegations were improper because the disposal of the public lands
is an act of legislative power, which Congress could not delegate to an-
other body. The Court characterized the statute as an exercise of Con-
gress' proprietary rather than legislative authority and held that just "as
an owner may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ subordi-
nates, giving to them a limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress
might rightfully entrust to the local legislature the determination of mi-
nor matters respecting the disposal of these lands. ' 36 7 The delegations to
the local miners were valid for the same reason.
368
respect to federal property which it could not do by virtue of any legislative power." Id. at
353. According to Mr. Engdahl, however, the Court in KIeppe held that the converse was true:
the federal legislative power gives Congress powers beyond those which it would have as a
mere proprietor. Kleppe did not involve an attempt by Congress to act without presidential
participation. Rather, the case inquired whether Congress could enact legislation under the
property clause protecting federal property by prohibiting the states from seizing wild animals
on federally-owned lands. Cf id. at 347 n.269, 368 (prior to Kleppe, "the government's power
as a proprietor was inherently subordinate to the rules of state law"). The Court's broad
reading of the scope of congressional legislative authority under the property clause does not
suggest that its proprietary power should be construed narrowly.
364. Cf Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897). In this case the government
sought to compel the removal of a fence erected by the defendants. The fence enclosed 20,000
acres of the public lands and in effect appropriated that land to the defendants' exclusive use.
Although there was a statute authorizing the federal government to abate nuisances on the
public lands, the Court stated that "no legislation was necessary to vindicate the rights of the
government as a landed properietor." Id. at 524.
365. See Engdahl, supra note 346, at 309, 353 n.301, 368 ("The property power was
wholly different in nature and conception, and that is the reason why, for example, it could be
delegated by Congress to administrative functionaries without regard to whatever restrictions
on delegation might be found applicable to Congress' legislative powers.").
366. 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
367. Id. at 126.
368. Id. at 127; see also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (the authority
to make administrative rules governing the national forests was not a legislative authority and
could therefore be delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture). Compare Butte City and
Grimaud with Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (cited in United States
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In FLPMA, Congress, the nation's "principal agent" to dispose of
and administer property,369 delegated some of its proprietary authority
over the public lands to the Secretary of the Interior, but retained the
power to overrule the sub-agent's actions in carrying out the delegated
authority. Such a delegation would appear to be no more objectionable
than those upheld in previous property clause cases, especially since the
President had the opportunity to prevent such a delegation by vetoing
FLPMA upon its enactment.
3 70
Separation of Powers Concerns
The expansive scope of Congress' authority to act as a proprietor of
the public lands supports, but by no means compels, the conclusion that
Congress need not comply with article I procedures when it exercises its
property clause powers. Resolution of the issue depends on whether
Congress' exercise of the property clause power evokes concerns similar
to those that led the Framers to restrain Congress' legislative authority
through the requirements of bicameral action and presidential present-
ment. The courts in both the Chadha and CECA cases relied heavily
upon these concerns in declaring the legislative vetoes in those cases
unlawful.
371
The requirements of presentment and bicameral action were
designed in large part to circumscribe the exercise of congressional
power. The presentment clause imposed a check on the potential for
Congress to enact ill-considered measures by subjecting congressional ac-
v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911)) ("That 'Congress cannot delegate legislative power to
the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of
the system of government ordained by the Constitution.' ").
369. Butte City, 196 U.S. at 126.
370. The court in National Wildlife Fed'n envisioned just such a possibility.
It may well be held that the statute requiring the Secretary temporarily to withdraw
lands at the request of a designated congressional committee in order that Congress
may reexamine the leasing process after an impending recess is an appropriate exer-
cise of the proprietary power, as distinguished from legislative power, created in Con-
gress by Article IV, Section 3.
571 F. Supp. at 1147. But see supra notes 200, 339 & accompanying text.
One can distinguish the Butte City and Grimaud cases from the FLPMA veto provisions
on the ground that in the earlier cases, the Court sanctioned only the delegation of "minor
matters respecting the disposal" of the public lands. Butte City, 196 U.S. at 126; see also
Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517 ("it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to
make laws, from administrative authority to make regulations"). In FLPMA, Congress dele-
gated authority to the Secretary of the Interior to make withdrawals, sales, and management
decisions. Some of these actions, those concerning relatively small tracts of land, are not sub-
ject to legislative veto. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(a), 1713(a), 1712(e)(1) (1982). Arguably, it is only
the matters which Congress deemed major over which it has retained a veto power.
371. See supra notes 118-23, 199-205 & accompanying text.
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tion to a presidential veto. The bicameralism requirement limited the
authority of the legislative branch by dividing its authority into two
houses. The need for such limitations on congressional authority appears
no less weighty in the property clause context than in article I legislative
areas.372 The opportunity for a presidential veto over the ill-considered,
large-scale disposal of the public lands, for example, would seem consis-
tent with the Framers' intent to restrain ill-advised legislative action and
to insure protection of the national interest.
373
The requirement of bicameral action also served to prevent special
interests from prevailing over the public interest. 374 This concern is
highly significant to public lands management, an area in which govern-
ment officials are often subject to pressure from a variety of private inter-
ests seeking to devote the public lands to irreconcilable uses. Finally, the
mandate of bicameral action was meant to insure adequate representa-
tion for the smaller states, which would have been disadvantaged in a
national legislature based solely on proportional representation. 375 Be-
cause most of the public lands are located in the less populous western
states, 376 the concerns underlying the bicameralism provisions of the
Constitution are especially relevant to Congress' administration of the
public lands.
The freedom of Congress to avoid article I procedures in managing
the public lands under its property clause powers is a "complex and deli-
cate" question. 377 The fact that the Framers' desire to restrain legislative
power through a carefully prescribed set of procedures seems particularly
relevant to public lands administration may tip the scales against the
constitutionality of the FLPMA veto provisions.
372. Pacific Legal Found., 529 F. Supp. at 1003 (Congress' proprietary powers over the
public lands are "subject to the requirements of bicameralism, 'one of the most fundamental of
the checks of government power.' ") (quoting the decision of the Court of Appeal for the
Ninth Circuit in Chadha, 634 F.2d at 434).
373. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982) (stating Congress' policy that the public lands be
retained in federal ownership unless disposal of a particular parcel will serve "the national
interest"); cf National Wildlife Fed'n, 571 F. Supp. at 1157 (the Framers may have intended to
permit Congress to delegate its authority to dispose of public lands, "subject to an express and
narrow condition" that a committee could temporarily suspend that delegation). But see Butte
City, 196 U.S. at 126 ("Congress is the body to which is given the power to determine the
conditions upon which the public lands shall be disposed of.").
374. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2783.
375. Id.
376. See PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1982, supra note 23, at 9.
377. National Wildlife Fed'n, 571 F. Supp. at 1158.
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Severability of the FLPMA Veto Provisions
A General Approach to Severability
If a court were to decide that the legislative veto provisions of
FLPMA were unconstitutional despite their property clause underpin-
ning, it would then need to determine whether those provisions are sever-
able from the remainder of the statute. The unconstitutionality of part of
a statute does not necessarily affect the validity of its remaining provi-
sions.378 At least since its decision in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpora-
tion Commission,379 the Supreme Court has resolved issues of severability
by applying the following principle: "Unless it is evident that the Legis-
lature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."'380
Severability analysis, under the principles enunciated in the
Champlin case, proceeds in several stages.381 The court begins by deter-
mining whether Congress, if it had known that one or more provisions of
that law were invalid, would have preferred not to enact a statute at
all.382 Congress often assists the court in making this determination by
including a severability clause in the statute. In Champlin, the Supreme
Court indicated that such clauses disclose Congress' intention to make
the statute divisible.383 A severability provision therefore gives rise to a
presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the whole or of
any part of the statute to depend upon the validity of the stricken provi-
sion.384 The courts have scrutinized the legislative history to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence of congressional intent to rebut this
378. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). For a
description of the history and development of the concept of severability, see generally Sever-
ability Note, supra note 133.
379. 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
380. Id. at 234.
381. The two-part Champlin test is still controlling on issues of severability. See Chadha,
103 S. Ct. at 2774-75; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976); CECA, 673 F.2d at 441.
382. CECA, 673 F.2d at 442 (rephrasing the first part of the Champlin test as "whether
Congress would have enacted other portions of the statute in the absence of the invalidated
provision"); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 307 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
383. 286 U.S. at 235.
384. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2774; Champlin, 286 U.S. at 235; Allen v. Carmen, 578 F.
Supp. 951, 970 (D.D.C. 1983). But see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968)
("the ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such
a clause"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 803-05 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing legislative veto provisions severable in absence of severability clause); EEOC v. Ingersoll
Johnson Steel Co., 583 F. Supp. 983, 989 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (same). See generally Stem,
Separability and Separability Clauses, 51 HARv. L. REV. 76 (1937).
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presumption of severability. 38
5
But even if the court decides that Congress did not intend the stat-
ute to stand or fall as a unit, the inquiry into the legislative history must
go further. Typically, the court will have several options for severing the
unconstitutional provisions from the remainder of the statute. The court
may invalidate an entire part or subpart of the statute, or only the sec-
tion, subsection, or portion of a subsection containing the unconstitu-
tional provision. 386 The court's task once again is to determine which of
these choices comes closest to reflecting the statutory scheme Congress
would have preferred had it known the unconstitutional provisions
would be stricken. 387 The court must also satisfy itself that the provi-
sions remaining after severance survive as "a workable administrative
mechanism." 3
88
If the unconstitutional provisions of a statute contain a legislative
veto, the Court's choice among various methods of severing those provi-
sions could have a significant effect on the balance of power allocated to
the executive and legislative branches under the surviving portions of the
statute. In this regard, the FLPMA legislative veto provisions sharply
illustrate the implications of the severance process. Congress enacted
FLPMA after extensive debate concerning the appropriate role of the
two branches of government in public lands policy-making and adminis-
tration. One of the principal legislative goals in enacting FLPMA was to
limit the executive's discretionary authority over the public lands.389 At
the same time, Congress felt a need to delegate some of its own authority
over the public lands, to avoid being overly burdened with making rou-
tine administrative decisions.390 Congress reconciled these potentially
conflicting objectives by delegating to the executive authority subject to
various substantive and procedural constraints. The legislative veto pro-
visions of the Act are the most significant of those constraints. Invalida-
385. See, e.g., infra notes 393-95 & accompanying text.
386. See infra note 447 & accompanying text.
387. "In such a situation, when constitutional infirmities are discovered, the court must
struggle to effectuate the constitutional purpose of the legislature, to decide which clauses,
subparts and sections must be enjoined, and to determine which of the remaining provisions
may still be enforced." Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 464, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1983); accord Exxon
Corp. v. Department of Energy, 744 F.2d 98, 115 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984); see also Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 804 n.26 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that clause
containing unconstitutional legislative veto is severable from the rest of the statute, in part
because such severance "preserves to the greatest extent possible the compromise between
Congress and the Executive intended in the legislation").
388. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
389. See infra notes 414-28 & accompanying text.
390. See infra notes 429-33 & accompanying text.
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tion of the veto provisions will unavoidably upset the balance of power
which Congress preferred. The new division of power will depend on
how the veto provisions are severed from the remainder of the statute.
This part analyzes the severability options available to a court after
invalidation of the legislative veto provisions of FLPMA. The object of
this analysis is to identify the severability options that will result in a
division of power over the public lands that is closest to the one Congress
presumably would have preferred had it known the legislative veto was
invalid. The various severability options are compared with respect to
each of the statute's legislative veto provisions, to determine which op-
tion best effectuates Congress' objectives in enacting the part of the stat-
ute affected by that provision.
The analysis begins with a brief discussion of the Supreme Court's
severability analysis in Chadha, to illustrate the manner in which the
courts use the legislative history of a statute to assist in the severability
analysis. The next section examines the legislative history of FLPMA to
determine Congress' principal objectives in enacting that statute. The
final section considers the extent to which each of the possible severabil-
ity options is consistent with the policy objectives underlying FLPMA.
An Example of the General Approach: The Chadha Decision
The Court in Chadha asserted that it need not "embark on [the]
elusive inquiry" into the legislative history demanded by the first part of
the Champlin severability test. 391 Congress obviated the need for this
inquiry by including a severability provision in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.3
92
The Court nevertheless scrutinized the legislative history to buttress
its conclusion that the presumption created by the severability clause
could not be rebutted in that case. The Court conceded that the legisla-
tive history demonstrated congressional reluctance to delegate to the At-
torney General the unrestrained authority to cancel the deportion of
aliens.393 But the Court felt it essential to view this reluctance in light of
Congress' desire to avoid the burden of resolving numerous immigration
matters affecting individuals through the enactment of private bills.
394
That desire, together with the absence of any affirmative evidence in the
391. 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
392. Id. Section 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides, "If any particular
provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circum-
stances shall not be affected thereby." 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
393. 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
394. Id. at 2775.
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legislative history that Congress intended the entire statute to fall if the
veto were found unconstitutional, persuaded the Court that the presump-
tion of severability had not been rebutted.
395
After concluding that the presumption had not been overcome, the
Court in Chadha turned to the final part of the Champlin severability
analysis. The Court decided that section 244 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act would be "fully operative" and a "workable administra-
tive mechanism" even without the veto provision in section 244(c)(2).
39 6
This conclusion is justified. Section 244(a) of the Act still authorized the
Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation. 397 Congressional
oversight of this delegated authority was preserved, because the Attorney
General would have to report to Congress all suspensions. 398 Unless
Congress enacted a bill to the contrary, deportation proceedings would
be cancelled when the waiting period in section 244(c)(2) expired.
399
The Chadha case illustrates the conflict between Congress' desire to
maintain some control over administrative policy setting and its desire to
avoid the burden of involvement in routine matters. The decision also
illustrates the prominent role which the legislative history plays in resolv-
ing severability questions related to effectuating these legislative
purposes.
395. 103 S. Ct. at 2775. The court in CECA noted in dicta that it will be "extremely
difficult" to overcome the presumption in a statute containing a severability clause. 673 F.2d
at 441; see also Chadha Decision Hearings, supra note 355, at 41 (it will be "almost impossible"
to meet the burden after Chadha); id. at 102 (statement of Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel
to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, expressing doubt that the courts will have trouble
finding "the evidence of severability identified in Chadha"); Legislative Veto Hearings, supra
note 232, at 120 (statement by Professor Eugene Gressman that "[tihe Court has lowered its
severability standards, to the point where it is virtually impossible to convince the courts-
through use of the typical severability clause-that Congress intends the legislative veto provi-
sion to be inseverable from the remainder of any given statute"); id. at 136 (statement of
Professor David A. Martin that the Court "will go out of its way to find severability"). Com-
pare EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1984) (holding that a legislative veto provision in
the Reorganization Act of 1977, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982), which does not contain a sever-
ability clause, is inseverable, and therefore invalidates the entire Act) and EEOC v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D. Miss. 1983) (same), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 3499
(1984) with EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the same
legislative veto provision is severable from the rest of the Reorganization Act); EEOC v. Inger-
soll-Johnson Steel Co., 583 F. Supp. 983, 989 (S. D. Ind. 1984) (same); and Muller Optical Co.
v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 387-88 (6th Cir. 1984) (declining to reach the severability issue be-
cause a legislative veto that was never exercised does not invalidate the act containing it).
396. 103 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
397. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
398. Id. § 1254(c)(1).
399. Id. § 1254(c)(2).
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The Objectives of FLPMA
The Centralization Objective
One of Congress' objectives in enacting FLPMA was to centralize in
a single statute a comprehensive scheme for the adminstration of the
public lands. In the early 1960's Congress recognized the need to remedy
serious deficiencies in the laws governing the public lands.4° The ab-
sence of a coherent framework for administration of those lands
prompted Congress to create a Public Land Law Review Commission
(PLLRC or Commission) in 1964. 40 1 Congress declared that "the public
land 40 2 laws of the United States. . .are not fully correlated with each
other and. . may be inadequate to meet the current and future needs of
the American people."' 40 3 The Commission was ordered both to study
the laws governing the management and disposition of the public lands
and to recommend modifications where necessary to insure that the pub-
lic lands were retained, managed, or disposed of in a manner providing
400. The lack of a modern statutory management mandate for the BLM and the
existence of a vast number of antiquated public land laws were among the reasons for
Congressional recognition of a need to review and reassess the entire body of law
governing Federal lands. On September 19, 1964, Congress created the Public Land
Law Review Commission ....
S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 34, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra
note 23, at 99.
401. Id; see Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982. The PLLRC was
composed of 19 members, including six Senators appointed by the president of the Senate, six
members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, six persons
appointed by the President of the United States, and a chairman selected by the other 18
members. Id. § 3(b).
The creation of the PLLRC was preceded by a series of unsuccessful attempts, beginning
in the late 1950's, to adopt legislation dealing with classification, lease, and sale of federally-
owned land and with the management of those lands retained by the government. See LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at iii-v. On the same day that it created the
PLLRC, Congress passed the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-607,
78 Stat. 986, to provide interim guidance to the BLM pending issuance of the PLLRC's recom-
mendations. See supra note 24.
402. In the act creating the PLLRC, Congress defined the "public lands" to include:
(a) the public domain of the United States, (b) reservations, other than Indian reser-
vations, created from the public domain, (c) lands permanently or temporarily with-
drawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the
public land laws, including the mining" laws, (d) outstanding interests of the United
States in lands patented, conveyed in fee or otherwise, under the public land laws, (e)
national forests, (f) wildlife refuges and ranges, and (g) the surface and sub-surface
resources of all such lands, including the disposition or restriction on disposition of
the mineral resources in lands defined ... as being under the control of the United
States in the Outer Continental Shelf.
Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 10, 78 Stat. 982, 985.
403. Id. § 2.
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maximum benefit for the general public.4°4 The Commission issued its
final report in 1970.405 It emphasized the need to develop "a clear set of
goals for the management and use of public lands . . . particularly...
lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management.
'40 6
FLPMA was designed to implement many of the recommendations
of the PLLRC Report,40 7 providing for the first time comprehensive
guidelines for the administration and protection of the public lands under
the jurisdiction of the BLM.40 8 Title III of FLPMA implements that
objective by delegating authority to the executive to manage the public
lands, including the power to enact and enforce regulations.40 9 Under
titles IV through VI, the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture have
certain more specific powers and obligations concerning range manage-
ment, the authorization of rights of way, and the administration of desert
conservation and wilderness areas.410 Title II vests in the BLM the
power to make management decisions concerning, and sales and with-
drawals of, the public lands.
411
The Modernization Objective
In addition to creating a single statutory source of executive author-
404. Id. §§ 4(a), 1.
405. See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 23.
406. Id. at 41. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs later agreed that
"[in comparison with the organic acts of the other Federal land management agencies," the
laws governing the administration of the public domain by the BLM "are often conflicting, on
occasion truly contradictory, and to a serious extent, incomplete and inadequate." S. REP.
No. 583, supra note 23, at 24, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23,
at 89.
407. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs stated that S.507, the Senate
version of FLPMA, "is in accordance with over one hundred recommendations of the Public
Land Law Review Commission report." S. REP. No. 583, supra note 23, at 35, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 100. Many of the PLLRC's recom-
mended actions were adopted in the final version of FLPMA. See Carver, Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976: Fruition or Frustration, 54 DEN. L.J. 387 (1977); Dominick &
Crook, Title 1I of FLPMA: Public Land Law Reform or an Invitation for Bureaucratic
Overkill, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 329, 342 (1979); Gregg, Symposium on the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act: Introduction, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 271, 273 (1979); Muys, The Public Land
Law Review Commission's Impact on the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21
ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (1979); Wheatley, supra note 76, at 312.
408. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at vi.
409. Section 302 provides the Secretary of the Interior with the duty to "manage the pub-
lic lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield." 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1982).
Section 310 permits the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the pur-
poses of FLPMA and "of other laws applicable to the public lands" and National Forest lands.
Id. § 1740. Under § 303, the Secretary is given various powers to enforce the statute and its
implementing regulations. Id. § 1733.
410. Id. §§ 1751-1782.
411. Id. §§ 1711-1724.
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ity over the public lands; FLPMA was designed to eliminate a plethora
of "obsolete public land laws which heretofore hindered effective land
use planning for and management of public lands. '412 To achieve this
end, FLPMA repealed a series of scattered statutes concerning adminis-
tration of the public lands.
413
The Limitation of Power Objectives
One of Congress' principal objectives in enacting FLPMA was to
limit the discretion of the executive branch in managing the public lands.
The Commission had lamented that Congress, through "statutory dele-
gations [that] have often been lacking in standards or meaningful policy
determinations," in large part had abdicated its constitutional obligations
to retain, manage, and dispose of the public lands.414 As a result, execu-
tive agencies had been forced to "fill this vacuum" without proper gui-
dance from the legislature.415 The Commission therefore recommended
that Congress "establish national policy in all public land laws by pre-
scribing the controlling standards, guidelines, and criteria for the exercise
of authority delegated to executive agencies. ' 416 Congress agreed with
the Commission and enacted FLPMA as a means of providing the stan-
dards and guidelines lacking in previous laws.
417
Congress' desire to reassert its control over the public lands was par-
412. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at vi (statement of Senator Henry
M. Jackson); see also supra note 400; H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 26, at 1, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 431; Congressional Research Service
Report, supra note 216, at CRS-31 - CRS-32; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note
23, at 668 (statement of Rep. Melcher that of the thousands of public land laws, "in many
instances they are obsolete and, in total, do not add up to a coherent expression of congres-
sional policies adequate for today's national goals").
413. Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 702-706, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787-94 (1976) (repeal of laws relating
to homesteading and small tracts, disposals, withdrawals, administration of the public lands,
and rights of way).
414. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 2.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 26, at 1, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 431 (The executive branch "has tended to fill in missing
gaps in the law, not always in a manner consistent with a system balanced in the best interests
of all the people. A major weakness which has arisen under these circumstances is instability
of national policies."). The floor debate on FLPMA also reflected these concerns. For exam-
ple, Representative Skubitz stated,
One of the most important reasons for adopting this bill is that it provides for
congressional oversight and control over an executive agency which, at present, is
free to act mostly of its own accord.
[FLPMA is designed to] vest authority with the people and the Congress rather
than with an uncontrolled agency; to limit executive discretion over national land
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ticularly acute in the area of withdrawals. Throughout the legislative
process leading to the enactment of FLPMA, Congress repeatedly
stressed the need to restrain the executive's authority to make withdraw-
als.418 Opposition to the President's use of the implied withdrawal au-
thority, which arises from congressional acquiescence to past executive
withdrawals, 419 was particularly strong.420 As a result, FLPMA declares
a national policy that "the Congress exercise its constitutional authority
to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate federal lands for specified
purposes and that Congress delineate the extent to which the Executive
management; and to carefully outline procedures for the withdrawal, acquisition,
sale, and exchange of public lands.
This ... is the first important reason to adopt this bill, it reasserts congres-
sional authority over the Bureau of Land Management.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 669-70.
418. In his report on withdrawals prepared for the PLLRC, Charles Wheatley stated that
"the executive branch now exercises the dominant role with regard to at least one aspect of the
public lands system, the withdrawal process." WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 38. Due
to the executive's "unbridled discretion in the withdrawal of public lands," the "present roles
of the legislative and executive branches are clearly not those intended for them as set forth in
the Constitution." Id. To remedy this situation, Wheatley suggested the adoption of a statute
delegating to the executive limited withdrawal authority. In addition, he recommended that
Congress retain the power to overturn executive withdrawals. Id. at 512-14.
The PLLRC endorsed Wheatley's suggestions and agreed that the executive branch had
engaged in withdrawals "in an uncontrolled and haphazard manner." PLLRC REPORT, supra
note 23, at 43. The PLLRC therefore recommended that "Congress assert its constitutional
authority by enacting legislation reserving unto itself exclusive authority to withdraw or set
aside public lands. . . and delineating specific delegations of authority to the Executive as to
the types of withdrawals and set asides that may be effected without legislative action." Id. at
2; see also Wheatley, supra note 76, at 311-13, 317.
The floor debates on FLPMA echoed the sentiments of Wheatley and the PLLRC. Rep-
resentative Skubitz stated that "[t]he management or withdrawal of Federal lands is an ex-
tremely important matter, a matter which must not be left in the hands of an often
unresponsive and unyielding bureaucracy." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note
23, at 669-70. He added that "[i]t is essential that Congress be informed of, and able to oppose
if necessary, withdrawals which it determines not to be in the best interests of all the people."
Id. at 670. Representative Melcher complained that there was "no system of congressional
review and congressional oversight of withdrawals." Id. at 685; see also id. at 687 (statement
of Mr. Johnson that the executive branch had abused its authority to make withdrawals).
419. See supra notes 81-86 & accompanying text.
420. According to Wheatley, the President's use of Midwest Oil implied withdrawal au-
thority, coupled with the executive's expansive interpretation of the Pickett Act, gave the exec-
utive "virtual unlimited authority over the withdrawal process which is not subject to any
Congressional limitations or control." WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 511. Wheatley
deemed it particularly important for Congress to eliminate this nonstatutory, implied with-
drawal power. Id. at 518. The PLLRC agreed that congressional delegations of withdrawal
authority "should be specific, not implied, and should be made through the enactment of a
single statute which clearly replaces all existing authority expressly or impliedly delegated."
PLLRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 55.
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may withdraw lands without legislative action." 421 The Act repealed
portions of twenty-nine statutes delegating withdrawal authority to the
executive branch422 and expressly revoked the President's implied with-
drawal authority under Midwest Oil.423
The enactment of FLPMA also reflected dissatisfaction with the
broad scope of the executive's authority to sell portions of the public
lands. The PLLRC had rejected the view that wholesale disposal of the
public lands was appropriate.424 It concluded in 1970 that the policy of
large-scale disposal of public lands was outdated and that "at this time
most public lands would not serve the maximum public interest in pri-
vate ownership. '425 The Commission recommended that the govern-
ment make modest disposals only where maximum benefit for the general
public could be achieved with nonfederal ownership. 426 Congress recog-
421. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4) (1982).
422. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976). Several statutory sources of
executive withdrawal authority, such as the Antiquities Act (concerning national monuments),
the Defense Withdrawal Act of 1958 (withdrawals for defense purposes), and the Taylor Graz-
ing Act (grazing districts) were not affected by the repeal provisions. Id.; cf. H.R. REP. No.
1163, supra note 26, at 29, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at
459 (listing the withdrawal statutes the House bill would not repeal).
423. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976) ("Effective on and after the
date of approval of this Act, the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and
reservations resulting from acquiescence of the Congress (U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459). . .[is] repealed."). The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs voiced con-
cern that such a repeal would "resurrect" the issue left open in the Midwest Oil case: "[H]ow
much inherent withdrawal power does the Executive possess constitutionally?" H.R. REP.
No. 1163, supra note 26, at 52, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23,
at 482; see supra notes 75-80 & accompanying text.
There is some question whether the statutory reference to the Midwest Oil case demon-
strates an intent to repeal only pre-Pickett Act implied withdrawal authority. The leading
commentators on withdrawals have agreed that the most plausible interpretation is that Con-
gress intended in § 704(a) of FLPMA to abolish all implied authority, whether that authority
was created before or after enactment of the Pickett Act. See Wheatley, supra note 76, at 318-
19; see also H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 26, at 9, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 439. This view is supported by the provisions of FLPMA, which
state that "[o]n and after the effective date of this Act the Secretary [of the Interior] is author-
ized to make, modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance with the provisions
and limitations of this section." 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1982) (emphasis added). Such a result
would also be consistent with the recommendation of the PLLRC, which stated: "Delegations
of the congressional authority [to make withdrawals and reservations] should be specific, not
implied, and should be made through the enactment of a single statute which clearly replaces
all existing authority expressly or impliedly delegated." PLLRC REPORT, supra note 26, at
55. FLPMA was intended to reflect many of the PLLRC recommendations. See supra note
407.
424. PLLRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 48.
425. Id. at 1, 48.
426. Id.
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nized the public concern over the possibility of excessive disposals427 and
provided in FLPMA that "the public lands be retained in Federal owner-
ship" unless the executive branch determined under FLPMA's proce-
dures "that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national
interest."
428
The Administrative Workability Objective
Although the PLLRC concluded that pre-FLPMA statutory delega-
tions concerning public land management were extremely broad, it did
not favor total abolition of the executive's authority to make withdrawals
and sales.42 9 As Charles Wheatley noted in the study he prepared for the
PLLRC, complete legislative control over withdrawals has much to rec-
ommend it. 43° He noted, however, that the problem with such an ap-
proach is the legislative burden it would impose upon Congress:
"Obviously it would not seem feasible for Congress to seek to pass legis-
lation on every proposal for a withdrawal or revocation of public lands,
nor would the importance of many of these transactions warrant such
attention."
431
A system of exclusive congressional control would cause an addi-
tional problem of delay. The time-consuming legislative process might
be ill-equipped to meet the need to make emergency withdrawals.
432
Wheatley therefore doubted that complete congressional control would
provide "a workable arrangement for the continued day-to-day adminis-
tration of the public lands.
'433
Severability Options Under FLPMA
A Summary of the Options
The legislative veto provisions can be stricken in several different
ways, ranging from invalidation of the entire statute to invalidation of
only the parts of the statute that contain the legislative vetoes. This sec-
tion analyzes which option available for FLPMA results in a statutory
scheme most consistent with congressional intent, "fully operative as a
427. H.R. REP. No. 1136, supra note 26, at 3-4, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FLPMA, supra note 23, at 433-34.
428. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982); see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra
note 23, at vi (statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson).
429. See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 2.
430. WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 494.
431. Id; see also id. at 514-16.




law," and containing a workable administrative mechanism for manag-
ing the public lands.
Two options are available to a court considering severability of
FLPMA.434 The first option is the invalidation of all sections containing
legislative veto mechanisms. The result would be the elimination of all
provisions relating to withdrawals, sales, and management decisions.
This option is rejected because it contravenes the administrative worka-
bility objective. Under a variant of this option, a court might choose to
strike the sections repealing previous statutory delegations of withdrawal
and sale authority to the executive. The variant is also rejected because it
would conflict with the modernization and limitation of power
objectives.
Under the second option, a court may invalidate the entire sub-sec-
tion in which a veto is contained, or delete only parts of the sentences
authorizing use of the veto mechanism. Separate consideration of each of
the Act's five vetoes is necessary because the identification of the most
appropriate sub-option depends upon the precise language and structure
of each section. This option will be referred to as the "selective invalida-
tion approach." The Article concludes that a court should use the selec-
tive invalidation approach and choose the sub-options which will result
in an allocation of power over the public lands that is closest to the one
Congress tried to create in FLPMA.
Option One. Invalidation of All Withdrawal Sale, and Management Decision
Authority
One option available to a court finding the FLPMA veto provisions
unconstitutional is to invalidate only the statutory sections containing
legislative veto mechanisms. 435 Under this option, sections 202-204 of
FLPMA would be stricken, thereby removing all of the statute's delega-
434. A third option available to a court is the invalidation of the entire statute. This op-
tion is inapplicable to FLPMA because the Act contains a severability clause and because
invalidation of all of FLPMA would be inconsistent with the centralization, modernization,
and limitation of power objectives described above. See infra note 435.
435. A court holding that the veto provisions are unconstitutional could find them insever-
able from the rest of FLPMA and invalidate the entire statute. It is almost inconceivable that
any court would reach this result, since FLPMA contains a severability clause very similar to
the one addressed by the Court in Chadha. Section 707 of FLPMA provides that "[i]f any
provision of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and
the application thereof shall not be affected thereby." See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1982).
Given the presumption of severability created by this provision, a court should require compel-
ling evidence that Congress would not have enacted FLPMA without the veto provisions
before invalidating the entire statute. See supra note 395; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734
F.2d 797, 803-04 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that despite a reference in the statu-
tory purposes of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1982), to
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tions of authority to the executive to withdraw, sell, or make manage-
ment decisions concerning the public lands.436 Under this alternative,
the executive branch would have no authority to engage in withdrawals,
sales, or management decisions under FLPMA. The executive could not
act under the guise of the statutes in place before FLPMA's enactment
the statute's legislative veto mechanism, there is no "clear indication that the [Act] would not
have been passed without such vetoes").
The legislative history of FLPMA does not contain such evidence. In fact, invalidation of
the entire statute would contravene several of Congress' principal objectives in enacting
FLPMA. First, invalidation of the entire Act would frustrate Congress' attempt to centralize
in one statute all of the BLM's authority to administer the public lands. See supra notes 400-
11 & accompanying text. The legislative history provides no indication that Congress would
not have chosen to vest in the BLM general management authority, see 43 U.S.C. § 1732
(1982), had it known that some of the limitations placed on the more specific withdrawal, sale,
and management decision authority were unconstitutional. For similar reasons, the Supreme
Court in Chadha refused to invalidate the entire Immigration and Nationality Act. See supra
note 395 & accompanying text. It is even less likely that Congress would not have authorized
the executive to engage in range management activities, grant rights of way, and administer
desert conservation and wilderness areas, see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1782 (1982), merely because
legislative vetoes could not be attached to the largely unrelated authorizations in title II of
FLPMA. Cf Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J., dissent-
ing) (invalidation of the entire Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1982), on the
basis of the unconstitutionality of one legislative veto mechanism in that Act "would be pa-
tently ludicrous"); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 970 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing to invali-
date a section of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107
note (1982), authorizing the General Services Administration to enact and submit for congres-
sional review regulations ensuring public access to the papers and tape recordings compiled
during the Nixon Administration, because to do so would "gut the statute").
Second, striking down the entire statute would sharply conflict with Congress' desire to
modernize the BLM's statutory authority. See supra notes 412-13 & accompanying text. In-
validation of all of FLPMA, including the statute's repealing provisions, would appear to re-
vive the obsolete and fragmented laws that FLPMA was designed to eliminate. See, e.g., Frost
v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 526-27 (1928); Conlon v. Adamski, 77 F.2d 397, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1935); Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206, 215 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Weissinger v.
Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615, 625 (M.D. Ala. 1971); State v. Hunter, 387 So. 2d 1086, 1090 (La.
1980). Surely Congress would not have preferred to leave these laws in place merely because
certain limitations on the delegations of authority in title II could not be imposed.
Third, complete invalidation would be inconsistent with Congress' clearly-expressed in-
tent to limit the executive's discretionary authority over the public lands. See supra notes 414-
28 & accompanying text. Invalidation of FLPMA would eliminate the Act's various delega-
tions of power to the Secretary of the Interior. At the same time, however, the previous statu-
tory delegations would also be stricken. As a result, the earlier delegations, which Congress
considered excessively broad and standardless, see supra notes 414-17 & accompanying text,
would be revived. In particular, repeal of FLPMA in its entirety would revive all of the re-
pealed statutes authorizing executive withdrawals, as well as the President's implied authority
to make withdrawals, leaving executive branch discretion relatively unfettered. Invalidation of
FLPMA in its entirety would also revive the disposal laws repealed by the Act, see Pub. L. No.
94-579, § 703, 90 Stat. 2743, 2789-91 (1976), restoring to the executive authority to sell the
public lands which Congress deemed excessive. A more carefully tailored approach to the
severability issue would result in a much better reflection of congressional intent.
436. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712-1714 (1982).
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because the repeal of those statutes by sections 702-705 of FLPMA437
would be unaffected by striking sections 202-204. The only source of ex-
ecutive authority to sell or withdraw the public lands would be those few
statutes-for example, the Antiquities Act-not expressly repealed by
FLPMA.438 To a large extent, withdrawals and sales could only be made
by Congress through statutory enactment.
439
The simplicity of this option might make it judicially attractive. A
court would not have to parse the various subsections of sections 202-204
of FLPMA to determine which are sufficiently tied to the veto provisions
that they must also be struck down. Instead, sections 202-204 would be
erased with one stroke. At the same time, this alternative would avoid
the invalidation of provisions that grant unrelated authority to the Secre-
tary of the Interior and would therefore be less disruptive of the adminis-
trative mechanisms Congress wanted to establish than would striking
down the entire statute"0
The severance of sections 202-204 would not directly contravene
FLPMA's centralization, modernization, or limitation of power objec-
tives. The provisions of the Act granting to the executive branch author-
ity unrelated to the provisions containing legislative vetoes would remain
in effect. In addition, because the repealing sections would not be
stricken, a body of obsolete statutory law, that grants what Congress
considered to be excessively broad authority to make sales and withdraw-
als, would not be revived.
Nevertheless, implementation of this option might bring about a re-
sult Congress would not have embraced. Although Congress believed
that pre-FLPMA delegations were excessively broad, the legislative his-
tory indicates that it did not want to burden itself with the task of mak-
ing all withdrawal and sale decisions. 4 1 Thus, the severance of sections
437. These provisions dealt with statutes concerning homesteading and small tracts,
disposals, withdrawals, and administration of the public lands. Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 702-
705, 90 Stat. 2743, 2787-93 (1976).
438. See supra note 422. If the President has inherent constitutional authority to make
withdrawals, he could still make withdrawals pursuant to that authority. See supra notes 75-
80 & accompanying text. The President could not, however, invoke any implied withdrawal
authority under the Midwest Oil doctrine. See Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743,
2792 (1976) (repealing such authority).
439. Congress would be free to delegate withdrawal or sale authority to the executive in
newly enacted statutes. In addition, congressional failure to object to any nonstatutory with-
drawals by the executive might give rise to a new implied withdrawal power pursuant to the
Midwest Oil doctrine. See supra notes 87-95 & accompanying text.
440. See supra note 435 & accompanying text; see also infra notes 443-46 & accompanying
text.
441. See supra notes 429-33 & accompanying text.
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202-204 should be rejected because it would leave in place an "adminis-
trative mechanism" that is not "workable."
44 2
If the court viewed the delegations in sections 202-204 as replace-
ments for the authority previously delegated to the executive in the stat-
utes repealed by sections 702-705 of FLPMA, 44 3 a court conceivably
might strike these repealing sections to retain a workable administrative
mechanism.44 As a result, the Secretary of the Interior would have no
authority under FLPMA to undertake any of the activities to which the
congressional veto mechanisms applied. Rather, the executive branch
would have whatever authority it had been delegated prior to the enact-
ment of FLPMA. 445
Invalidation of the repeal provisions, however, would revive the ob-
solete, scattered, and overly broad delegations of authority in the areas of
withdrawals and disposals that FLPMA was designed to eliminate.44 6
Thus, the use of this severability option would be inconsistent with the
modernization and limitation of power objectives of FLPMA. A court
should not adopt this approach.
Option Two: Selective Invalidation of Parts of Sections Containing Withdrawal,
Sale, and Management Decision Authority
The second severability option involves selective invalidation of
those subsections, or even parts of those subsections, of FLPMA that
contain legislative vetoes. Although this technique involves a much more
difficult task of line-drawing than the other options, the courts in both
Chadha and CECA engaged in just such an approach. 447 This selective
442. Cf. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76, where the Court stated that although Congress
was reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such reluctance was
insufficient to overcome the presumption of severability. The burden that would have been
imposed on Congress by judicial invalidation of all of the Attorney General's authority to
suspend deportations impelled the Court to save the substantive grant of authority to suspend
deportations under §§ 244(a)(1) and 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, even
though the legislative veto over that authority in § 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional. See infra
note 447.
443. See supra note 437.
444. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1163, supra note 26, at 29, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF FLPMA, supra note 23, at 459 ("FLPMA substitutes [for repealed statutes] a general
grant of authority to Secretary of the Interior to make and modify withdrawals subject to
certain procedural requirements.").
445. See cases cited supra note 435.
446. See supra notes 412-28 & accompanying text.
447. In Chadha, the Court invalidated § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982), but left intact §§ 244(a)(1) and 244(c)(1), authorizing the
Attorney General to suspend deportations. See 103 S. Ct. at 2788. In CECA, the court sev-
ered § 202(c) of the NGPA, but left in effect § 202(a), (b), authorizing the FERC to issue the
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invalidation approach requires a careful, line-by-line analysis of the vari-
ous statutory provisions related to the delegated authority subject to con-
gressional veto. Despite the difficulty of implementing this option, it is
preferable to other options because, with respect to each of the FLPMA
veto provisions, it would result in an allocation of authority more consis-
tent with what Congress would have wanted had it known the legislative
vetoes were unlawful. The resulting statutory provisions would also be





Under the selective invalidation approach, a court invalidating
FLPMA's legislative veto over large-tract withdrawals 449 would have at
least three different sub-options. Under the first of these, the Secretary
would only be able to make withdrawals of tracts of less than five thou-
sand acres (small-tract withdrawals). Under the second sub-option, the
Secretary would be authorized to make both small- and large-tract with-
drawals, neither of which would be subject to any formal congressional
review process. Under the third sub-option, the Secretary could make
both small- and large-tract withdrawals, but would be required to notify
Congress within a specified time after the effective date of a large-tract
withdrawal. This Article contends that a court should choose the first of
these as most consistent with congressional intent.
The first sub-option is to invalidate all of section 204(c). The provi-
sions authorizing a legislative veto of large-tract withdrawals are con-
tained in section 204(c)(1). 450 If all of section 204(c) were severed, the
Act would still contain a general grant of authority to make withdrawals
under section 204(a). 45' The question is whether that authority would
extend to large-tract withdrawals.
After severance of section 204(c), section 204(a) could be inter-
Phase II incremental pricing rules. See 673 F.2d at 441; see also Allen v. Carmen, 578 F.
Supp. 951, 970 (D.D.C. 1983).
448. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
449. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1982).
450. Id.
451. Section 204(a) provides:
On and after the effective date of this Act the Secretary is authorized to make, mod-
ify, extend, or revoke withdrawals but only in accordance with the provisions and
limitations of this section. The Secretary may delegate this withdrawal authority
only to individuals in the Office of the Secretary who have been appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Id. § 1714(a).
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preted in one of two ways. First, the general grant of withdrawal author-
ity in section 204(a) could be interpreted as authorizing the Secretary to
make withdrawals, regardless of their size, without the threat of a con-
gressional veto. Alternatively, the Secretary's withdrawal authority
under section 204(a) could be construed as limited to small-tract with-
drawals. The latter interpretation would be premised upon the require-
ment in section 204(a) that the Secretary make withdrawals "only in
accordance with the provisions and limitations of this section [i.e., sec-
tion 204]." Section 204(d), which would not be stricken from the Act,
explicitly authorizes the Secretary to make small-tract withdrawals, sub-
ject to the restraints on duration contained in that subsection. 452 But
section 204(c), which contains the only express grant of authority to
make large-tract withdrawals, would have been stricken from the statute.
Therefore, absent any express statutory authority to make large-tract
withdrawals, such withdrawals would not be "in accordance with the
provisions and limitations"4 53 of section 204(a) and would be beyond the
scope of the Secretary's authority. This more restrictive interpretation of
the general grant of withdrawal authority in section 204(a) is more con-
sistent with Congress' desire to limit the executive's ability to make
withdrawals.
454
If this restrictive interpretation were adopted, severance of section
204(c) would leave intact a "workable administrative mechanism." The
Secretary could make withdrawals, but only of small tracts and only in
accordance with the durational restraints in section 204(d). Large-tract
withdrawals would have to be made by Congress. The administrative
burden on Congress would not be great, because large-tract withdrawals
are relatively rare.
Two other possibilities should be considered with respect to the veto
of large-tract withdrawals contained in section 204(c)(1). Under the sec-
ond sub-option, a court could strike only the provisions of section
452. Section 204(d) provides:
A withdrawal aggregating less than five thousand acres may be made under this sub-
section by the Secretary on his own motion or upon request by a department or an
agency head-
(1) for such period of time as he deems desirable for a resource use; or
(2) for a period of not more than twenty years for any other use, including but not
limited to use for administrative sites, location of facilities, and other proprietary
purposes; or
(3) for a period of not more than five years to preserve such tract for a specific use
then under consideration by the Congress.
Id. § 1714(d).
453. Id. § 1714(a) (emphasis added).
454. See supra notes 418-23 & accompanying text.
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204(c)(1), beginning with the second sentence, that actually describe the
veto procedures.4 55 Severance in this manner would permit the Secretary
to make not only small-tract withdrawals under section 204(d), but also
large-tract withdrawals under the first sentence of section 204(c)(1).
These large-tract withdrawals would no longer be subject to any proce-
dural constraints. 456 Although the result would be an "operative law," it
would be inconsistent with Congress' desire to limit executive discretion
in making withdrawals.4 57 It is therefore an inferior choice to severance
of all of section 204(c).
458
A court could also strike only the provisions of section 204(c)(1)
following the requirement that the Secretary provide notice to Congress
of large-tract withdrawals. 459 If the third sub-option were adopted, the
Secretary could still make a large-tract withdrawal, but would be obliged
455. Section 204(c)(1) provides in part:
On and after the dates of approval of this Act a withdrawal aggregating five thousand
acres or more may be made (or such a withdrawal or any other withdrawal involving
in the aggregate five thousand acres or more which terminates after such date of
approval may be extended) only for a period of not more than twenty years by the
Secretary on his own motion or upon request by a department or agency head. The
Secretary shall notify both Houses of Congress of such a withdrawal no later than its
effective date and the withdrawal shall terminate and become ineffective at the end of
ninety days (not counting days on which the Senate or the House of Representatives
has adjourned for more than three consecutive days) beginning on the day notice of
such withdrawal has been submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives,
if the Congress has adopted a concurrent resolution stating that such House does not
approve the withdrawal.
43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1982).
456. Section 204(c)(2), which describes the contents of the notice submitted by the Secre-
tary to Congress when he makes a large-tract withdrawal, would probably also be stricken
since the Secretary's obligation to supply the notice is contained in the second sentence of
§ 204(c)(1), which will have been severed.
457. See supra notes 418-23 & accompanying text.
458. See McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1011 (1978) (when questioned clause restricts a power granted by legislature, case against
severance is strong); see also EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984). Since
the second and following sentences of § 204(c)(1) of FLPMA restrict the Secretary's authority
to make withdrawals of 5,000 or more acres, these portions of § 204(c)(1) should not be sev-
ered from the first sentence, which delegates to the Secretary the power to make large-tract
withdrawals. Section 204(c) should fall in its entirety. But see CECA, 673 F.2d at 445 n.70
(declining to adopt as a general rule the proposition that the case against severance is strong
where the provision restricts a grant of power); Chadha Decision Hearings, supra note 355, at
54 (Chadha demonstrates that the Court will find a legislative veto provision severable "even
when the statute's legislative history reflects Congressional unwillingness to grant the Execu-
tive authority without such a provision").
459. Everything in § 204(c)(1) after the following language would be stricken: "The Sec-
retary shall notify both Houses of Congress of such a withdrawal no later than its effective date
." See supra note 455.
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to notify Congress no later than its effective date.460 Congress could then
enact legislation overturning the withdrawal.
46 1
This choice is somewhat less troublesome than the second sub-op-
tion because Congress would at least retain a formal oversight mecha-
nism permitting it to review large-tract withdrawals by the Secretary.
Although Congress could not veto such withdrawals, it could reverse
them by legislation. While this result is surely more consistent with Con-
gress' desire to limit executive withdrawals than the result of the second
sub-option, the constraints imposed by a notice requirement would not
be significant. Unlike a report-and-wait requirement, a simple reporting
mechanism would permit the Secretary's action to take effect immedi-
ately, subject to reversal only upon the enactment of legislation. Con-
gress enacted FLPMA because it felt that this "oversight" mechanism,
which it always had, was insufficient and left the executive with too much
discretion to make withdrawals. Thus, this sub-option is less consistent
with the thrust of FLPMA than the first, which limits the Secretary to
small-tract withdrawals. In addition, to effectuate the third sub-option, a
court would have to sever section 204(c)(1) in the middle of a sentence. A
court might be more reluctant to engage in this type of statutory "re-
drafting" than to strike all of section 204(c) from the statute.
462
To summarize, the first sub-option-removal of all of section 204(c)
from the statute-seems closest to the scheme Congress itself would have
chosen had it known that the legislative veto was invalid. The Secretary
of the Interior's authority to make withdrawals under FLPMA would be
limited to tracts of less than five thousand acres. This result also would
be consistent with the administrative workability objective, under which
Congress sought to avoid excessively narrow statutory delegations.
463
460. Under this sub-option, the notice provisions of § 204(c)(2) would remain, since those
provisions would describe the contents of the notice still required under the remaining parts of
§ 204(c)(1).
461. The Chadha Court accepted that its decision had this effect: "Congress' oversight of
the exercise of [the] delegated authority is preserved since all . . . suspensions will continue to
be reported to it under § 244(c)(1)." 103 S. Ct. at 2775; see also id. at 2776 n.9; Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984) (after severance of the legislative
veto, statute resembled report-and-wait procedures specifically approved in Chadha); Atkins v.
United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.2, 1086 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J., dissenting); Allen v.
Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 971 (D.D.C. 1983).
462. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
where the court reversed a district court decision severing a provision in mid-sentence rather
than striking a complete section of an act. The court of appeals stated, "[i]n the absence of
indicators that Congress would have opted for [a mid-sentence severance], we conclude that
the proviso is not divisible." Id. at 307 n.5. But see Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028,
1034 n.2, 1086-88 (Ct. C1. 1977) (Skelton, J., dissenting).
463. See supra text accompanying note 431.
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The burden of making numerous, less important withdrawals would not
be shifted to Congress. Only the larger, more significant withdrawals
would have to emanate from the legislature.
464
-Management Decisions
Under the selective invalidation approach, severance of the legisla-
tive veto pertaining to large-tract management decisions could be accom-
plished in at least two ways. The introductory language of section 202(e)
authorizes the Secretary to "issue management decisions to implement
land use plans" developed by the Secretary.465 This authority would not
be affected by the deletion of all of section 202(e)(2), the subsection con-
taining the legislative veto of large-tract management decisions. The re-
maining general grant of authority would encompass both small- and
large-tract management decisions, neither of which would be subject to
any congressional notice or other oversight requirements. The Secre-
tary's ability to make management decisions would not be without con-
straints, however, since land use plans, which are implemented by
management decisions, must be developed in accordance with a series of
statutory guidelines.4
66
Alternatively, a court could retain the first sentence of section
202(e)(2). 467 Under this approach, the Secretary would have to report to
464. This approach is consistent with prior cases. See, e.g., CECA, 673 F.2d at 443-44
(legislative history indicates that Congress considered incremental pricing a desirable policy;
therefore, severance of only § 202(c), which left in place the FERC's authority to implement
Phase II under § 202(a), (b), is consistent with the result Congress would have reached had it
known § 202(c) was unconstitutional); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 971 (D.D.C. 1983)
(section 104(a) of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1982), authorizing GSA to enact regulations to ensure public access to presiden-
tial papers and other materials, should not be invalidated along with § 104(b), which contains
an invalid legislative veto, since § 104(a) "still provides a viable framework for the Administra-
tor to promulgate new regulations").
465. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (1982). Under § 202(e)(1),
[s]uch decisions, including but not limited to exclusions (that is, total elimination) of
one or more of the principal or major uses made by a management decision shall
remain subject to reconsideration, modification, and termination through revision by
the Secretary or his delegate, under the provisions of this section, of the land use plan
involved.
Id. § 1712(e)(1).
466. See id. § 1712(c); supra note 242.
467. Section 202(e)(2) provides in part:
Any management decision or action pursuant to a management decision that ex-
cludes (that is, totally eliminates) one or more of the principal or major uses for two
or more years with respect to a tract of land of one hundred thousand acres or more
shall be reported by the Secretary to the House of Representatives and the Senate. If
within ninety days from the giving of such notice (exclusive of days on which either
House has adjourned for more than three consecutive days), the Congress adopts a
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Congress any large-tract management decision that would eliminate one
or more principal or major uses. 468 The decision would still take effect
immediately and could be reversed only through the enactment of
legislation.
Under either of these sub-options, the provisions remaining after
severance would be "fully operative as a law." The second sub-option
provides a slightly greater degree of congressional oversight and is there-
fore somewhat more consistent with congressional desire to restrain the




The selective invalidation approach can be implemented in three dif-
ferent ways with respect to the legislative veto of a decision by the Secre-
tary to terminate a withdrawal. First, section 204(1 )(2), the subsection
containing the legislative veto, could be stricken in its entirety. This sub-
option would probably totally eliminate the Secretary's power to termi-
nate withdrawals. The other two sub-options involve invalidation of only
parts of section 204(1 )(2). Under the second sub-option, the Secretary
could recommend terminations, but Congress would have to enact legis-
lation to terminate a withdrawal. The third sub-option would permit the
Secretary unilaterally to terminate withdrawals except where specifically
prohibited by other provisions of the Act. The first two sub-options are
far more consistent with the legislative objectives of FLPMA than is the
third.
Section 204(1 )(1) of FLPMA authorizes the Secretary to review var-
ious withdrawals in existence when FLPMA was enacted. 470 Under sec-
tion 204(/)(2), the Secretary can terminate a withdrawal unless Congress
vetoes such a termination by concurrent resolution. 47' If all of section
204(1 )(2) were severed from the rest of the Act, the Secretary would
retain the power to "revoke withdrawals" under the general grant of au-
concurrent resolution of nonapproval of the management decision or action, then the
management decision or action shall be promptly terminated by the Secretary.
Id. § 1712(e)(2).
468. Id.
469. See supra notes 414-17 & accompanying text. Since management decisions can in-
clude withdrawals under § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(3) (1982), Congress' desire to prevent
unbridled executive withdrawals would also be relevant. See supra notes 418-23 & accompa-
nying text.
470. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1 )(1) (1982); see supra notes 247-48 & accompanying text.
471. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(1 )(2) (1982). The Secretary may not terminate withdrawals made
by Act of Congress. Id.
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thority in section 204(a).472 This remaining general grant of authority
would raise a question of interpretation similar to that raised by the sev-
erance of the veto concerning large-tract withdrawals. 473 The general
grant of revocation authority in section 204(a) could be construed as au-
thorizing the Secretary to revoke withdrawals, regardless of their size,
without threat of a congressional veto, as that veto will have been
stricken from the statute. On the other hand, section 204(a) could be
construed as prohibiting revocations by the Secretary under any circum-
stances. Section 204(a) limits the Secretary to revocations made "in ac-
cordance with the provisions and limitations of this section [i.e., section
204]."474 Once the court removed section 204(/)(2), the only "provisions
and limitations" concerning revocation or termination of withdrawals re-
maining in FLPMA would be the express prohibitions on terminations
contained in section 204(j). 4 7 5 Because the statute would no longer con-
tain any affirmative delegation of authority to terminate withdrawals, the
Secretary arguably would be precluded from making any terminations.
Given Congress' limitation of power objectives,476 this latter interpreta-
tion of section 204(a)'s general grant of revocation authority is preferable
to the former interpretation, which would vest broad revocation author-
ity in the Secretary.47
7
The second sub-option is to leave the first three sentences of section
204(1 )(2) in place, striking only those subsequent sentences describing
the legislative veto procedures.478 As a result, the Secretary could rec-
472. Id. § 1714(a); see supra note 451.
473. See supra notes 451-54 & accompanying text.
474. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (1982); see supra note 451.
475. Section 2040) prohibits revocation by the Secretary of withdrawals created by act of
Congress or those concerning national monuments or wildlife refuges. 43 U.S.C. ,§ 17140)
(1982).
476. See supra notes 414-23 & accompanying text.
477. The more restrictive interpretation of § 204(a) arguably would render that provision's
reference to revocation authority meaningless, since the Secretary would no longer have such
authority. The reference to revocation authority was not meaningless, however, when Con-
gress enacted FLPMA, since the Secretary could terminate withdrawals subject to congres-
sional veto. If a court has a choice between interpreting a severed statute in such a way as to
render some of its provisions meaningless or interpreting it in a way that contravenes congres-
sional intent, the court should choose the former. The object of the severance process is to
leave in place a "fully operative" statute that is consistent with the one Congress would have
enacted if it had known the legislative veto provisions were invalid. See supra notes 379-85 &
accompanying text.
478. Section 204(1 )(2) provides in part:
In the review required by paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Secretary shall deter-
mine whether, and for how long, the continuation of the existing withdrawal of the
lands would be, in his judgment, consistent with the statutory objectives of the pro-
grams for which the lands were dedicated and of the other relevant programs. The
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ommend terminations to the President, who would submit his and the
Secretary's recommendations to Congress. 479  The executive branch
could not unilaterally implement any such terminations.480 The third
sub-option is to preserve the first part of the fourth sentence of section
204(l )(2),481 leaving the Secretary the power to terminate withdrawals,
which Congress could reverse only by enacting new legislation. 48 2
All three of these sub-options would leave in place a "workable ad-
ministrative mechanism." The third sub-option, however, which would
permit the Secretary to terminate all withdrawals except where specifi-
cally prohibited by statute, seems inconsistent with the result Congress
probably would have preferred if it had known the legislative veto provi-
sions were invalid. Congress' use of a prevention veto in connection with
the termination of withdrawals 483 shows that Congress wanted to insure
itself the opportunity to prevent any irreversible changes in the character
of the land between the time the Secretary decides to terminate a with-
drawal and the time Congress is able to review the Secretary's deci-
sion.484 Implementation of the third sub-option would directly conflict
with this objective. The legislative history consistently reflects Congress'
desire to limit, not to expand, executive authority over the public
lands.
485
Secretary shall report his recommendations to the President, together with state-
ments of concurrence or nonconcurrence submitted by the heads of the departments
or agencies which administer the lands. The President shall transmit this report to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, together
with his recommendations for action by the Secretary, or for legislation. The Secre-
tary may act to terminate withdrawals other than those made by Act of the Congress
in accordance with the recommendations of the President unless before the end of
ninety days (not counting days on which the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives has adjourned for more than three consecutive days) beginning on the day the
report of the President has been submitted to the Senate and the House of Represent-
atives the Congress has adopted a concurrent resolution indicating otherwise.
43 U.S.C. § 1714(l )(2) (1982).
479. The Secretary and the President presumably could transmit such recommendations
to Congress even without express statutory authority to do so. Thus, the second sub-option
allocates the power to terminate withdrawals in precisely the same manner as the first sub-
option does.
480. See supra notes 473-77 & accompanying text.
481. The fourth sentence of § 204(1 )(2) would read as follows after severance: "The Sec-
retary may act to terminate withdrawals other than those made by Act of the Congress in
accordance with the recommendations of the President." See supra note 478.
482. The only withdrawals that the Secretary could not terminate would be those de-
scribed in § 204(j). See supra note 475.
483. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(l )(2) (1982).
484. See supra text accompanying and following note 253.
485. See supra notes 414-17 & accompanying text. That objective is also reflected in
§ 204(j), which prohibits the Secretary from revoking certain withdrawals. See 43 U.S.C.
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Accordingly, Congress probably would have preferred judicial
adoption of either the first or second sub-options for severing section
204(1 )(2).486 Adoption of either approach will prevent the Secretary
from unilaterally terminating withdrawals.
-Sales
Under the selective invalidation approach, the legislative veto in sec-
tion 203(c), relating to large-tract sales, could be severed in one of two
ways. The first sub-option would permit the Secretary to make sales of
tracts of all sizes without prior congressional approval. Under the sec-
ond sub-option, the Secretary's authority with respect to large-tract sales
would be limited to proposing such sales and implementing them only
after expiration of a congressional report-and-wait period. The second
sub-option is the choice that is most consistent with congressional
objectives.
The first sub-option would be to eliminate all of section 203(c). The
Secretary could still make sales under the general grant of sale authority
in section 203(a).487 The Secretary's authority would encompass both
§ 1714() (1982); supra note 475. Of course, one could make an argument to the contrary. The
inclusion of the specific prohibitions on terminations in § 2040) indicates that Congress was
less concerned about other kinds of terminations. Thus, Secretarial termination without con-
gressional review under § 204(1 )(2) would not unduly interfere with congressional objectives.
See also WHEATLEY STUDY, supra note 48, at 494 (suggesting that Congress would be unduly
burdened if exclusive authority to terminate withdrawals were vested in Congress).
In addition, a termination of withdrawal could open up land to mineral disposition by
private parties. Congressional desire to limit the executive's authority to dispose of the public
lands, therefore, also supports rejection of the third option for severing § 204(/)(2). See supra
notes 424-28 & accompanying text; cf. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982) (setting forth basic statu-
tory policy of retention of public lands).
486. Adoption of the third sub-option would require severing the provisions of § 204()(2)
in the middle of the fourth sentence. See supra note 478. This might add to a court's reluc-
tance to adopt this approach. See supra note 462.
487. Section 203(a) provides that:
A tract of the public lands. . . may be sold under this Act where, as a result of land
use planning required under section 202 of this Act, the Secretary determines that
the sale of such tract meets the following disposal criteria:
(1) such tract because of its location or other characteristics is difficult and uneco-
nomic to manage as part of the public lands, and is not suitable for management by
another Federal department or agency; or
(2) such tract was acquired for a specific purpose and the tract is no longer required
for that or any other Federal purpose; or
(3) disposal of such tract will serve important public objectives, including but not
limited to, expansion of communities and economic development, which cannot be
achieved prudently or feasibly on land other than public land and which outweigh
other public objectives and values, including, but not limited to, recreation and scenic
values, which would be served by maintaining such tract in Federal ownership.
43 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1982).
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large and small tracts. Although the Secretary would have to determine
before the sale that it met the statute's disposal criteria,4 88 the sale would
take effect without prior congressional notification or approval.
The second sub-option is to remove only a part of section 203(c), so
that the Secretary would have to notify Congress of his intention to make
large-tract sales.4 89 Such a sale could not proceed until the end of the
ninety-day congressional review period. Congress could prevent the sale,
but only by enacting new legislation, rather than through adoption of a
concurrent resolution of disapproval. In effect, section 203(c) would be
transformed from an unconstitutional legislative veto provision to a valid
report-and-wait mechanism.
490
Both sub-options would leave in place a "workable administrative
mechanism." The second sub-option is probably more consistent with
the scheme Congress would have preferred had it known the legislative
veto was invalid. By use of a prevention veto prohibiting large-tract sales
from going into effect until the end of the legislative review period, Con-
gress intended to assure itself the opportunity to stop any proposed sales
with which it disagreed.4 91 Implementation of the first sub-option, by
eliminating the notification requirement, would frustrate this intent. The
second sub-option is less destructive of the legislative intent in this re-
gard, perhaps providing some mechanism for faciliating congressional
limitation of executive branch discretion. Finally, retention of a report-
and-wait procedure is more consistent with the general retention policy
of FLPMA.
492
The Committee-Directive Veto and Emergency Withdrawals
The committee-initiated emergency-withdrawal provisions of sec-
488. See id. The other procedural requirements of § 203 would also still apply. See supra
note 263.
489. Section 203(c) provides in part:
Where a tract of public lands in excess of two thousand five hundred acres has been
designated for sale, such sale may be made only after the end of the ninety days (not
counting days on which the House of Representatives or the Senate has adjourned
for more than three consecutive days) beginning on the day the Secretary has submit-
ted notice of such designation to the Senate and the House of Representatives, and
then only if the Congress has not adopted a concurrent resolution stating that such
House does not approve of such designation.
43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1982). Pursuant to the second sub-option, only the last clause (beginning
with the words "and then only if") of the last sentence of § 203(c) would be deleted.
490. See supra notes 274, 461.
491. See supra note 267.
492. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982). A court might nevertheless be reluctant to adopt
the second sub-option since it would require severance of § 203(c) in the middle of a sentence.
See supra note 462.
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tion 204(e) of FLPMA could be severed from the rest of the statute in at
least two ways under the selective invalidation approach. The first sub-
option, which would eliminate all of the Secretary's emergency-with-
drawal authority, might prevent withdrawals from taking place quickly
enough to prevent irreparable damage to the land in emergency situa-
tions. In that sense, this option would not leave a "workable administra-
tive mechanism" and should be rejected. The second sub-option, which
would permit the Secretary, without congressional urging, to make an
emergency withdrawal for a limited period of time, is preferable.
If a court struck down section 204(e), the Act would contain no
express delegation of authority to make emergency withdrawals, This
result might conflict with the scheme Congress would have preferred if it
had known that the committee-initiated veto was unconstitutional. As
Charles Wheatley noted, the process for enacting legislation may be too
slow and cumbersome to implement an emergency withdrawal quickly
enough to provide adequate protection for a tract being endangered by
mineral exploitation or other use.493 Section 204(e) of FLPMA seems to
reflect Congress' recognition that it would have to sacrifice some control
over the public lands in order to permit immediate withdrawal action in
emergency situations.
494
As a second sub-option, a court could remove from section 204(e)
only those provisions authorizing a committee of one house to mandate
emergency withdrawals by the Secretary, but leave in place the Secre-
tary's authority to make unilateral emergency withdrawals. 495 Such
493. See supra notes 430-31 & accompanying text.
494. See Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L.
REv. 439, 448 (1981).
A court could avoid the elimination of all of the Secretary's emergency-withdrawal au-
thority by construing the general grant of withdrawal authority in § 204(a), which would re-
main after invalidation of both § 204(c) and § 204(e), to encompass emergency withdrawals.
See supra note 45 1. Such an interpretation of § 204(a), however, would be troublesome. If the
court followed the analysis set forth above in connection with option one to the severance of
§ 204(c), then the Secretary's emergency-withdrawal authority would be limited to small
tracts. See supra notes 450-54 & accompanying text. But Congress would probably be more,
not less, concerned about irreparable damage to large tracts. Alternatively, a court could con-
strue § 204(a) as granting unlimited authority to the Secretary to make emergency withdraw-
als. This result seems less consistent with Congress' limitation of power objectives than does
the second sub-option discussed below. See infra notes 495-500 & accompanying text.
495. Section 204(e) provides:
When the Secretary determines, or when the Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs of either the House of Representatives or the Senate [Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources] notifies the Secretary, that an emergency situation exists and
that extraordinary measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise
be lost, the Secretary notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c)(1) and (d) of
this section, shall immediately make a withdrawal and file notice of such emergency
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withdrawals would be limited in duration to a maximum of three years
and the Secretary would be required to provide detailed notice concern-
ing the withdrawals to the appropriate congressional committees. 496 The
Secretary's decision to make an emergency withdrawal could then be re-
versed through the enactment of legislation.
The second sub-option has several advantages. Although congres-
sional restraints would not be as strong under the second sub-option as
Congress evidently desired when it enacted FLPMA, this option seems
more consistent with congressional intent than removing all of the Secre-
tary's emergency-withdrawal authority.497 It leaves in place an adminis-
trative mechanism that is more workable than what would result from
complete removal of executive authority to make emergency withdraw-
als498 and one whose constitutionality seems certain.499 Its principal dis-
advantage is that it would require a court to delete language from the
middle of a sentence. Such judicial intrusion seems less objectionable,
however, than wholesale elimination of the Secretary's emergency-with-
drawal authority. 5°°
Conclusion
Over the past half century, Congress has resorted frequently to the
legislative veto as a means of controlling executive branch discretion.
Because Chadha probably tolls the death knell for some, if not all, of
those vetoes, either Congress or the courts must reformulate the statutes.
Congress could act by reformulating the legislative veto provisions as re-
port-and-wait requirements. In the case of FLPMA, Congress could
thus avoid the burden of day-to-day administration of the public lands
and retain the ability to prevent executive actions from going into effect
withdrawal with the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs of the Senate [Sen-
ate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources] and the House of Representatives.
Such emergency withdrawal shall be effective when made but shall last only for a
period not to exceed three years and may not be extended except under the provi-
sions of subsection (c)(1) or (d) of this section, whichever is applicable, and (b)(1) of
this section. The information required in subsection (c)(2) of this subsection shall be
furnished the committees within three months after filing such notice.
43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982) (emphasis added). The second sub-option would be accomplished
by deleting the emphasized language.
496. Id. § 1714(e), (c)(2).
497. Cf. authorities cited supra notes 442, 458.
498. See supra notes 493-94 & accompanying text.
499. See supra note 274 & accompanying text.
500. Cf. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.2, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (Skelton, J.,
dissenting) (favoring removal of one part of a sentence).
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by enacting legislation. 501
If Congress does not act first, the courts will have to address the
kinds of severability issues raised by the legislative veto provisions of
FLPMA. Severance of a legislative veto will necessarily alter the alloca-
tion of power that Congress envisioned when it enacted the statute. The
character and extent of that shift in the balance of power, however, will
depend on how the unconstitutional vetoes are severed. The court's pri-
mary tool in resolving severability issues will be the statute's legislative
history. Unfortunately, if Congress has not considered the possibility of
the veto's unconstitutionality, the courts will be seeking answers to ques-
tions the legislature never asked.
Due to the widespread use of severability clauses and the accompa-
nying presumption of severability, invalidation of the entire statute will
probably be rare. Courts may be tempted, however, to delete entire parts
or sections of a statute containing legislative vetoes, in order to avoid a
detailed line-by-line analysis and redrafting process. Although this tech-
nique may be attractive to courts reluctant to infringe upon the preroga-
tives of the legislature, it should not be used indiscriminately. Excision of
the substantive delegations to which the legislative vetoes relate may seri-
ously disrupt ongoing administrative programs until Congress has the
opportunity to consider reenacting the statute without the legislative veto
provisions. The issue the courts must face is whether Congress would
have preferred not to delegate any of the authority granted in the original
statute if that authority could not be controlled through the exercise of a
legislative veto.
02
The severability options presented by FLPMA's veto provisions in-
dicate that a court may be able to avoid the extremes of leaving unre-
strained authority in the executive and eliminating the delegated
authority altogether. By a careful deletion of the legislative veto provi-
sions and some of the statutory provisions to which the vetoes are di-
rectly related, a court can leave in place a statutory mechanism which
501. But see DeConcini & Faucher, supra note 133, at 56 (contending that the report-and-
wait mechanism is an insufficient method for controlling executive branch discretion); Levitas
& Brand, supra note 133, at 804-05 (same, suggesting adoption of a constitutional amendment
authorizing use of a legislative veto). Various alternatives to the legislative veto for congres-
sional oversight are discussed in R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.5.2 (to be published in 1985) (copy of manuscript on file with
author); Bolton & Abrams, supra note 133, at 315-39; DeConcini & Faucher, supra note 133,
at 53-58; Elliott, supra note 133, at 156-60; Kaiser, supra note 133; Levitas & Brand, supra
note 133, at 803-07; Tribe, supra note 133, at 18-21.
502. See Severability Note, supra note 133, at 1182, 1193-95 (emphasizing the need to
maintain administrative stability).
September 1984] LEGISLATIVE VETO: SEVERABILITY
includes congressional oversight techniques and controls that approxi-
mate those Congress initially intended to create.
In the case of FLPMA, that result can be assisted by a narrow inter-
pretation of several ambiguous statutory delegations remaining after sev-
erance of the vetoes. Narrowly construing the authority retained by the
agency seems appropriate in a statute enacted in large part to impose
restraints on an executive branch which, in the legislature's view, had
improperly taken control of public lands policy-making. 50 3  The proper
approach to severability might differ had Congress enacted a veto in a
separate statute, years after making the initial delegation of substantive
authority, 5° rather than, as it did in FLPMA, including the vetoes with
the initial statutory delegation. In the former case there might be less
justification for a narrow interpretation of authority initially granted. It
is also worthwhile noting that the court's approach to severability issues
might be different if it were determined that the executive branch had
inherent constitutional authority of its own in the area Congress tried to
control by use of a legislative veto.
A court facing severability issues might be reluctant to engage in the
type of selective invalidation suggested by this Article for fear of over-
stepping its constitutional bounds. The court's reliance on the legislative
history to determine which provisions should be severed and how to con-
strue those provisions remaining after severance seems similar, however,
to the method by which courts traditionally have resolved issues of statu-
tory ambiguity. Neither process may amount to the inappropriate judi-
cial exercise of legislative authority. 50 5  Moreover, if the court
misconstrues the legislature's intent, Congress is free to enact new legis-
lation to broaden or to narrow the scope of the affected agency's powers.
503. Professor Tribe endorses the use of a statute's legislative history to interpret the
meaning of the statute remaining after severance, although he objects strongly to the intent-
based inquiry by the courts into what statute Congress would have enacted had it known that
the legislative veto provisions were unlawful. See Tribe, supra note 133, at 26-27 n.118.
504. Such was the case with the veto invalidated in the Consumers Union decision. The
veto was added to pre-existing authority of the FTC by the Federal Trade Commission Im-
provements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21, 94 Stat. 374, 393-96. The court invalidated
only the amendment authorizing a legislative veto of FTC rules, leaving unaffected the
agency's underlying substantive authority. See 691 F.2d at 576-78; cf EEOC v. Ingersoll-
Johnson Steel Co., 583 F. Supp. 983, 988-89 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (fact that Congress, in other acts,
had conferred on the president the power to reorganize the executive branch without retaining
a legislative veto supports the conclusion that the legislative veto provision in the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1977 is severable).
505. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, supra note 501, at § 3.5.1. But see Tribe,
supra note 133, at 21-27 (Professor Tribe contends that construing a severability clause as an
instruction to judges to act as if Congress enacted a veto-free law leads to the abandonment of
the safeguards of presentment and bicameralism. "[A] new law is created by judicial fiat.").
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